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ABSTRACT
MODEL-BASED GUIDANCE
FOR HUMAN-INTENSIVE PROCESSES
FEBRUARY 2015
STEFAN C. CHRISTOV
B.Sc., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor George S. Avrunin and Professor Lori A. Clarke
Human-intensive processes (HIPs), such as medical processes involving coordina-
tion among doctors, nurses, and other medical staff, often play a critical role in society.
We use the word “process” to refer to the coordination of activities to achieve a task
or a goal, where the activities may be performed by humans, devices, or software
systems. We say that a process is “human-intensive” if the contributions of human
process performers have a significant impact on the process outcomes and require
substantial domain expertise and insight. Despite considerable work and progress in
error reduction, human errors are still a major concern for many HIPs. For example,
human errors in medical HIPs constitute a large part of the preventable medical er-
rors estimated to cause the death of between 98,000 and 400,000 people each year in
the U.S.
To address this problem of human errors in HIPs, this thesis investigates two
approaches for online process guidance, i.e., for guiding process performers while a
vii
process is being executed. Both approaches rely on monitoring a process execution
and base the guidance they provide on a detailed formal process model that captures
the recommended ways to perform the corresponding HIP. The first approach, which
we call deviation detection and explanation, automatically detects when an execut-
ing HIP deviates from a set of recommended executions of that HIP, as specified by
the process model. Such deviations could represent errors and, thus, detecting and
reporting deviations as they occur could help catch errors before something bad hap-
pens. The approach also provides information to help explain a detected deviation to
assist process performers with identifying potential errors and with planning recovery
from these errors. The second approach, which we call process state visualization,
proactively guides process performers by showing them information relevant to the
current process execution, such as the activities that need to be performed at each
point of that process execution. The goal of the process state visualization approach
is to reduce the number of human errors.
The success of the online process guidance approaches presented in this work
depends on the correctness and the degree of completeness of the underlying process
model. If the process model is incorrect with respect to some set of requirements or it
is incomplete by not representing all the process executions that domain experts have
agreed should be captured in the model, then the online guidance may be incorrect
or there might not be enough information in the process model to provide guidance
in certain scenarios. Given the complexity of some HIPs, creating a correct and
sufficiently complete process model is challenging. This thesis investigates process
elicitation techniques to help create such process models and discusses an evaluation
of these techniques based on their application to real-world HIPs.
The major contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Compared the relative strengths and weaknesses of several techniques for pro-
cess elicitation and process model validation to help create correct and suffi-
viii
ciently complete process models needed for the proposed online process guidance
approaches.
• Developed an approach for deviation detection and explanation and evaluated
it with realistic process models and synthetic process executions with seeded
errors.
– Recognized delayed deviation detection as a potential obstacle for the ap-
proach and investigated its frequency and consequences.
• Developed an initial approach for visualization of process execution state and
demonstrated it on a medical case study.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Human-intensive processes (HIPs), such as medical processes involving coordi-
nation among doctors, nurses, and other medical staff, often play a critical role in
society. We use the word process to refer to the coordination of activities to achieve a
task or a goal, where the activities may be performed by humans, devices, or software
systems. We say that a process is human-intensive if the contributions of human
process performers have a significant impact on the process outcomes and require
substantial domain expertise and insight. Despite considerable work and progress in
error reduction, human errors are still a major concern for many HIPs. For example,
human errors in medical HIPs constitute a large part of the preventable medical er-
rors estimated to cause the death of 98,000 people each year in the U.S. [82]. More
than a decade after this estimate, a 2009 US National Research Council report [122]
indicates that the problem with errors still persists and that “it is widely recognized
that today’s health care . . . suffers substantially as a result of medical errors”. A
recent study [78] from 2013 reports an even higher estimate of deaths per year in the
U.S., between 210,000 and 400,000, due to medical errors.
To address this problem of human errors in HIPs, this thesis investigates two
approaches for online process guidance, i.e., for guiding process performers while a
process is being executed. Both approaches rely on monitoring a process execution
and base the guidance they provide on a detailed formal process model that captures
the recommended ways to perform the corresponding HIP. The first approach, which
we call deviation detection and explanation, automatically detects when an execut-
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ing HIP deviates from a set of recommended executions of that HIP, as specified by
the process model. Such deviations could represent errors and, thus, detecting and
reporting deviations as they occur could help catch errors before something bad hap-
pens. The approach also provides information to help explain a detected deviation to
assist process performers with identifying potential errors and with planning recovery
from these errors. The second approach, which we call process state visualization,
proactively guides process performers by showing them information relevant to the
current process execution, such as the activities that need to be performed at each
point of that process execution. The goal of the process state visualization approach
is to reduce the number of human errors.
We use the widely-adopted definition of error : “failure of a planned action to be
completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve
an aim (i.e., error of planning)” [82, 111]. The online process guidance approaches
presented in this work focus on planning errors, and in particular on planning errors
that correspond to problems with the sequence of activities performed to achieve
an aim, e.g., omitting an activity that should have been done (error of omission)
or performing an activity that should not have been done (error of commission).
Planning errors that are related to violation of real-time constraints, such as “an
activity should be performed within five minutes after another activity has been
performed”, are outside the scope of this work.
The two online process guidance approaches discussed in this thesis are part of an
overall process improvement environment (PIE). This environment supports offline
analyses for finding defects, inefficiencies, and vulnerabilities in HIPs, and it also
supports online analyses to provide guidance to process performers while a process is
being executed. A key component of the PIE is a detailed and formal process model.
The offline analyses are applied to this model to reason about the corresponding
real-world HIP, to improve the model, and to potentially suggest improvements for
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the modeled HIP. A carefully analyzed and validated process model that captures
the recommended ways to perform a HIP is then used as the basis for online process
guidance.
The success of the online process guidance approaches presented in this work de-
pends on the correctness and the completeness of the underlying process model. If the
process model is incorrect with respect to some set of requirements or it is incomplete
by not representing all the process executions that domain experts have agreed should
be captured in the model, then the online guidance may be incorrect or there might
not be enough information in the process model to provide guidance in certain scenar-
ios. Given the complexity of some HIPs, creating a correct and sufficiently complete
process model is challenging. This thesis investigates process elicitation techniques
to help create such process models and discusses an evaluation of these techniques
based on their application to real-world HIPs [31,35,93]. We believe the criticality of
certain HIPs, such as medical processes, warrants the time and effort needed to cre-
ate high-quality process models that can in turn be leveraged to support continuous
process improvement [53, 119] via various static analyses (e.g., model checking [37],
fault-tree analysis [128], and failure-mode and effects analysis [121]) and to support
various aspects of online process guidance, such as the approaches discussed in this
work.
There have been considerable efforts to reduce the number and impact of errors
in HIPs. One line of work has focused on improving the design of HIPs to make
them less prone to human errors [14, 50, 93] and then train people to follow the
redesigned processes. Improvements in the design of HIPs include changing the order
of tasks, adding redundancy checks, and reducing the workload and/or working hours
of process performers. Despite such efforts, however, human process performers still
make errors while performing some HIPs, due to various reasons such as cognitive
overload, distraction, and fatigue.
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To further reduce the occurrence and impact of human errors, approaches have
been investigated for supporting process performers while executing a process by en-
couraging conformance with some specification of the recommend ways to perform a
process (e.g., process aids such as checklists [67, 130, 136] and care sets [92]). Such
process aids, however, tend to specify only the major steps during nominal flow,
omitting important details such as exceptional scenarios and concurrent process exe-
cution [31, 70]. Some of these process aids focus on training, but provide no support
during the actual performance of the process. The ones that could be used while a
process is being performed, such as checklists, in addition to often omitting impor-
tant details, also add to the workload of already heavily-burdened process performers.
The use of checklists, for example, often requires process performers to check what
needs to be done, to remember what activities they completed, and to decide what
the appropriate checklist is to use in a given context.
To remove some of the burdens that process aids, such as checklists, place on
process performers, there have been attempts to create systems that automatically
check the compliance of a process that is being performed with a specification of that
process. For example, Fitzgerald et al. designed and deployed a process guidance
system in a trauma center to guide medical professionals during the first 30 minutes
of trauma resuscitation [57]. This system increased compliance with the underlying
medical algorithms and reduced error rates, but these algorithms did not support
complex process behaviors, such as concurrency and exception handling.
The online process guidance approaches investigated in this thesis are intended to
go beyond these limitations. The approach for process state visualization provides dy-
namic, context-sensitive guidance and can automatically generate a checklist tailored
to the current process execution. The deviation detection and explanation approach
complements the process state visualization approach and could be particularly useful
in situations where providing proactive guidance via the process state visualization
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approach is not feasible or process performers have elected to not use such proac-
tive guidance. By automatically checking conformance with the recommended ways
to perform a process, the deviation detection and explanation approach reduces the
burden on process performers to themselves ensure this conformance. Because both
the deviation detection and explanation approach and the process state visualization
approach are based on a detailed process model, these approaches can provide online
guidance in a wider range of process execution scenarios than existing approaches
do, including exceptional scenarios and concurrent execution, which is where human
errors often occur [88].
The major contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Compared the relative strengths and weaknesses of several techniques for pro-
cess elicitation to help create correct and sufficiently complete process models
needed for the proposed online process guidance approaches.
• Developed an approach for deviation detection and explanation and evaluated
it with realistic process models and synthetic process executions with seeded
errors.
– Recognized delayed deviation detection as a potential obstacle for the ap-
proach and investigated its frequency and consequences.
• Developed an initial approach for visualization of process execution state and
demonstrated it on a medical case study.
Chapter 2 introduces the overall process improvement environment that includes
the online process guidance approaches investigated in this work and discusses prereq-
uisites for these approaches. Chapter 2 also describes the Little-JIL process modeling
language, which we use in the evaluation of the proposed online guidance approaches.
Chapter 3 presents several process elicitation approaches to help create such process
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models. It also discusses other approaches for facilitating the modeling of complex
HIPs. Chapter 4 discuses the deviation detection and explanation approach and
Chapter 5 discusses the process state visualization approach. Related work is covered
in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and discusses future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The proposed online process guidance approaches are part of a larger Process
Improvement Environment (PIE). This chapter provides an overview of the PIE,
discusses which components of the PIE are the focus of this work, and discusses pre-
requisites for our online process guidance approaches. The chapter also describes the
Little-JIL process modeling language, which we use in the evaluation of the proposed
online process guidance approaches.
2.1 Process Improvement Environment
The PIE is shown in Figure 2.1 and described in more detail in [14] and [15]. The
goal of the PIE is to improve HIPs via various offline and online analyses. Offline
analyses are applied to a model (the Process Model in Figure 2.1) of a real-world
process to infer characteristics of that process and suggest improvements for future
executions of that process. Offline analysis use the Process Model and various speci-
fications, such as properties and hazards (discussed in section 2.1.1). Online analyses
are applied while the real-world HIP is being executed to improve an ongoing pro-
cess execution. Online analyses use the Process Model and real-time events captured
during the ongoing process execution.
The offline analyses shown in Figure 2.1 have been implemented and evaluated
[14, 30, 31, 36, 109, 120, 129]. Editors exist for creating scenarios, properties, hazards,
and failure modes, which are inputs to the various offline analyses. An editor for
creating process models in a formal process modeling language [27] and an interpreter
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Figure 2.1: Process Improvement Environment.
8
to execute such process models also exist as part of the PIE. At the time of writing
this thesis, the online analyses are currently being investigated [15]. There are initial
prototypes of the Deviation Detector [33], of the Deviation Explainer [32], and of the
Process State Visualizer [40]. The rest of the online analysis components are yet to
be implemented.
The key component of the PIE is the Process Model, which is a representation of
a real-world HIP. This model captures detailed information about the corresponding
real-world HIP, such as the activities in the HIP, who performs them and in what or-
der(s), what artifacts are used or produced in the process, what resources are utilized,
what problems might arise while performing the process and how such problems are
handled. Chapter 3 discusses our work on creating such detailed process models and
presents the process modeling notation used in the PIE.
2.1.1 Offline Analyses
As mentioned earlier, offline analysis are applied to the Process Model to infer
characteristics of the real-world process and suggest improvements for future exe-
cutions of the process. Model Checking [37], an analysis approach used to evaluate
hardware and software systems, can be applied to the Process Model to determine
whether all process executions captured by the model satisfy a given set of proper-
ties. These properties are typically requirements for the correct sequencing of process
steps. An example property for a blood transfusion medical process is “The pa-
tient’s identity should be verified before infusing a unit of blood product into that
patient.” Properties are typically expressed as finite-state automata or formulas in
a suitable temporal logic. If the Model Checker finds that a property is violated, a
counterexample—a process execution that demonstrates the violation—is provided.
By examining the counterexamples, analysts can usually determine the cause of the
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problem, which could be an inaccuracy in the property, an inaccuracy in the process
model, or an actual defect in the modeled real-world process.
Another offline analyses technique part of the PIE is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
[128]. FTA is a hazard analysis technique used to systematically identify and evaluate
all possible causes of a given hazard. A hazard in a safety critical system is “a state
or set of conditions of the system that, together with certain other conditions in the
environment, will lead inevitably to an accident” [88]. An example hazard in a blood
transfusion process is “the patient received the wrong blood”.
Given a potential hazard in a process, FTA identifies events (component failures,
human errors, etc.) in the process that could lead to the hazard and produces a
fault tree, which provides a graphical depiction of all possible combinations of those
events. Once a fault tree has been derived, qualitative and quantitative analysis can
be applied to provide information, such as minimal cut sets, where a minimal cut set
is a set of events whose occurrence is sufficient to cause a hazard. This information
can then be used as guidance for reducing or removing vulnerabilities in the process.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [121], also referred to as Failure Mode
Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), is another safety analysis technique that
can be applied to the Process Model. FMEA can be used to evaluate the impact of
individual failures on the overall process. A failure mode represents a specific case
in which some part of the process fails to meet its intent or requirements. Given a
process model, potential failure modes are identified first. Then the process model
is explored to determine all possible hazards that could eventually be caused by
each failure mode. Failure modes then can be prioritized by their risks. The risk
of a failure mode can be calculated based on the probability and detectability of
that failure mode as well as the severities of hazards caused by that failure mode. For
failure modes with high priorities, modifications to the process model (and sometimes
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to the corresponding real-world HIP) are proposed to eliminate such failure modes or
at least reduce their probability of occurring.
In the PIE, the Process Model can also be used to drive Discrete-Event Simula-
tion to reason about efficiency of the modeled process. The Simulator in Figure 2.1
takes as input the Process Model along with scenario specifications, such as different
combinations of resources to be used in the process. The Simulator can then execute
the Process Model and determine which resource mixes optimize certain quantities of
interest. For example, discrete event simulation can be used to study how different
combinations of resources (e.g., the doctors, nurses, and beds available for treating
patients) and allocation strategies affect patient length of stay in a hospital emergency
department [41,109].
The application of the offline analyses described above often results in finding
problems with the Process Model or with the various specifications (scenarios, prop-
erties, hazards, failure models). Using the feedback from the offline analysis (indicated
by the smaller semi-circular arrow going from the Offline Analysis area to the Pro-
cess Model at the bottom of Figure 2.1), the Process Model and the specification are
improved and the analyses are iteratively applied.
Sometimes, the problems discovered by the offline analyses are problems associated
with the real-world HIP represented by the Process Model. In such cases, the analysis
results can be used to find defects in the real-world HIP and suggest process changes
that eliminate these defects, forming the basis for continuous process improvement
[119]. The process changes can be first applied to the Process Model and the offline
analyses can be used again to check whether the proposed changes indeed fix the
identified defects and whether the proposed changes introduce different defects in the
process. After the proposed process changes are determined to be safe on the process
model, they can then be implemented in the real-world HIP.
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2.1.2 Online Analyses
We envision that a carefully analyzed and validated process model would be used
to drive online analyses while the real-world HIP is being executed to improve an
ongoing process execution. The Retrospector in Figure 2.1 would keep track of process
execution history, provide capabilities for searching this history, and proactively select
information from the history that might be relevant to the current activities of the
process performers. The Prospector would provide possible future process execution
information, such as tasks to be performed, resources to be required, and upcoming
decisions to be made to help process performers plan their work.
The Deviation Detector would monitor an ongoing process execution to determine
if an executing HIP deviates from a set of recommended ways to perform that HIP,
as specified by the Process Model. Such deviations could represent errors and, thus,
detecting and reporting deviations as they occur could help catch errors before harm
is done. In complex and time-sensitive HIPs, simply informing process performers
that deviations have occurred might not be sufficient for identifying errors in a timely
manner and for deciding how to recover from them before harm is done. The Deviation
Explainer would provide information that could be useful for identifying errors, which
in turn can help process performers with planning how to recover from these errors.
The Constraint Evaluator would notify human performers when process execution
has, or will imminently, violate a specified constraint. The Real-Time Analyzer would
keep performers informed of looming deadlines increasing the urgency of warnings as
deadlines approach. The Hazard Analyzer would combine results from the offline
FMEA and FTA with events from an ongoing process execution to warn process
performers of potential risks for hazards.
The online analyzers would interact with performers of HIPs via the Event Inter-
action Manager and the Process State Visualizer. The Event Interaction Manager
would handle the flow of events between the online analysis components and process
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performers to ensure that the right events and information are delivered to the right
performers and that the right information from the ongoing process is delivered to
the online analyzers. The Event Interaction Manager will communicate directly with
automated process performers and it will funnel events meant for human process per-
formers through the Process State Visualizer, which would be responsible for creating
a visualization of the process execution state. The Event Interaction Manager consists
of two components (not shown in Figure 2.1 to reduce visual clutter)—a mechanism
for capturing events from an executing process and feeding these events to the online
analyzers and mechanisms for capturing events from online analyzers and redirect-
ing them to the appropriate process performers. We call the former mechanism a
Process Execution Monitor and the latter mechanism a Process Performers Notifier.
The online analyzers, which would utilize the process model and information from
the offline analyses, together with the Event Interaction Manager and the Process
State Visualizer would provide online process guidance to human process performers
to assist them with ongoing tasks.
The PIE would also accumulate process execution information, such as sequences
of performed steps on different process executions and problems that have arisen,
and that information could be used to refine offline and online analyses, improve the
process model (represented by the rounded arrow pointing from the online analysis
area to the Process Model at the bottom of Figure 2.1), and the actual modeled
HIP. The ultimate goal of the PIE is to support continuous process improvement as
introduced by Shewhart [119] and effectively applied by Deming [53].
2.1.3 Thesis Focus
This thesis focuses on three of the online analyzers—the Deviation Detector (dis-
cussed in Chapter 4), the Deviation Explainer (also discussed in Chapter 4), and
the Process State Visualizer (discussed in Chapter 5). This thesis also explores tech-
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niques for eliciting HIPs and for creating corresponding process models (discussed in
Chapter 3), as detailed and accurate process models are essential for the proposed
online guidance approaches.
2.2 Prerequisites for Online Process Guidance
2.2.1 Precise, Correct, and Sufficiently Complete Process Model
A Process Model is essential for the proposed PIE as that model drives both
the offline and the online analyzers. A Process Model used for online guidance is a
representation of the process that captures the recommended ways to perform that
process. Thus, such a process model is the “gold standard” for performing the process
it represents. To be useful for online guidance in complex HIPs a process model needs
to satisfy certain criteria:
• Precision. The process model needs to be precise, i.e., written in a notation
with well-defined semantics, so that the model can unambiguously guide process
performers and the various online analyses could be automatically applied. For
example, the Deviation Detector needs to be able to algorithmically explore
the process model to determine whether an ongoing process execution deviates
from that model.
• Correctness. The process executions captured by the model need to be correct
with respect to a set of requirements identified by domain experts, so that the
model can provide correct guidance to process performers. If the model contains
incorrect executions, then they could result in providing wrong guidance that
could ultimately lead to undesired process outcomes.
• Sufficient completeness. To support an adequate level of online guidance
during an ongoing HIP, a process model needs to be sufficiently complete, i.e.,
it needs to capture all the executions that process stakeholders have agreed the
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model should capture. The model should adequately capture the complexities of
the HIP it represents, such as the activities that need to be performed, complex
and realistic control flow (e.g., exception handling and concurrency), types of
human and non-human performers, and artifacts that are used or produced.
Such a process model would be more realistic compared to checklists and simple
flow charts, which in turn should allow for guiding process performers in a wider
range of scenarios.
Creating process models that meet these criteria could be challenging, especially
for complex HIPs. We expect process models to be incrementally improved as prob-
lems are found and/or the HIPs they represent change. Section 3.1 discusses some
elicitation techniques for obtaining detailed process information needed to create pro-
cess models that can be used for online process guidance. Section 3.2 describes our
experience with process modeling, including: creating such process models and using
Little-JIL, a semantically rich and formal process modeling language that can sup-
port the kinds of process models needed for online process guidance (section 2.3);
exception handling patterns for facilitating the modeling of exceptional situations
(section 3.2.1); and a study that compares the effectiveness of a diagrammatic and
a textual process representation in terms of their ability to facilitate process under-
standing (section 3.2.2).
2.2.2 Process Execution Monitor
Some of the online analyzers in the PIE rely on a mechanism for monitoring an
executing process and for capturing events of interest. For example, the Deviation
Detector needs to know the sequence of performed activities to determine whether
process performers have deviated from the recommended ways to perform the process,
as specified by the Process Model. As previously discussed, this mechanism, which
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we call the Process Execution Monitor, is one of the two components of the Event
Interaction Manager in Figure 2.1.
The details of such a mechanism for monitoring an executing process and associ-
ated issues are outside the scope of this work. Recent developments in HIPs should
facilitate monitoring of executing processes. For example, electronic medical records
are being introduced in more medical HIPs and data entries in such records could
be used to infer what activities are being/have been performed. Medical scribes are
increasingly being used in medical HIPs to document the executing process [65] and
thus could capture the activities as they are being performed. Computer vision tech-
niques could also be utilized to recognize process events in a live video stream of
cameras installed in the environment where a process is taking place.
2.3 The Little-JIL Process Modeling Language
To create models that satisfy the criteria discussed in section 2.2.1 we chose the
Little-JIL process modeling language [27], because it has the capabilities to create
such models. Little-JIL’s rich semantics allow creating realistic models of complex
HIPs. Little-JIL supports modeling of process activities, complex control flow (such as
exception handling and concurrency), specification of process performers responsible
for the various activities and of the artifacts used or produced during these activities.
Little-JIL’s semantics are formally defined, allowing for Little-JIL process models
to be automatically interpreted and analyzed by the various online analyzers in the
PIE in Figure 2.1. Little-JIL’s compact visual, diagrammatic representation supports
scalability of process models, allowing us to capture large and complex HIPs. Little-
JIL also has a hyperlinked textual representation, the Little-JIL narrative, that is
automatically kept synchronized with the diagrammatic notation. The availability
of these two representations facilitates communication with domain experts during
process elicitation and validation of the resulting models.
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A Little-JIL process model consists of three main specifications—a resource spec-
ification, an artifact specification, and a coordination specification. The resource
specification defines the process performers (called agents) and resources (human
and non-human) needed to perform process activities. The artifact specification de-
fines the products of the process activities. The coordination specification brings
these two together by defining which agents, using which resources, perform which
activities on which artifacts at which times. The main building blocks of a Little-JIL
process model are the steps. A step corresponds to an activity performed by a human
or non-human agent. A Little-JIL process model is a hierarchical decomposition of
steps where each step can be decomposed into substeps to an arbitrary level of detail.
We first describe the Little-JIL diagrammatic representation and also introduce
some of Little-JIL’s semantics. Section 2.3.2 describes the Little-JIL narrative repre-
sentation.
2.3.1 The Little-JIL Diagrammatic Representation
Figure 2.2 illustrates the diagrammatic representation of a Little-JIL step. A step
in Little-JIL’s diagrammatic notation is iconically represented by a black bar. Right
above the black bar is the the step name, which is the name of the process activity the
step represents. A step can be decomposed into substeps, Figure 2.2 shows one such
substep (we also refer to the decomposed step as the parent step). The sequencing
badge of a step determines the order in which substeps need to be completed and how
many of them need to be completed, so that the step is considered completed. There
are four sequencing badges in Little-JIL. A sequential badge (represented by an arrow
pointing to the right) means that all substeps need to be completed in left-to-right
order for the step to be considered completed. A parallel badge (represented by an
equal sign) means that all substeps need to be completed, but they can be done in
any order, including in parallel. A try badge (represented by an arrow crossing an
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X) means that substeps should be tried in left-to-right order until one of them is
successfully completed. At that point, the parent step is considered completed. A
choice badge (represented by a horizontal line segment crossing a circle) means that
any substep can be chosen to be performed. If that substep is successfully completed,
the parent step is considered completed; otherwise one of the remaining substeps can
be chosen to be performed next, until one is successfully completed.
In Little-JIL, it can be specified how many times a step should be performed.
This is done via the cardinality symbol. The plus symbol in Figure 2.2 means that
the Substep should be performed one or more times. Little-JIL allows for specifying
an arbitrary cardinality, including upper and lower bounds.
Steps in Little-JIL can throw exceptions to represent abnormal situations in a
process execution. When a step throws an exception, that exception propagates up
the step tree until a matching exception handler is found. At that point, the exception
handler is executed. For example, if the Substep in Figure 2.2 throws an exception
and the Handlerstep is a matching handler for that exception, the Handlerstep will
be executed next. Exception handlers are regular steps and, thus, they can be further
decomposed to any desired level of detail. Exception handlers are attached to the X
badge on the left side of the parent step bar.
After an exception handler is completed, the continuation badge connecting the
handlers to its parent step determines where in the process model control is returned.
There are four continuation badges in Little-JIL. A continue badge (represented by
an arrow pointing to the right) means that control should return at the step after the
step that threw the exception (what that step is depends on the sequencing badge
of the parent step). A rethrow badge (represented by an arrow pointing upwards)
means that the exception should be re-thrown and matching handlers searched up
the step tree. A restart badge means that the parent step of the one that threw the
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Figure 2.2: Little-JIL Step (figure adapted from [29])
exception should be restarted. A complete badge means that the parent step of the
one that threw the exception is considered completed.
A Little-JIL step can also have pre- and postrequisites, which are specified via
the pre- and post requisite badges (represented by triangles pointing downwards and
upwards respectively). Prerequisites are conditions that need to be true or other steps
that need to be performed before the step is allowed to start execution. Postrequsites
are conditions that need to be true or other steps that need to be performed after a
step has finished execution.
The circle on top of a step’s black bar represents the step’s interface. The step’s
interface is the place where the agent responsible for executing the step, the resources
utilized by the step, the artifacts produced by the step, and potential exceptions that
can be thrown by the step are specified.
2.3.1.1 Example Little-JIL Process Model
Figure 2.3 shows a Little-JIL process model of a simplified blood transfusion
process. This process is decomposed into six substeps: obtain patient’s blood type,
order blood from blood bank, prepare blood, pick up blood from blood bank, perform
bedside checks, and infuse blood. These six substeps need to be performed in left-to-
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Figure 2.3: Little-JIL model of a simplified blood transfusion process.
right order, indicated by the sequencing badge (right arrow) of the parent step blood
transfusion process. Some of these six substeps are further decomposed (e.g., obtain
patient’s blood type), whereas others are not, i.e., they are leaf steps (e.g., order blood
from blood bank).
Obtain patient’s blood type is a try step (indicated by the try sequencing badge on
the left part of the step bar), which means that to perform that step, the nurse needs
to first contact the lab for the patient’s blood type, and if the blood type is unknown,
the nurse needs to test the patient’s blood type. The possibility that the blood type
might be unknown is represented by specifying that the step contact lab for patient’s
blood type can throw the exception BloodTypeUnknown. If this exception is thrown,
it is propagated up the step tree and the matching exception handler (attached to
the exception handling badge of the step obtain patient’s blood type) is executed next.
This exception handler is a simple handler, meaning that it just specifies where control
flows after the exception is thrown. It has the continue continuation badge, which
means that the step to be performed next is test patient’s blood type.
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Once the nurse has obtained the patient’s blood type, the nurse needs to order
the blood from the blood bank. At that point, the blood bank can prepare the
blood1. Once the blood has been prepared, the nurse needs to pick it up and then
perform the bedside checks on the patient. These checks consist of verifying the
patient’s identity and checking the blood product information. The step check blood
product information is a parallel step (indicated by the equal sign step badge), which
represents the fact that its substeps check expiration date and check product info
matches patient info can be performed in any order2. Finally, after the nurse has
performed the bedside checks, the blood can be infused into the patient.
2.3.2 The Little-JIL Narrative Representation
The Little-JIL narrative representation is a textual, hyper-linked, description of
the process model. In addition to a natural-language description of the process model,
this textual representation includes a table of contents and an index of process steps.
The Little-JIL narrative is generated by the Little-JIL Narrator. The Narrator takes
as input a Little-JIL process model, a set of templates of English phrases that cor-
respond to the different semantic features of the process modeling language, and
customization rules, and weaves together the narrative representation.
Figure 2.4 shows the narrative corresponding to part of the Little-JIL model of
the simplified blood transfusion process in Figure 2.3. The narrative consists of two
main parts: a table of contents on the left and the descriptive part on the right.
The table of contents lists the names of the steps from the process model and uses
1The note under the step prepare blood indicates that the agent for that step is the blood bank.
All other steps in this process model are performed by the nurse. To reduce visual clutter on the
diagram, we elide the agent specification for these steps.
2Different problems could arise while performing the substeps of check blood product (e.g., the
nurse might find that the blood has expired). Thus, the substeps should throw various exceptions
to represent these possible problems. These exceptions and their corresponding handlers are elided
from Figure 2.3 to reduce visual clutter and because they are not essential for this discussion.
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the same icons used in the diagrammatic representation to represent the step kinds
(sequential, parallel, choice, try step). The parent/child relationship from the Little-
JIL process model tree is captured by the indentation in the table of contents. For
example, the steps at one level of indentation under blood transfusion process, namely
obtain patient’s blood type, order blood from blood bank, prepare blood, and so on, are
the substeps of blood transfusion process. Each step in the table of contents is also a
hyperlink and clicking on it will bring up a more detailed description of that step in
the descriptive part of the narrative.
The descriptive part of the narrative (the right part of Figure 2.4) contains a
section for each step in the process model. This step section consists of several
subsections that present various attributes of the given step, such as name, pre/post
requisites, substep sequencing information, exceptions, and required resources. For
instance, the step section for obtain patient’s blood type contains subsections about
the step’s outputs, the resources needed to perform the step, the step’s substeps and
the order in which they have to be executed. The step section for contact lab for
patient’s blood type contains similar information and also the exception that the step
throws and how that exception is handled.
Unlike the diagrammatic representation of the process model in Figure 2.3 where
familiarity with the notation semantics is assumed, the descriptive part of the narra-
tive representation provides sentences to explain the process. For example, the step
section for obtain patient’s blood type in Figure 2.4 explains what it means for the
step to be a try step, namely that its first substep needs to be tried first, and if it
fails, the second substep should be tried and so on.
The descriptive part of the narrative also uses hyperlinks to facilitate navigation.
When the substep test patient’s blood type (in the step section for obtain patient’s
blood type) is clicked, for example, its step section will be displayed and the user
will see the detailed information associated with that step. Another facility to help
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Figure 2.4: The narrative corresponding to the Little-JIL process model in Figure 2.3.
with navigation is an alphabetized index of step names (shown in the top right of
Figure 2.4), where each step is represented as a hyperlink that can be clicked to display
the description for that step. The index can be opened at any time by clicking on
Index of step names on the top of the main part of the narrative and closed when
not needed.
The narrative uses the same icons as the diagrammatic representation of the pro-
cess model. Although these icons are not necessary to understand the narrative view,
they might be helpful for users who would like to work with both views at the same
time. They also provide some visual grouping of sentences based on the icon the sen-
tences are associated with. The meaning of the icons can be seen in a legend (shown
to the left of the index of step names in Figure 2.4), which can be opened and closed
the same way as the index of step names.
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Figure 2.5: Architecture of the Little-JIL Narrator.
2.3.2.1 Design of Little-JIL Narrator
Figure 2.5 shows the high-level architecture of the Narrator. The Little-JIL Pro-
cess Model, the Phrasing Templates, and the Customization Rules are used by the
Narration Weaver to produce the Narrative Content, which contains just the content
and the structure without any formatting of the natural-language document to be
generated. The Formatting Weaver then combines the Narrative Content together
with the Formatting Templates to produce the final Generated Narrative.
2.3.2.1.1 Phrasing Templates. The Phrasing Templates are parameterized, natural-
language phrases that correspond to the different semantic features of the Little-JIL
process language (e.g., what it means for a step to be sequential), where the parame-
ters represent information that is specific to a given process model. Table 2.1 shows
three example phrasing templates. The first phrasing template is used with sequen-
tial process steps to generate a sentence explaining the order of execution of their
substeps. This template was used to generate the sentence in Figure 2.4 explaining
the order in which the substeps of blood transfusion process should be performed.
The second phrasing template in Table 2.1 is used to generate a sentence that
explains what it means for a step to be a try step. For instance, applying this
phrasing template to the step obtain patient’s blood type (in Figure 2.3) results in the
sentence To “obtain patient’s blood type”, the following should be tried, in the listed
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To [stepName], the following need to be done in the listed order [substepsList].
To [stepName], the following should be tried, in the listed order, until one
succeeds [substepsList].
Successful completion of the [activity] [step name] should yield the
[parameter name].
Table 2.1: Example phrasing templates.
order, until one succeeds: “contact lab for patient’s blood type” or “test patient’s blood
type”. This exact sentence can be seen in the step section for obtain patient’s blood
type in Figure 2.4.
The third phrasing template in Figure 2.1 is used to generate a sentence explaining
what it means for a step to have an output parameter. For instance, applying this
phrasing template to the step obtain patient’s blood type, which outputs the patient’s
blood type and screen, results in the sentence Successful completion of the step “obtain
patient’s blood type” should yield the blood type and screen.
2.3.2.1.2 Customization Rules. The Customization Rules in the Narrator ar-
chitecture in Figure 2.5 represent a set of user preferences to customize the content
and the structure of the generated natural-language narrative. The Narrator supports
the use of synonyms. For example, different words can be used to refer to a process
activity. The parameter [activity] in the third phrasing template in Figure 2.1 is a
placeholder for such a synonym. The word “step” was used in place of [activity] when
this phrasing template was instantiated to describe the output parameter of the step
obtain patient’s blood type in Figure 2.4.
Another kind of customization supported by the Little-JIL Narrator deals with
the ability to hide or show certain kinds of process information. For example, the user
can select to hide or show sentences that present information about the resources in a
process model. Before the narrative shown in Figure 2.4 was generated, the option to
show resources was selected. Thus, resource information, such as the human agents
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responsible for executing the process steps, is included in the narrative. The user
can choose to hide or show this information or information about other aspects of
the process, such as parameters and exceptions. The Narrator also provides the
flexibility to choose what kinds of process steps to associate certain information with.
For example, the user can choose to show resource information only for leaf steps
but not intermediate steps. This is sometimes useful as intermediate steps in Little-
JIL are often used for coordination purposes, whereas the actual work performed by
agents is modeled by leaf steps.
The Little-JIL Narrator also provides facilities to customize the sentence structure
of the generated narrative. For instance, the user can define when the substeps of
a step should be enumerated as a comma-separated phrase or when they should be
shown as a list.
2.3.2.1.3 Formatting Templates. The Narrative Content artifact produced by
the Narration Weaver (as shown in Figure 2.5) contains the raw content of the gen-
erated narrative, but does not have any formatting information. It is the job of the
Formatting Templates to define the presentation style of the generated narrative.
This design essentially follows the well-established recommendations from the web
application domain to separate content from presentation.
For Figure 2.4, for example, the Formatting Templates were responsible for defin-
ing text font, text color, text size, text style (e.g., bold vs. non-bold), spacing infor-
mation and background color for the table of contents, the main part of the narrative,
the index and the legend. The Formatting Templates were also responsible for asso-
ciating images (e.g, arrow, filled circle, check mark, etc.) with the different sections
of the narrative and for the visualization (indentation and vertical lines that help
keeping track of the hierarchical decomposition) of the table of contents. The set of
Formatting Templates used by the Formatting Weaver in this example resulted in an
HTML-based generated narrative. A different set of Formatting Templates could be
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used to produce a plain text (not hyperlinked) narrative or a narrative in some other
document format.
The Phrasing Templates, the Customization Rules, and the Narrative Content
artifacts are currently XML documents following a schema we defined. The Narra-
tion Weaver is a Java system. The formatting templates are expressed as XSLT [7]
templates and the Formatting Weaver is therefore an XSLT processor.
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CHAPTER 3
PROCESS ELICITATION AND MODELING
It is difficult to create process models for online process guidance that satisfy the
requirements discussed in section 2.2.1. One reason for this difficulty is that it is
time-consuming and challenging to elicit accurate and sufficiently complete process
information from process stakeholders. A single stakeholder often does not know
how the entire process works, or should work, necessitating elicitation of the process
from several stakeholders. Different stakeholders, however, often have different under-
standing of the process, use different terminology, and could even provide conflicting
information. Furthermore, for large and complex HIPs, it is often impractical for all
stakeholders to take part in the elicitation. Thus, processes are often elicited from a
subset of all process performers, which makes difficult capturing process nuances that
depend on personal style and preferences.
It is also difficult to formally represent an elicited process, so that the resulting
model is precise enough to support automated online process guidance and yet rich
enough to support process performers in various scenarios and circumstances. Many
process modeling notations lack the semantics to express complex process behavior,
such as exception handling and concurrent execution. Some notations that do have
such semantics have awkward syntax, increasing the probability making an error while
creating the process model. Regardless of what process modeling notation is used,
intricate process details, such as resumption semantics after exception handling or
synchronization in the presence of concurrency, are difficult to capture correctly.
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To address the process elicitation challenges, we investigated several process elic-
itation methods and evaluated their effectiveness in terms of their ability to reveal
several kinds of important process information. Section 3.1 describes this investiga-
tion. To address some of the challenges in representing elicited process information
via a process model that satisfies the desiderata from section 2.2.1, we took several
steps:
• For our online process guidance approach, we used the Little-JIL process mod-
eling language [27], whose rich semantics allow for capturing complex real-world
processes. Little-JIL’s explicit support of exception handling and concurrency
and its diagrammatic notation facilitated accurately modeling complex process
behaviors.
• We identified common ways in which people handle exceptions in processes and
codified these ways into a catalog of exception handling patterns to facilitate
modeling of exceptional behaviors.
• To facilitate the understanding of process models, we developed a natural lan-
guage process representation that can be automatically generated from a formal
process model. We conducted a user study to compare this natural language
representation with the existing Little-JIL diagrammatic representation.
• We also employed formal analysis techniques to investigate their ability to val-
idate process models.
Our experience with process modeling is described in Section 3.2.
3.1 Process Elicitation
The process elicitation methods we studied fall under the general approach of
task analysis [44, 81]. The goal of task analysis is to describe the manual and men-
tal activities involved in accomplishing a task. We focused on observations of and
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interviews with process performers, which are common task elicitation methods for
evaluating how performers complete a certain task. In particular, we investigated the
ability of these methods to reveal specific kinds of process information—process steps
that occur on the normal process flow; exceptional situations that might arise during
the performance of a process; and process performers’ responses to such exceptional
situations. The following section describes the case study on which we applied these
methods, the methods themselves, and our observations about these methods.
3.1.1 Case Study
To evaluate the elicitation methods discussed above, we used them to elicit a part
of a critical medical process and then compared them in terms of their ability to elicit
certain process information. The kinds of process information that we focused on
were steps on the normal process flow (i.e., activities that are performed on process
executions when no problems arise), exceptional situations (i.e., problems that might
arise during a process execution), and recognition of and responses to exceptional
situations. We based our decision to elicit these kinds of process information on
frameworks for understanding and eliciting processes from other high-risk domains
[103,133,134,137].
3.1.1.1 Elicited Process
We elicited the chemotherapy treatment plan review process performed by a Prac-
tice Registered Nurse (RN)1 as a critical part of a larger process for outpatient breast
cancer chemotherapy administration at the D’Amour Center for Cancer Care in West-
ern Massachusetts. We chose the RNs’ treatment plan review process because it is
1The term “Practice RN” is specific to the D’Amour Center for Cancer Care. It refers to RNs
responsible for verification of chemotherapy treatment plan and orders and who participate in the
preparation for chemotherapy administration. The RNs who are primarily in charge of the actual
chemotherapy administration are called “Clinic RNs” in this cancer center.
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a safety-critical process whose complexity makes it an appropriate benchmark for
evaluating different process elicitation methods.
Chemotherapy treatment plans differ by cancer type, the stage or extent of the
disease, the goal of therapy, and a patient’s tolerance for therapy with specific agents.
Therapeutic options may change rapidly as new research findings are released, thus
requiring ongoing diligence and review to ensure that a chemotherapy treatment plan
is appropriate for the patient and is safely executed by the team of care providers
[11,61]. During the treatment plan review process, RNs perform essential coordinating
functions with physicians (to ensure the treatment plan is accurate), schedulers (to
ensure chemotherapy appointments on the treatment plan are scheduled correctly),
and Clinic Registered Nurses (to ensure chemotherapy medications are administered
as directed in the treatment plan). The RNs also use several data sources when
reviewing treatment plans (e.g. clinical notes, electronic medical records (EMRs),
the paper chart, careset2 information, reference books, and online resources).
3.1.1.2 Elicitation Methods
We used five elicitation methods to detail the process by which RNs review treat-
ment plans. We used unstructured interviews, direct observations, and three types
of semi-structured interviews to elicit normal flow steps, exceptional situations, and
RNs’ recognition of and responses to exceptional situations . We obtained protocol
approval from the Cancer Center Clinical Research Review Committee and from the
Institutional Review Boards of the University of Massachusetts and Baystate Medical
Center; we obtained informed consent from all participants.
3.1.1.2.1 Unstructured Interviews. Over the course of six months, we con-
ducted six unstructured interviews with a senior RN experienced in reviewing treat-
2A careset is a standardized treatment (based on best practices) for a given diagnosis.
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ment plans. These unstructured interviews were open and conversational in nature.
These interviews were iterative in that we elicited information about the treatment
plan review process, created a precise and detailed natural language description of the
process, and then presented that description to the RN for further refinement. In par-
allel, we created a formal and detailed model of the treatment plan review process in
the Little-JIL process modeling language [27] (Little-JIL is presented in section 2.3).
We performed several iterations of the unstructured interviews—guided by the se-
mantic features of Little-JIL3—until the RN expressed satisfaction that the natural
language description of the process accurately represented the treatment plan review
process as performed at the Cancer Center. These unstructured interviews occurred
in parallel with interview sessions with other clinicians involved in the chemotherapy
process, as one of our goals was to create a process model for the full outpatient
breast cancer chemotherapy preparation and administration process.
3.1.1.2.2 Direct Observations. After completing the unstructured interviews
with the senior RN, we observed three other experienced RNs conduct two treatment
plan reviews each. We stopped collecting data after six observations because research
using qualitative data collection approaches suggests that prominent themes tend to
emerge after six data collection points [64]. Additionally, during our observations,
we observed the same normal flow steps and exceptional situations across multiple
sessions—a sign of data saturation. Our goal in conducting these observations was to
improve our understanding of the process captured during the unstructured interviews
by observing the process as it happened in the real world. Because cognitive tasks are
often difficult or impossible to observe, the observed RNs used a think-aloud protocol
[44] to verbally describe their cognitive tasks (such as verifying that information
3Little-JIL’s explicit support for exception handling, for example, prompted us to ask about
information related to exceptional situations that might arise during the performance of the process
and what the response(s) should be. Little-JIL’s semantics are discussed in detail in section 2.3.
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Figure 3.1: Sample sequence of observed steps
on two artifacts matched) as they completed the process. Two researchers were
present for each observation and, using the audio recordings from the sessions, they
reconciled the differences in the observation notes after all observations were complete.
Figure 3.1 shows a sample sequence of observed steps. Throughout this chapter, we
refer to such a sequence of process steps as a process trace.
3.1.1.2.3 Semi-structured interviews. We conducted three kinds of semi-struc-
tured interviews with each of the three observed RNs. In the semi-structured inter-
views, we asked each RN the same questions in the same order, but asked clarifying
questions as needed. As often occurs in qualitative research, the interview materials
for the semi-structured interviews were guided by the findings from the unstructured
interviews, as these two methods complement one another [24]. We conducted the
semi-structured interviews after the observations to avoid affecting the process by
which the RNs completed their treatment plan reviews. As in the observations, two
researchers were present for each interview and, using the audio recordings from the
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Figure 3.2: Sample open-ended scenarios.
sessions, they reconciled the differences in the interview notes after all interviews were
completed.
3.1.1.2.3.1 Open-ended prompts. In the first kind of the semi-structured
interviews, we constructed fifteen plausible scenarios from the process model cre-
ated during the unstructured interviews, where each scenario represented one par-
tial process trace. These scenarios were open-ended: we asked the RNs how they
would continue the treatment plan review process given the scenario. Some scenarios
prompted the RNs with only normal flow steps, while others included steps performed
in response to exceptional situations as well. Seven sample scenarios are shown in
Figure 3.2.
3.1.1.2.3.2 Complete process traces. In the second kind of the semi-struc-
tured interviews, we presented each of the RNs with three complete treatment plan
review process traces in free-text form, based on the process model created during the
unstructured interviews. The first process trace represented a normal flow process
execution; the second and third process traces included exceptional situations and
possible responses to those exceptional situations. The third process trace is shown
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in Figure 3.3. We asked each RN whether each process trace was feasible and, if not,
what steps should be added, removed, or reordered.
3.1.1.2.3.3 Full process model. In the third part of the semi-structured in-
terviews, we presented each RN with a free-text representation of the full process
model created during the unstructured interviews. This full process model included
the normal process flow, all exceptional situations and all possible responses to ex-
ceptional situations defined during the unstructured interviews. We asked each RN
whether the full process model captured the process accurately and, if not, what steps
should be added, removed, or reordered.
The fifteen open-ended prompts, the three complete process traces, and the full
process model used in the semi-structured interviews are included in Appendix A.
3.1.1.3 Results
Figure 3.4 shows the results for all the elicitation methods based on the number of
new normal flow steps, exceptional situations, and responses to exceptional situations
(hereafter referred to as events) that were identified via each method. We elicited
35 unique normal flow process steps, 16 unique exceptional situations, and 31 unique
steps as part of the RNs’ responses to exceptional situations, or 82 total unique events.
We identified 52 of the 82 (63%) events through the unstructured interviews, 22 new
events through the observations (15 solely elicited during the observations), 7 new
events through the semi-structured interviews using open-ended prompts (5 solely
elicited using this method), and 1 new event through the semi-structured interviews
using the full process description.
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, show by which method we elicited each event. The
integers on the horizontal axis represent events, where the names of the corresponding
events are provided in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 respectively. The elicitation methods
are listed on the vertical axis in Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, and each pair (event E,
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Figure 3.3: Sample process trace.
Figure 3.4: Number of new events identified using each elicitation method.
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Figure 3.5: Normal flow process steps identified and refuted via each method.
Figure 3.6: Exceptional situations identified and refuted via each method.
elicitation method M) is interpreted as the contribution of method M for eliciting
event E. In section 3.1.1.4, we elaborate on how we reconciled differences in the RNs’
responses.
Events shown in black in Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 signify that the event was
explicitly identified using a specific elicitation method. An event was explicitly iden-
tified if it was mentioned during the unstructured interviews, occurred during the
observations, or was mentioned during the semi-structured interviews.
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Figure 3.7: Responses to exceptional situations identified and refuted via each method.
Table 3.1: Normal flow process steps.
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Table 3.2: Exceptional situations.
Table 3.3: Responses to exceptional situations.
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Events in gray signify that the event was implicitly identified using the elicitation
method. An event was implicitly identified if it was not mentioned during the inter-
views, but was implied via another step that was mentioned during the interviews.
For example, the step “retrieve patient chart from medical records” was not explic-
itly mentioned during the unstructured interviews, but the step “enter height/weight
from patient chart into EMR” implied that the RN retrieved the patient chart from
the patient’s medical record. Some normal flow steps and exceptional situations iden-
tified during the unstructured interviews were used in the questions we asked during
the semi-structured interviews and so were considered to be implicitly identified in
the semi-structured interviews, an exception being when the RN explicitly objected
to the step or situation. During the open-ended prompt interviews, we prompted the
RNs with exceptional situations specifically, so all exceptional situations identified
using this method were implicitly identified.
Events shown with an “X” were refuted using an elicitation method. An event
was refuted if during the semi-structured interviews, at least one RN stated that a
given event elicited during the unstructured interviews is not performed at any time
during the treatment plan review process. For example, the step “confirm labs have
been done” was explicitly identified as a normal flow process step during the unstruc-
tured interviews by the senior RN, but was refuted by some of the RNs during the
semi-structured interviews. In the next section, we discuss instances where the RNs
disagreed with one another and instances where an RN’s responses were inconsistent
across interviews and observations.
Events shown in white were not addressed via the corresponding elicitation method,
meaning that they were not observed or were not mentioned during one of the inter-
views. For example, the exceptional situation “Old orders still in the EMR” was not
addressed during the unstructured interviews but was explicitly identified during the
observations. Having old orders in the EMR is clinically significant as a Clinic Reg-
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istered Nurse may administer the wrong dose of a given medication or give another
medication instead of or in addition to the intended medication.
3.1.1.4 Discussion
Unstructured interviews with an expert RN were a useful way to glean detailed
knowledge about the structure of the process, providing information about 51 events.
The unstructured interviews were labor-intensive as they included several iterations
with the RN over the course of 6 months. Between the meetings, we had to carefully
examine our meeting notes and recordings to extract all relevant information and to
create a precise model of the treatment plan review process.
The observation and semi-structured interview data showed that even after the
significant amount of time and effort spent during the unstructured interviews, the
resulting elicited process information was still problematic. We discovered that the
process model created from the unstructured interviews omitted certain events and
included events later refuted by the RNs. Observations were a useful way to discover
additional normal flow steps (10), exceptional situations (5), and responses to excep-
tional situations (7). Semi-structured interviews with prompts were a useful means
to find additional normal flow steps that RNs perform (3) as well as steps that RNs
perform in response to exceptional situations (5). Finally, semi-structured interviews
using full process traces and the full process model did not provide information about
new events, but were an essential means for the RNs to refute events defined via other
elicitation methods.
The white spaces in Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 signify that a specific elicitation
method did not identify a specific event. An elicitation method may not address a
specific event or series of events for a variety of reasons. As the unstructured in-
terviews occurred first, they did not address any events identified for the first time
during the observations and semi-structured interviews. The observations only ad-
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dressed events that explicitly occurred during the observations; situations that did not
arise could not be observed. The open-ended prompt portion of the semi-structured
interviews focused on sub-sections of the process, so was not designed to cover the
entire process. Similarly, the complete process traces presented to the RNs during
the semi-structured interviews were only a sample of all possible traces. Finally, the
full process model presented to the RNs during the semi-structured interviews, while
exhaustive, did not include additional events elicited via the observations or via the
semi-structured interviews using open-ended prompts and full process traces.
Some of the inconsistencies between the unstructured interviews and the other
methods likely occurred because we initially interviewed only one RN, but we subse-
quently observed and conducted semi-structured interviews with three RNs. A single
RN may conduct the process differently than the other RNs, or may not mention
process events that seem obvious to her. Yet, holding time-intensive interviews with
more than one individual may not yield enough additional information to justify the
extra time requirements for the interviewers and participants.
In a few instances concerning the confirmation or refutation of a particular event,
individual RNs were inconsistent within their individual responses across the observa-
tions and interviews or the RNs disagreed with one another about a particular event.
For instance, step 24 on the normal flow (confirm labs have been done) was refuted by
RN 1 and RN 2, but RN 3 noted that this step is done if the medications are platinum-
based. In step 4 of the responses to exceptional situations (enter height/weight from
the patient chart into the EMR), RN 1 and RN 2 stated that this step either did not
happen or that the original individual who entered the height/weight in the paper
chart—typically the medical assistant—would transcribe the information into the
EMR. In general, we noted a step as refuted if at least one RN refuted the step,
knowing that the refuted steps may require further scrutiny.
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Based on our findings, it appears to be important to use multiple methods when
understanding how individuals complete a complex process, such as chemotherapy
treatment plan review; each subsequent process elicitation method provided new in-
formation about the process. Observations added 22 new events not discovered via
the unstructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews using open-ended prompts
added 7 new events not discovered via the unstructured interviews or observations,
but did not add new exceptional situations. Semi-structured interviews using the full
process model produced only 1 new event. Finally, the semi-structured interviews
using the full process traces and full process model identified 6 refuted events.
3.1.1.5 Threats to Validity
There are several limitations inherent in this study, which can guide the design
of future studies aiming to identify how best to elicit complex processes. We pur-
posefully ordered our elicitation methods to glean the most new information from
each subsequent elicitation method and to minimize the impact of a given elicitation
method on the results of subsequent elicitation methods. We first conducted unstruc-
tured interviews so as not to prompt the senior RN with any preconceived notions
about the process. With the second group of RNs, we conducted observations fol-
lowed by semi-structured interviews to not influence how the RNs acted during the
observations. Additionally, we developed the semi-structured interview guides solely
from the unstructured interview findings, and these were not updated based on the
observational data or between interviews. We did so to allow the RNs freedom to
refute events without being biased as to what behaviors other RNs exhibited during
the observations. These methods could easily be reordered, or the materials could be
continuously updated based on findings to-date. Each of these changes may produce
different or additional events, or may omit steps discovered using our order.
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In this study, we focused on the viability of using the proposed elicitation methods
to identify normal flow process steps, exceptional situations, and the identification
of and responses to the exceptional situations. We did not explicitly analyze how
well each elicitation method helped to understand the order in which events happen
during the process. This study addressed one type of worker completing a single type
of process. Additionally, one RN participated in the unstructured interviews, and
three different RNs all completed the observations and semi-structured interviews.
The relative strengths and weaknesses of the elicitation methods may differ when
applied to a different process, depending on whether all RNs participate in all of the
elicitation methods, or different RNs participate in one elicitation method each.
3.1.1.6 Summary
Through this work, we describe our application of five process elicitation methods
to the complex, safety-critical chemotherapy treatment plan review process: unstruc-
tured interviews, observations, and three types of semi-structured interviews. We
also detail our quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of these elicitation methods. By using the aforementioned five process
elicitation methods, we identified a large number of events (82) involved in the pro-
cess by which RNs review chemotherapy treatment plans. These elicitation methods
allowed us to determine how many and which process components were associated
with the normal process flow (35), which were exceptional situations (16), and which
were identification of and responses to exceptional situations (31). Each of the five
elicitation methods contributed uniquely to our understanding of the process by which
RNs review chemotherapy treatment plans. The research detailed in this section in-
dicates that to create accurate descriptions of complex processes, a combination of
elicitation methods should be used.
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3.2 Process Modeling
This section describes work related facilitating process modeling and also discusses
our overall experience with creating models of complex HIPs. The section starts
with a discussion of exception handling patterns that we identified and codified to
facilitate the modeling of exceptional situations. Then follows a study that compares
two process model representations—a diagrammatic and a textual representation—in
terms of their ability to facilitate process understanding. The section concludes with
a brief discussion of our experience with creating process models with Little-JIL and
with validating these models.
3.2.1 Exception Handling Patterns
Exceptional situations occur in any but the most trivial HIPs. People or other
resources might be unavailable when they are needed, the activities of process per-
formers might be incorrect or inappropriate, or deadlines might not be met. In each
of these cases, additional action is required beyond the nominal process execution.
We refer to the recognition that a problem has occurred during a process execution
as an exception and to the non-nominal activities that are taken to address such a
problem as exception handling. In some cases, exceptions might not be particularly
unusual or surprising, such as when trying to book a flight the day before a trip and
finding out that there are no seats on a flight or hotel rooms available.
In real-world HIPs, the number and complexity of such exceptional situations is
typically large and the need to assure that they are appropriately handled may be
quite important. Furthermore, exceptional situations are often the source of errors
[88], perhaps due to the complexity of such situations and/or the lack of appropriate
training, as training often focuses mostly on nominal process executions. To enable
the process guidance approaches discussed in this work to reduce the number of
errors or catch errors before harm is done in exceptional situations, a process model
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needs to specify in detail the recommended exception handling behaviors of real-
world HIPs. Modeling exception handling, however, is difficult. A process modeler
needs to consider the exceptions that might arise and during which activities they
might arise, how these exceptions should be handled, and how the process should
proceed afterwards. Because of the difficulty of modeling exceptional situations, such
situations are often modeled incorrectly or even not modeled at all.
To facilitate the modeling of exceptional situations that could arise in HIPs, we
propose to use a set of exception handling patterns [86]. We believe that exception
handling patterns can improve the writing of models of HIPs the same way object-
oriented design patterns have improved the writing of object-oriented software. Ex-
ception handling patterns can raise the level of abstraction at which process modelers
think about and discuss exceptional situations. If such patterns are appropriately
codified, process modelers can reuse modeling idioms when they recognize that a
HIPs exhibits a certain exception handling pattern, thus avoiding to need to model
the exceptional behavior from first principles, which could be a time-consuming and
error-prone task.
The exception handling patterns we identified are based on significant experience
in modeling HIPs from a variety of domains, including health care [36, 109], labor-
management dispute resolution [38], software development [28], and elections [99,110,
120]. Members of our research team have defined processes in each of these domains,
and some of the processes have been non-trivial in size, consisting of hundreds of
steps. In the course of defining these processes, our team members have recognized
strong similarities among the ways in which the domain experts have described how
they deal with exceptional situations. This led to careful attempts to characterize
and categorize these different approaches to exception handling.
We grouped the exception handling patterns we identified into three high-level
categories:
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• Trying other alternatives. This category contains patterns for presenting alter-
native means to perform the same activity. Thus, for example, if one hotel has
no vacancies, we will try other hotels, or stay at the home of a friend or relative.
• Inserting behavior. This category contains patterns for inserting additional
activities after an exceptional situation has been recognized and before returning
to the normative process. Thus, for example, if the passenger’s name is wrong
on the itinerary after purchasing a plane ticket, then the passenger may need
to perform the extra work of contacting the airline to fix that problem.
• Canceling behavior. This category contains patterns for aborting the current
processing when the process is not allowed to continue after an exceptional
situation has been recognized. If there is no date and time at which all key
people can be present at a meeting, then the whole trip might be cancelled,
possibly requiring the cancellation of various travel arrangements.
Following the style introduced in the classic book on design patterns for object-
oriented software [60], for each pattern, we provide:
• Name—the name of the pattern
• Intent—what recurring behavior the pattern captures
• Applicability—in what situations the pattern should be used
• Structure—the general structure of the pattern expressed in two different pro-
cess definition formalisms
• Participants—the roles played by different parts of the process that contribute
to the pattern
• Example—an example from a real-world process that exhibits the pattern
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• Variations—small changes that can be made in the application of a pattern to
get slightly different effects
In the remainder of this section, we present one pattern from each of the above
three categories and use the Little-JIL process modeling language [27] to describe
pattern structure and example usage. The rest of the exception handling patterns
are described in detail in [86], where also examples of each pattern are shown in two
other process modeling notations—UML Activity Diagrams [97] and BPMN [96]—
and Little-JIL, UML Activity Diagrams, and BPMN are compared in terms of their
ability to support the identified exception handling patterns.
After presenting one pattern from each of the three categories, we describe an
evaluation where we studied the occurrence of all the patterns from [86] in two process
models from the healthcare and the online dispute resolution domains.
3.2.1.1 Selected Patterns
3.2.1.1.1 Ordered Alternatives
Pattern Name: Ordered Alternatives
Intent: There are multiple ways to accomplish a task and there is a fixed order
in which the alternatives should be tried. Provision must be made for the possibility
that no alternatives will be successful.
Applicability: This pattern is applicable when there is a preferred order among
the alternatives that should be tried in order to execute a task.
Structure: The Little-JIL diagram in Figure 3.8 depicts the structure of the
Ordered Alternatives pattern. As discussed in section 2.3, processes are represented
in Little-JIL as hierarchical decompositions of steps. Here, we see the step named
Task with three substeps, each defining one way to complete the task. The icon at the
left end of the black step bar of Task indicates that this is a Try step. The semantics
of the Little-JIL Try step match the definition of this pattern quite closely, as the
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Task
Normative Step Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Exception
throws Exception throws Exception throws Exception
throws NoMoreAlternatives
Figure 3.8: Structure of the Ordered Alternatives Pattern in Little-JIL.
Try step semantics specify that the step’s children represent alternatives that are to
be tried in order from left to right. If an alternative succeeds, the parent step is
completed and no more alternatives are offered. If execution of an alternative throws
an exception, the exception is handled by the handler attached to the Try step by the
rightmost edge. The icon associated with the exception handler indicates that the
Try step should continue with the next alternative. This continues until one of the
alternative substeps succeeds. If none of the substeps succeeds, a special exception,
called NoMoreAlternatives, is thrown. This exception must be handled by an ancestor
of the Try step. Indicating that all alternatives have failed is part of the pattern, but
the handling of that exception must take place in the context in which the pattern is
used rather than as part of the pattern.
Participants: This pattern has three types of participants: the menu, the alter-
natives, and the continuer. The menu is the portion of the process that organizes
the alternatives into an order. The alternatives are the various ways in which the
desired task can be carried out. While the figures show three alternatives, there is
no limit to the number of alternatives that could be used in this pattern. Each alter-
native, except possibly the last, must have the potential to throw an exception that
causes consideration of the next alternative. The continuer is the exception handler
that indicates the process should continue to the next alternative.
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Make Reservations
Reserve HotelReserve Flight
Reserve Southwest Use Travelocity
throws NoFlightAvailable throws NoFlightAvailable
NoFlightAvailable
Book Conference Hotel Book Other Hotel
throws HotelFull throws HotelFull
HotelFull
Figure 3.9: Using the Ordered and Unordered Alternative Patterns when Planning a Trip.
Sample Code and Usage: Figure 3.9 shows the use of the Ordered Alternatives
pattern in a Litlte-JIL process to plan travel to attend a conference. This pattern
can be seen in the Reserve hotel step. Here, the process requires first trying to get a
reservation at the conference hotel before considering other hotels. If the conference
hotel is full, the HotelFull exception is thrown. This is handled by causing the Book
other hotel step to be attempted next.
Variations: One variation of this pattern uses boolean conditions after an alter-
native is tried, rather than expecting the alternative to throw an exception. If the
condition evaluates to true, it means the alternative has succeeded. If the condition
evaluates to false it means the alternative failed and the process should proceed to
the next alternative. The tradeoff here is essentially the same as we see in procedu-
ral programming when deciding whether a function should return a status value to
indicate whether it has succeeded or it should throw an exception.
If the conditions under which an alternative will succeed are known in advance, the
alternatives are better represented with a construct similar to an if-else construct in a
traditional programming language. This allows the orders to be specified while avoid-
ing the need for exception handling. This is the Exclusive Choice pattern presented
as a control flow pattern by van der Aalst, et al. [125].
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3.2.1.1.2 Deferred Fixing
Pattern Name: Deferred Fixing
Intent: When an exceptional situation arises during a process execution, action
must be taken to record that situation and to possibly address the situation either
partially or temporarily, because addressing the situation fully is either not immedi-
ately possible or not necessary. Later in the process, an additional action needs to be
taken to complete the recovery from the condition that caused the occurrence of the
exceptional situation.
Applicability: This pattern is useful in preventing the process from coming to
a halt even though the potentially disruptive effects of an unusual, yet predictable,
situation cannot be addressed completely. The pattern is useful in those cases where
addressing the problem definitively is possible only when more time or information
becomes available, where the need for further work to complete the handling of the
exception can be captured in the state of the process, and where temporary mea-
sures can enable the process to proceed to the point where such additional time and
information have become available.
Structure: Figure 3.10 is a Little-JIL depiction of the structure of this pattern. In
Figure 3.10 an exception is thrown during the execution of Substep 1. The exception
is handled by Do temporary fix, an exception handler that makes some expedient
temporary adjustment, records the need for a more complete fix, and then returns to
the nominal process flow, as indicated by the continue handler. However, at some
later stage of the process, an additional step (or collection of steps), represented by the
step Some step, must be executed to either complete the handling of the exceptional
condition or check that the exceptional condition has been already handled. This
check is made by an edge predicate, denoted by the parenthetical condition, prior
to executing Some step. The edge predicate checks the process state to determine if
the fix is required. Note that the dotted line notation is not Little-JIL syntax, but is
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Process
Parent Some step
Substep 1 Substep 2 Do temporary x
Exception
throws Exception
(x.required)?
Figure 3.10: The Structure of the Deferred Fixing Pattern in Little-JIL.
intended just to note that an arbitrary amount of work may occur between when the
temporary fix takes place and the fix is completed.
Participants: There are three participants in the Deferred Fixing pattern: the
detector of the anomaly, the logger/patcher, and the fixer. The anomaly detector
is the portion of the process that recognizes that a problem has arisen and throws
an exception to represent the recognition of that problem. The logger/patcher is
responsible for recording the anomaly and possibly doing a temporary fix. In the
Deferred Fixing pattern, the logger/patcher is the exception handler. The fixer is
the later step that examines the log and completes the handling of the exceptional
situation. Notice that the fixer does not use an exception handling mechanism, yet
is a key participant in resolving the anomaly.
Sample Code and Usage: Figure 3.11 shows an example of the deferred fixing
pattern. Here a traveler has successfully reserved a flight but the website that is used
to select a seat is unavailable. Reserve flight throws the SeatSelectionWebsiteIsDown
exception. This is handled by making a note to select seats later and then continuing
with reserving the hotel and car. At some later point in the process, a test is made
to see if the seats have been selected. If not, the Select plane seats step is executed.
3.2.1.1.3 Compensate
Pattern Name: Compensate
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Plan a Trip
Select dates and destination Make the reservations
Write note to select seats laterReserve ight Reserve hotel Reserve car
SeatSelectionWebsiteIsDown
throws SeatSelectionWebsiteIsDown
Select plane seats
(seatsSelected)?
Figure 3.11: Using the Deferred Fixing Pattern to Complete Seat Selection at a Later Time.
Intent: When canceling an activity, it is often necessary to undo work that has
already been completed. This pattern addresses the need to determine what work
must be undone and to then execute the compensating action(s) needed to undo that
work.
Applicability: This pattern is particularly useful in contexts in which it is not
possible to know at the outset that a task will succeed, or the results produced by
the task will prove ultimately to be acceptable. Because of this, the process must
incorporate mechanisms for undoing the part(s) of the task that did complete and/or
replacing the outputs that proved to be unacceptable. In some cases, the state of
the process after compensation may appear the same as if the failed activities never
occurred. Often, however, there will be a record that the activity occurred but the
compensating activity nullifies the effect of the original activity, as when a credit card
credit compensates for a credit card charge.
Structure: Figure 3.12 shows the structure of the Compensate pattern in Little-
JIL. Step 1 and Step 2 can be done in any order, including in parallel. If Step
2 fails but Step 1 completes, an exception handler is used to compensate for the
effects of Step 1. Notice that as part of the exception handling, it needs to explicitly
checked if Step 1 has been completed. This is done because Little-JIL does not have a
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Process
Step 1 Step 2 Cancel
Compensate step 1
(step1completed)?throws Exception
Exception
Figure 3.12: The Structure of the Compensate Pattern in Little-JIL.
Plan a Trip
Select dates and destination Make the reservations
Cancel tripReserve ight Reserve hotel Reserve car
Notify traveller
FlightNotAvailable
throws FlightNotAvailable
Cancel hotel
(hotel.reserved)?
Cancel car
(car.reserved)?
Figure 3.13: Using the Compensate Pattern to Cancel a Trip.
compensation construct, unlike BPMN, for example. This makes the Compensation
pattern somewhat awkward to express in Little-JIL.
Participants: The participants in this pattern are the Actor, the Canceler and
the Compensator. The Actor performs some task that the Canceler later wants to
undo. The undo is accomplished by the Compensator, which understands the work
that was completed and how to undo it.
Sample Code and Usage: Figure 3.13 show a variation of the Little-JIL process
of planning a trip. In this example, the reservations can be made in any order. If
we fail to get a flight, we cancel the trip. This will require canceling hotel and car
reservations if they have already been made.
Variations: Compensation can be combined with other patterns. In particular,
any time that an activity fails with an exception, it may be necessary to undo some
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work that has been completed. Thus, compensation could form part of the exception
handling used in any of the preceding patterns.
Another variation is that it is not always necessary to include in the process
the tests to determine what work needs to be compensated, even in the absence of
a compensation construct like BPMN has. This is the case if the location of the
exception handler is sufficient to determine what work has been completed, as would
be the case if the compensation was in the context of sequential tasks rather than
concurrent tasks.
3.2.1.2 Evaluation of Exception Handling Patterns
To evaluate the catalogue of exception handling patterns, we examined several
existing models of real-world processes. The main question in which we were inter-
ested was how well the exceptional situations encountered in the real world can be
specified by the exception handling patterns from the catalogue. Associated goals
were to determine the relative frequencies of the occurrence of the various patterns in
the models of the real world processes and to gain some intuition about the amount
of effort entailed in representing the handling of exceptions in real-world processes.
Here, we present results obtained from studying Little-JIL models of two processes
from different domains—the medical and the digital government domains.
The chemotherapy process model. The Little-JIL model of a chemotherapy
process was the largest model of a real-world process that we had access to. At the
time this evaluating was performed, the chemotherapy process model consisted of 467
Little-JIL steps, 283 of which were Little-JIL leaf steps. The model captures the pro-
cess of preparation for and administration of outpatient breast cancer chemotherapy.
In a period of approximately a year, computer scientists elicited the process from
medical professionals working at the a cancer center in Western Massachusetts and
created a Little-JIL model of that process. Since many medical errors that lead to
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Figure 3.14: The number of occurrences of each pattern in the chemotherapy and ODR process
models.
patient safety hazards occur in atypical, exceptional situations, a great deal of effort
was spent in identifying such exceptional situations and specifying them precisely in
Little-JIL. In particular, 207 of all 467 steps (or about 44%) were used to represent
these exceptional situations and their handling in this process model.
The resulting process model captured 59 exceptional situations specifying precisely
the types of the exceptions, where in the process they occurred, the actions undertaken
to remedy the exceptions and the resumption of nominal flow after handling the
exception. We studied these 59 exceptional situations and tried to determine if and
how they related to the patterns in the catalogue. Figure 3.14 presents the results
of this investigation. Most of the exceptional situations in the chemotherapy process
that were captured by the Little-JIL model seemed to be instances of the patterns in
the catalogue. The two exceptional situations that did not easily match any pattern
in the catalogue actually seemed to combine elements of both the inserting and the
canceling behaviors.
The ODR process model. The second process model that we examined was
a Little-JIL model of an online dispute resolution (ODR) process that was used to
drive a web-based application for dispute resolution. The model captures a dispute
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resolution process used by the National Mediation Board (NMB) to resolve conflicts
between two different parties. It was elicited from a mediator working for the NMB.
At the time this evaluation was performed, the ODR process model consisted of
209 Little-JIL steps (69 leaf steps), 108 of which (or about 52%) were part of the
exceptional flow.
The ODR Little-JIL process model specified 19 exceptional situations. Figure 3.14
shows how many of them are instances of each of the different exception handling
patterns in the catalogue.
Observations. Almost all of the exception handling situations specified in the
process models we studied (76 out of the 78, or 97.5%) were instances of the patterns
from the catalogue. This was encouraging, suggesting that the identified patterns
cover a significant portion of the exceptional situations that arise in real-world HIPs,
and underscoring the potential value for enunciating a set of patterns that could
be useful in guiding the efforts of people who are attempting to define real-world
processes. We hope that defining these process patterns might cause process definers
to be more aware of the presence of exceptions, and more comfortable in incorporating
them into process models.
The variation in levels of usage of the different patterns was also interesting. We
note that the Immediate Fixing pattern occurred most frequently in these examples,
with 36 uses. This seems to be reasonable as agents are perhaps most inclined to try
to remedy exceptional situations immediately in the real world. We are less certain of
the reasons for the relative scarcity of instances of some of the other patterns. It seems
indeed possible that Unordered Alternatives are less prevalent because people innately
have preconceived preferences among alternatives, but this is not immediately obvious
to us. It is far less obvious why there are so few instances of the Compensation pattern,
as this seems to be a relatively common reaction to exceptional circumstances. Here
we are concerned that the relative scarcity of this pattern in our examples might
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be due to possible bias in the examples themselves. We note that these examples
were written in Little-JIL, a notation in which compensation is relatively difficult
to specify, suggesting that the facilities of a language might have a noticeable effect
upon the process features that are incorporated into a process model. Furthermore,
in Little-JIL, it is possible to represent the idea of compensation by not explicitly
fleshing out the compensation activities in the Little-JIL step tree, but relying on the
agent(s) responsible for the handling of an exception to perform the corresponding
compensation. If a compensation is expressed this way in a process model, then the
compensate structure in Figure 3.12 will not be observed in the corresponding process
model.
Another interesting observation concerns the nesting of exception handling pat-
terns within each other. We said that an instance of pattern A is nested within
an instance of pattern B, if the instance of A occurs entirely “inside” the exception
handler of the instance of B. 10 of the pattern instances (7 from the chemotherapy
and 3 from the ODR case studies) were nested within other patterns. All the nested
patterns, except one, were instances of the Ordered Alternatives pattern. This seems
to suggest that when people are dealing with an exceptional situation, they often
have a prioritized list of tasks to try to fix the problem.
Threats to validity. The results presented above may have been affected by
unintentional personal bias in two ways. First, the decision about whether a certain
behavior is exceptional or not and consequently whether this behavior was considered
in the evaluation of the patterns, may have been biased. The chemotherapy process
model was created by the author of this thesis and deciding which behaviors were
part of the nominal flow and which behaviors were part of the exceptional flow may
have been influenced by the author’s awareness of the exception handling patterns
work. To attempt to reduce possible bias in categorization of the exceptions in the
chemotherapy process, we also consulted the medical professionals from whom the
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process was elicited. We asked which behaviors they considered nominal and which
behaviors they considered exceptional. Their responses did confirm our selection and
categorization of the exceptions in that process.
The second process model (the ODR process model) was created by a process
model developer who was unaware of the exception handling patterns when creating
the model. Thus, the frequency and distribution of instances of the process patterns
should not have been influenced by the work on the patterns. This may have affected
the distribution of types of exception patterns that were observed, however.
The second source of bias is associated with classifying the exceptional behaviors
from the process models as instances of the patterns from the catalogue. The precise
structure of the patterns was an extremely useful guide in making these classification
decisions, but on a small number of occasions personal judgment was involved in
deciding which pattern a particular exceptional situation used.
Evaluation of processes in other notations. We made an attempt to examine
process models in UML and BPMN. The process models that we had access to,
however, were focused primarily on nominal flow and lacked thorough specification of
exceptional flow. For example, we looked at the model-based Simulation, Verification
& Testing (SV&T) process repository created as a part of the MODELPLEX project
[4]. The processes were formalized in SPEM2.0 [98] using the EPF Tool [3]. The
SV&T process repository contained 47 process diagrams, some of which were at a
higher level of abstraction and others were lower level decompositions of the higher
level diagrams. There were only a few occasions on which some process behavior
modeled with decision nodes could be thought of as exceptional behavior. There
seemed to be six instances of the Rework, one instance of Reject, and one instance
of Immediate Fixing in the processes in this repository. The process models were,
however, specified at a very high level (to make them general) and omitted detail
that could allow us to claim with certainty that specified behavior is an instance of
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a given exception handling pattern. We were unable to gain access to any sizable
BPMN process repository for this work. Thus, our evaluation focused on two Little-
JIL process models that specified a significant amount of exceptional behaviors and
at the same time were detailed and precise enough to allow us to categorize these
exceptional behaviors as instances of the presented patterns.
3.2.2 Comparing the Little-JIL Diagrammatic and Narrative Represen-
tations
To develop accurate models of a human-intensive process, it is usually important
that various stakeholders carefully review, evaluate, correct, and propose improve-
ments to these models. Some stakeholders (e.g., domain experts, process performers,
user interface designers, even some programmers), however, might not be experts in
process modeling. Consequently, such stakeholders may not have the skills to un-
derstand the process models except at a relatively superficial level. We have seen
this problem in our own work on modeling medical procedures. Medical professionals
may be able to point out glaring misrepresentations, but are not sufficiently versed in
modeling to fully understand the implications, for example, of complex control flow
such as the handling of exceptional situations and concurrent execution.
To help stakeholders with diverse backgrounds understand complex processes, we
have used two different process representations in our work—the Little-JIL visual,
diagrammatic representation (described in section 2.3.1 and the Little-JIL textual,
narrative representation (described in section 2.3.2). Each of these representations,
however, has its own strengths and weaknesses to facilitate process understanding.
Knowing these strengths and weaknesses could help process modelers what notation
to use when interacting with other process stakeholders, depending on the kinds of
process information to be discussed and the background of the stakeholders who
will participate in such discussions. To explore the strengths and weaknesses of the
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Little-JIL diagrammatic and narrative representations in terms of facilitating process
understanding, we conducted a user study.
3.2.2.1 User Study
3.2.2.1.1 Study Design. We created two process models and for each we created
the corresponding Little-JIL diagrammatic and narrative representations. The two
process models were of equal complexity, in terms of their size and the language
features they employed. In fact, one model was created by essentially “reshuffling”
the steps in the other one. We used colors for step names (e.g., perform blue) as
opposed to names of real activities (e.g., drive to work) to not bias the results based
on a subject’s experience with a domain. The process model representations are
included in Appendix B.2.
For each process model, we also created a questionnaire consisting of nine ques-
tions testing the understanding of the process. The two questionnaires were of equal
complexity since they were almost identical except for variations in step names. We
also included a final questionnaire with five open-ended questions asking for general
feedback about the two process representations. The questionnaires are shown in
Appendix B.2.
Half of the subjects were presented with the narrative representation of process
model 1 followed by the diagrammatic representation of process model 2; the other
half of the subjects were presented with the diagrammatic representation of process
model 1 followed by the narrative representation of process model 2. We presented
the two process representations in different orders to the two groups of subjects, be-
cause even though the understanding of process model 1 should not have helped with
understanding process model 2, the subjects might have improved their understand-
ing of fundamental process concepts (such as various kinds of control flow, exception
handling and artifact use). The subjects were assigned randomly to one of these two
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groups. Subjects were provided with a 10-15 minutes training in their first process
model representations (the narrative or the diagrammatic representation). Then, the
subjects were presented with a process model in that representation and with the
questionnaire for that process model. After the subjects answered the questionnaire
(there was no time limit imposed), that subjects were provided with a 10-15 min-
utes training in the other process model representation. Then, the subjects were
presented with the process model for their second process represented in their second
representation and with the questionnaire for that process model. After the subjects
answered the second questionnaire (again, no time limit was imposed), the subjects
were presented with the final questionnaire. Subjects were given laptops and they
viewed the narrative representation in a browser to be able to follow the hyperlinks
in the narrative.
The training materials used in the study are shown in Appendix B.1. During
a training period, the subjects were given an example process model in either the
diagrammatic or the narrative process representation and that representation was
explained to them using the corresponding training script. The training script was
given to the study subjects at the beginning of each training and they were allowed to
keep that script and use it as a reference during the entire study session. The subjects
were allowed and encouraged to ask any questions that they might have during the
training. After the training, the subjects were allowed to ask only about clarifications
on the questionnaires.
We performed the above study with two sets of subjects—computer science stu-
dents and nursing students. We decided to study two different sets to see whether
the subject’s background is related to their ability to understand a process via each
of the two representations. 16 computer science students participated in the study:
6 graduate and 10 undergraduate. 17 undergraduate nursing students participated
in the study. We tried to recruit as many subjects as possible and to keep the two
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a b
Figure 3.15: Study results—computer science students.
a b
Figure 3.16: Study results—nursing students.
sets of subjects of similar sizes. Students who had experience with the Little-JIL
diagrammatic or narrative representations were not allowed to participate.
3.2.2.1.2 Results and Discussion. On average, computer science students an-
swered correctly a higher number of questions—6.3 vs. 5.5 (out of 84)—when they
were using the diagrams (Figure 3.15a), and this difference is statistically significant
(p = 0.037)5. The same tendency was observed when examining the two groups of
4There were 9 questions in the original questionnaire, but question 4 was excluded from our
analysis because it covered the difficult concept of non-deterministic choice and the training we
provided might not have been sufficient to answer this question. It was answered correctly by only
one person when they were using the narrative.
5A paired t-test was used to determine statistical significance.
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computer science students separately (Figure 3.15a), where the difference for group
2 was statistically significant (p = 0.047) too. Graduate computer science students
answered more questions correctly than undergraduate computer science students for
both of the notations (on average, graduate students answered 6.5 and 5.8 questions
correctly using the diagrams and the narrative respectively, whereas undergraduates
answered on average 6.2 and 5.3 questions correctly), but, again, the same tendency
was observed—a higher number of questions was answered correctly when the di-
agrams were used (the differences were not statistically significant). These results
might suggest that computer science students are more comfortable with the di-
agrammatic notation, perhaps because of their experience with programming and
familiarity with control flow and data flow constructs.
Nursing students, on the other hand, answered a higher number of questions—
5.47 vs. 4.82 (out of 8)—when they were using the narrative representation (Fig-
ure 3.16a), but this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.238). The same
tendency was observed when examining the two groups of nursing students separately
(Figure 3.16a), but again the difference was not statistically significant. The nursing
students who saw their first process model in the narrative representation (students in
group 2) answered a higher number of questions on their first model than the nursing
students who saw their first process model in the diagrammatic notation (students in
group 1)—5.75 vs. 4.33—and the statistical significance of that difference (p = 0.0666)
was between the significance levels of p = 0.05 and p = 0.10. This might suggest that
if only one process representation is to be used, then nursing students (or perhaps even
professionals without computer science background, in general) should be presented
with a narrative process representation.
6A paired t-test could not be used in this case, so a t-test that assumes the two samples have
unequal variance had to be used.
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Figures 3.15b and 3.16b show the break down of correct answers per question for
computer science and nursing students respectively7. Computer science students gave
statistically significantly more correct answers for questions 2 and 7 when using the
diagrammatic representation than when using the narrative representation (p = 0.002
and p = 0.004 respectively). Computer science students gave more correct answers
to question 9 using the narrative representation than when using the diagrammatic
representation (p = 0.083, between the significance levels of p = 0.05 and p = 0.10).
The results for questions 2, 7, and 9 were similar when computer science undergrad-
uate and graduate students were considered separately, but only the difference in
correct answers for question 2 was statistically significant for both undergraduates
and graduates and the difference for question 7 for undergraduates.
Nursing students gave statistically significantly more correct answers to question 7
using the diagrammatic representation (p = 0.009) and statistically significantly more
correct answers to question 8 using the narrative representation (p = 0.014). Nursing
students also gave more correct answers to question 3 using the narrative than when
using the diagrammatic representation (p = 0.083, between the significance levels of
p = 0.05 and p = 0.10).
Question 2 was about prerequisites, 3 about parallel execution and 7 about the
number of times a step can be executed. Questions 8 and 9 were about artifacts. The
above results suggest that the two process representations complement each other
in terms of facilitating the understanding of different kinds of process information
and also that each representation makes different kinds of process information more
accessible to people with different backgrounds.
7Question 4 was excluded from our analysis because it covered the difficult concept of non-
deterministic choice and the training we provided might not have been sufficient to answer this
question. It was answered correctly by only one person when they were using the narrative.
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10 computer science students (37.5%) found the diagrams easier to understand,
the other 6 preferred the narrative. 8 nursing students found the diagrams easier
to understand, the other 9 preferred the narrative. The answers to the open-ended,
qualitative questions also indicated that the order of step execution and artifacts were
easier to understand with the narrative, whereas the number of times a step needs to
be performed was easier to understand with the diagrams. Several people mentioned
that the narrative was easier to understand at first with little training.
3.2.2.1.3 Threats to validity. The sample size was small and subjects from only
two areas of expertise participated in the study. Thus, the results may not apply to
stakeholders with different backgrounds and education, or even stakeholders with
backgrounds and education similar to the ones of the study subjects.
The quality of the training might have affected the results of the study. For in-
stance, if more time is spent on training, the quality of the training and the resulting
understanding of the corresponding process representation could be improved. Sub-
jects could be given multiple training examples or the subjects could be event be
tested and the test results discussed to reaffirm the understanding of the process
representations and correct any misunderstandings.
On the other hand, during the study, the subjects received focused training about
how each of the two process representations expressed process information that the
subsequent questionnaires asked about. In a real-world situation, the amount of time
between training and a subsequent use of one of the process representations might be
much longer and the training wold most likely be more general.
Due to time constraints on the study sessions, the two process models used were
relatively small (19 steps each). Realistic process models, especially models of com-
plex human-intensive processes, however, could be larger. It is not clear whether the
results obtained in the study will apply to such larger models.
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3.2.3 Overall Experience with Process Modeling
3.2.3.1 Experience with Using Little-JIL
The well-defined formal semantics of Little-JIL and its diagrammatic and narrative
notations have been useful in our work on eliciting and modeling processes from
several domains, and in particular processes from the highly-complex medical domain.
During process elicitation, Little-JIL’s rich semantic features, such as support for
exception handling and concurrency, encouraged process modelers to ask questions
about corresponding aspects of processes [14]. This helped elucidate process aspects
that are important but are often overlooked during open, unstructured interviews. In
fact, many of the difficulties we encountered in creating accurate process models arose
because initial versions based on open, unstructured interviews were too restrictive
or did not adequately capture all important process behaviors. Initial versions did
not contain adequate description of exception handling as domain experts often focus
on normal process executions during elicitation interviews. Prompted by Little-JIL’s
support for exception handling, process modelers asked questions such as “What do
you do if this check fails?” and “How do you resume the normal execution of the
process (if at all), after you have dealt with the failure of the check?”.
When asked to describe a complex procedure, domain experts often presented a
long list of activities, saying that the activities have to be done in sequence. It was
often the case, however, that sequential ordering was too restrictive and subsequent
questions by process modelers (stimulated by Little-JIL’s support for various activity
orderings) revealed that some subsets of activities can be done in any order, including
in parallel (especially when multiple process performers were involved). In other
cases, domain experts would say that some activities could be done in any order
(including in parallel), but subsequent questions (stimulated by Little-JIL’s support
for synchronization) indicated that there is some partial order between the activities.
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The need for precision in Little-JIL process models also proved to be helpful dur-
ing process elicitation and modeling. Having to precisely decompose a step into its
substeps, for example, led to identifying problems with existing terminology and clari-
fying this terminology, resulting in better understanding of the process, more accurate
models, and even improvements to the process. In a chemotherapy case study, we
found that terms like“verify”, “confirm”, “check”, “match”, and “consistent” were
used loosely [36]. The same word used at different times or in different contexts often
had different meanings, even when used by the same individual. Since many of the
critical errors that may occur in a process like chemotherapy may arise from neglect-
ing small details (like not checking to see if the patient height or weight measurements
on which the chemotherapy dose is based are sufficiently up-to-date while “verifying”
the doses), we had to develop a precise naming template and a glossary that dis-
ambiguated the use of different terms. This led to not only a better understanding
of the process and more accurate process models, but also the clarified terminology
was rapidly adopted for clinical use and contributed to improved accuracy of staff
communication [93].
The diagrammatic notation of Little-JIL also seemed useful for process elicitation
and modeling. The medical professionals who participated in several medical process
case studies [14] did not have a computer science background and were initially leery
about having to learn a process modeling language. Having a diagrammatic represen-
tation that is relatively easy to understand seemed to help considerably. The ability
of that notation to also provide restricted views of the process model also seemed to
help, since low-level details about the process model, such as the artifacts that needed
to be provided to process steps, could be suppressed until the higher-level views of
the major steps and their decompositions were agreed upon.
Having a natural language representation of the process was also helpful, since it
further lowered the technology hurdle for the medical professionals. The Little-JIL
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narrative (described in more detail in section 2.3.2) is a hyperlinked natural language
representation of a process and it is automatically generated from a Little-JIL process
model. Unlike manually created natural language representation, which are often
inconsistent and ambiguous, the Little-JIL narrative uses carefully defined natural
language templates to consistently and precisely describe the process information
captured by the formal Little-JIL process model. Even some of the computer scientists
found it useful to read through the narrative to find inconsistencies or to convince
themselves that the model was accurate8. Real processes are large and complex,
however, so both visual and textual representations can quickly become ungainly,
suggesting the need to develop effective process model summarization technologies.
Process elicitation guided by developing in parallel a Little-JIL process model
has had positive impact on the actual elicited processes. The very act of trying to
precisely model a process often led to discovering process defects and to identifying
possible process improvements. Sometimes during elicitation, misunderstandings be-
tween process stakeholders arose. In one situation it was determined that an artifact
that was being created was not being used subsequently. In another situation, a dead-
lock that involved two different medical professionals was discovered while eliciting a
chemotherapy process. A nurse needed to obtain the height and weight of a patient
to be able to verify drug dosages and to subsequently sign the patient’s treatment
plan. There was a hospital rule, however, that an appointment scheduler must wait
for a signed treatment plan before scheduling a visit at which the patient’s height
and weight could be verified. Thus, having both the nurse and the scheduler follow
the rules creates a deadlock situation, which was actually being observed in clinical
practice. To break the deadlock, some nurses were signing an unverified treatment
plan so that the scheduler could schedule a visit at which height and weight could
8We describe a user study that compares the Little-JIL diagrammatic and narrative process
representations in section 3.2.2.
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be verified. The signing of an unverified and potentially incorrect treatment plan is
dangerous, however, because it may mislead other medical professionals and perhaps
result in the administration of the wrong dosage. The discovery of this deadlock led
to a modification in the actual clinical process.
Little-JIL process models, being rich and precise, have also proved useful for train-
ing purposes. The senior oncology pharmacist who participated in the elicitation of a
chemotherapy process printed the natural language process description corresponding
to a Little-JIL process model and posted it as a training guide and reference for other
pharmacists working in the chemotherapy center [14]. After having participated in
the elicitation and modeling with Little-JIL of a blood transfusion process and becom-
ing more aware of different exceptional situations that might arise and inconsistent
use of terminology, a nursing professor modified the way she taught students how to
perform that process.
3.2.3.2 Process Model Validation
As previously discussed, creating process models could be difficult. To determine
how accurately a model represents what it models, a model is usually validated. Val-
idation, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, is “the process of determining
the degree to which a model is an accurate representation of the real-world from the
perspective of the intended uses of the model” [9]. Since in this work models are
used for online process guidance, we adapt this definition of validation to insist that
models be an accurate representation of the the set of process executions as agreed by
domain experts and process designers. We consider model accuracy to consist of two
components—model correctness and model completeness. A model is correct when
all the process executions it captures are correct with respect to a set of requirements.
A model is sufficiently complete when it does not omit any of the process executions
that should be part of that model as agreed by domain experts and process designers.
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A process model is rarely accurate the first time it is created and it often takes
several iterations discussing the model (or the information it represents, if the domain
experts are not versed in the modeling notation) with domain experts to improve the
accuracy of that model. During such discussions, process modelers, and sometimes
even domain experts, obtain new knowledge about the process, meaning that there
is a fine line between process elicitation and process model validation. Thus, the
process elicitation techniques described in section 3.1 could be used for process model
validation. In fact, as discussed in section 3.1, a process model was created in parallel
while the unstructured interviews were performed to elicit the chemotherapy treat-
ment plan review process. The subsequent elicitation methods, namely structured
interviews and direct observations, revealed inaccuracies in the model and led to
modifications in that model. These inaccuracies correspond to the new process infor-
mation that was obtained via the application of these subsequent elicitation methods
and included omitted steps from the normal process flow specified by the model,
missing exceptional situations and the responses to these situations.
Another technique to validate process models is to apply static analyses ap-
proaches to such models. We have applied model checking [37], fault-tree analysis
[128], and failure mode and effects analysis [121] to several models of HIPs from differ-
ent domains to find defects and vulnerabilities in the modeled HIPs ( [14,34,110,120]).
We have observed that before any problems can be found in the real-world HIPs, mul-
tiple inaccuracies in the models of these HIPs are uncovered via these static analysis
approaches. For example, we have found that important steps were missing from the
process models and that control flow among steps in these models was incorrectly
specified, especially control flow related to exceptional situations where various as-
pects need to be considered, such as how is an exception handled, what happens
to other potentially concurrently executing process activities while the exception is
being handled, and how the process resume nominal flow after the exception has
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been handled. We have found such static analyses approaches to be very useful for
validating process models and we believe they should be used in conjunction with
more traditional model validation approaches such as inspections, observations, and
interviews.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVIATION DETECTION AND EXPLANATION
4.1 Overview
The deviation detection and explanation approach presented in this chapter is a
component of the process improvement environment discussed in Chapter 2. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the high-level architecture of the deviation detection and explanation
approach. As a process is being performed, the Process Execution Monitor captures
events associated with the performed steps and incrementally creates the sequence
of performed step events. We use the term step to refer to an activity of interest
performed by humans, software or hardware devices as part of a process. To sim-
plify the discussion, hereafter we shall refer to the sequence of step events associated
with the sequence of actual performed steps as the sequence of performed steps. We
make the simplifying assumption that the sequence of performed steps is accurate,
meaning that the sequence contains all the events in the appropriate order for all
steps of interest that were performed, and there are no “noise” events (events that do
not correspond to a performed step of interest). We briefly discuss several possible
approaches for monitoring an executing process in section 4.4, but the details of these
approaches are outside the scope of this work.
Every time the Deviation Detector receives a step event from the Process Execu-
tion Monitor, it checks whether the corresponding sequence of steps performed so far
is one of the recommended sequences as specified by the Process Model. If it is not, a
deviation is detected, where we define a deviation as a situation where the sequence
of performed steps is not a prefix of one of the recommended sequences as specified
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Figure 4.1: Deviation detection and explanation approach.
by the Process Model. Upon deviation detection, process performers are warned that
a potential error might have occurred and the Deviation Explainer provides process
performers with information that could be useful for identifying potential errors and
for determining how to recover from such errors.
The deviation detection and explanation approach focuses on planning errors,
where a planning error is the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim [82]. We use a
standard definition of plan, which is “a sequence of activities”, and adapt it to be a
“sequence of steps”, because in this work we use the term step to represent a process
activity. Process performers can use the wrong sequences of steps to achieve an aim
either because they choose a wrong sequence to achieve that aim or because they
choose a correct sequence, but as they carry out that sequence they perform (or do
not perform) a step, which causes the sequence of performed steps to not be one of
the possible correct sequences for achieving the aim. The deviation detection and
explanation approach targets the latter kind of planning errors. Thus, we assume
that process performers intend to perform a correct sequence of steps to achieve
an aim (we call that sequence the intended sequence of steps) and we restrict the
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definition of planning error to “performing (or not performing) one or more steps,
which causes the sequence of performed steps to not be a prefix of the intended
sequence of steps”. Hereafter, we will use this meaning of planning error and we will
use the terms planning error and error interchangeably, unless explicitly indicated
otherwise. We also define the term first erroneous step as the first step in the sequence
of performed steps where the sequence of performed steps and the intended sequence
of steps differ from each other. In general, detecting a deviation does not necessarily
mean that process performers have made an error. If an intended sequence of steps
is not captured by a process model, because the process model is incomplete, then
if that sequence is performed, a deviation will be detected, but there would be no
error. In this work, we assume that the process model used for deviation detection
is complete and, thus, when a deviation is detected it means that an error has been
made. In practice, it is difficult to create complete process models, especially models
of complex HIPs, such as medical processes. We believe, however, that process models
could capture a significant portion of the recommended ways to perform a process to
the extent that such models could be useful for the deviation detection approach to
help catch errors before harm is done without at the same time generating too many
false positive deviation warnings due to the incompleteness of the model. Chapter 3
discusses approaches for eliciting processes and creating corresponding models.
It is also interesting to note that making an error during a process execution
does not necessarily mean that a deviation will be detected (immediately, or even
eventually). Even if we assume that the process model is correct (i.e., all the sequences
of steps it captures are recommended sequences to perform a process), it is still
possible for an error to occur without the Deviation Detector being able to detect a
deviation. Section 4.1.2.1 discusses this phenomenon in further detail. In this work,
we assume that the process model used for deviation detection is correct. In practice
it is difficult to create correct process models, but there are approaches for analyzing
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process models with respect to a set of correctness properties with the goal of finding
and removing defects from the models. Model checking [37] is one such approach and
it is discussed in section 2.1.1.
In the rest of this section, we describe in more detail the components of the
deviation detection and explanation approach shown in Figure 4.1.
Process Model. As discussed in chapter 2.2, in our experience, to support on-
line guidance for complex HIPs, the process model needs to be written in a notation
with rich and well-defined semantics. Specifically, such a notation should provide
support for modeling human choice, exception handling, concurrency, and synchro-
nization. For our work, we have chosen the Little-JIL process modeling language [27],
because it satisfies these requirements (Little-JIL is presented in Chapter 3). Little-
JIL’s compact visual notation and the corresponding automatically-generated precise
natural language representation facilitate communication with domain experts and,
hence, the elicitation and validation of process models. The proposed deviation de-
tection and explanation approach, however, is independent of the process modeling
language; it can be used with any language that has well-defined semantics that are
also sufficiently rich to capture complex real-world processes.
To make the implementation of the deviation detection experimental framework
(described in section 4.2) independent of a particular process modeling language, we
used a low-level process model representation into which various high-level process
modeling languages can be translated. This translation and the resulting low-level
representation are explained in detail in Appendix C.
To keep the discussion at a higher level and to better illustrate some of the issues
related to deviation detection and explanation, in this chapter we chose to use a con-
ceptual, simplified process representation—an extended control flow graph (ECFG).
An ECFG process model consists of nodes and edges. Activity nodes (graphically
illustrated as rounded rectangles) represent steps from the real world process. Each
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activity node is labeled with the name of the step it represents. There is a directed
edge from activity node A to activity node B, if the process step represented by
node A can immediately precede the process step represented by node B. An edge
can optionally have guards (shown as text in square brackets), which can specify the
conditions under which control can flow over that edge.
Fork and join nodes (graphically illustrated as black bars with the words “fork”
and “join” next to them respectively) are used to represent concurrent execution
and synchronization. The destination nodes of all edges leaving a fork node are the
beginning of node sequences whose corresponding step sequences from the real process
can be performed in parallel with each other. The source nodes of all edges going
to a join node are nodes whose corresponding process steps need to all be performed
before control can flow through the join node.
The nodes and the edges in an ECFG form a weakly connected directed graph.
Nodes that do not have any incoming edges are start nodes (i.e., control can start at
such nodes); nodes that do not have any outgoing edges are final nodes (i.e., control
ends at such nodes).
An ECFG representing a simplified blood transfusion process is shown in Fig-
ure 4.2. In that example, each activity node is also labeled with a single letter for
convenience in the discussion in section 4.5.
Deviation Detector. The Deviation Detector traverses the process model, start-
ing from every start “location” of that model1, to determine whether the sequence
of performed steps so far is a legal sequence of steps through the model. For effi-
ciency, this traversal is done incrementally, breadth-first, maintaining a frontier of
possible locations2 in the process model that could correspond to the last performed
1What “start location” means, depends on the kind of process model used. In the low-level
representation of a Little-JIL model that we use in our implementation, the start location is a node
in a graph.
2Again, what “location” means depends on the particular process model used.
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step. When this frontier becomes empty, i.e., when there is no sequence of locations
through the process model that corresponds to the sequence of performed steps, a
deviation is detected.
Deviation Explainer. When a deviation is detected, the Deviation Explainer
compares the sequence of performed steps against sequences of steps from the process
model. Given the sequence of performed steps, it uses a similarity measure based on
string comparison techniques to identify sequences of steps from the process model
that are likely to have been intended by the process performers. The differences
between these likely intended sequences and the sequence of performed steps are then
interpreted to obtain information that could be used to explain the detected deviation.
The deviation explanation approach is discussed in more detail in section 4.5.
4.1.1 Example of Applying the Deviation Detection and Explanation Ap-
proach to a Medical Process
Figure 4.2 shows a model of a simplified blood transfusion process in the ECFG
notation. Figure 4.2 focuses on some of the steps performed by the nurse and, to re-
duce clutter, leaves out information that is not relevant to this discussion, such as the
tasks of others (e.g., blood bank, physician) as well as most of the exceptional situa-
tions that could arise (e.g., the patient does not speak the language or is unconscious).
According to this model, to carry out a physician’s order for blood transfusion, the
nurse needs to first contact the laboratory to check whether the patient’s blood type
is known. If the blood type is not known, the nurse needs to obtain a blood specimen
and send it to the blood bank for testing. Once the patient’s blood type is known
and the blood bank has prepared the blood product, the nurse can pick up the blood
from the blood bank.
After picking up the blood and before infusing it into the patient, the nurse needs
to first verify the patient’s identity and then verify the blood product to ensure that
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Figure 4.2: Simplified blood transfusion process.
the correct blood product will be given to the correct patient. Verifying the patient’s
identity involves asking the patient for identification information, such as name and
date of birth, and making sure that this information matches the patient’s ID band
and the patient chart. Verifying the blood product involves checking its expiration
date and checking that the information on the product (patient name, date of birth,
and blood type) matches the same information on the patient ID band and in the
patient chart.
A common error reported in the medical literature, and one that can cause severe
harm to patients, is not fully following the procedure for verifying the patient’s iden-
tity [70]. A possible instance of this error is omitting the step verify patient’s identity
altogether. Consider the situation where in a busy emergency department patient A
is wearing the incorrect ID band—that of patient B. Perhaps a registration clerk had
to place ID bands on several patients and inadvertently switched the ID bands; or
there was a shift change and due to a miscommunication the new clerk placed the
ID band for patient B on patient A. Suppose that patient B is the one for whom a
blood transfusion was ordered. Since patient A is wearing patient B’s ID band, if the
nurse does not check the identity of patient A prior to infusing the blood, patient A
might receive the blood ordered for patient B. Note that the nurse might still have
successfully performed the blood product checks since they are done against the ID
band and not against the patient’s real identity.
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Potential harm as a result of this error might be avoided if the nurse is warned
that the process is being performed incorrectly before the infusion is started. One way
to achieve this is by comparing the sequence of steps the nurse has performed against
the process model. A possible sequence of steps when the nurse forgets to verify
the patient’s identity is contact lab for patient’s blood type, pick up blood from blood
bank, check blood product expiration date, check blood product info matches patient
info, infuse blood. As soon as the nurse starts the step check blood product expiration
date, the sequence of steps is no longer a sequence allowed by the model specified in
Figure 4.23. Informing the nurse about such a deviation might help the nurse recover
from the error before harm is done (i.e., infusing blood into the wrong patient).
Depending on the level of expertise of the process performer and the complexity
of the error, just a warning that an error might have been committed might be
sufficient to identify the error and to recover from it. In the example above, it
might be fairly easy for an experienced nurse to determine what went wrong. In
more complicated situations, however, perhaps involving a less experienced process
performer or involving multiple process performers working concurrently and dealing
with exceptional cases, additional information might help determine what the errors
were and how to recover from them.
For instance, a hypothesis about the location(s) in the sequence of performed steps
where the error was committed could be presented. In the current example, the nurse
could be told that an error might have occurred when the third step in the sequence,
check blood product expiration date, was performed. In a more complex situation, the
actual error might have occurred earlier than when it was detected (an example is
3Note that checking the blood product expiration date before verifying the patient’s identity
might not be problematic by itself. The hospital might have designed the process the way it is
shown in Figure 4.2, however, based on experience that when the blood product checks are done
before verifying the patient’s identity, the verification of the patient’s identity is more likely to be
omitted, or for efficiency reasons.
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Figure 4.3: An Example Extended Control Flow Graph.
discussed in section 4.1.2). Pointing the process performers to that earlier location
in the performed sequence of steps could provide them with the necessary context to
determine what the error is and how to recover from it.
4.1.2 Issues
There are several interesting issues related to the proposed deviation detection
approach. These issues are discussed next.
4.1.2.1 Delayed Deviation Detection and Potential Harm Due to Delay
It is sometimes possible that process performers make an error, but a deviation
cannot be immediately detected. For example, consider the example ECFG process
model in Figure 4.3. The two legal sequences of steps allowed by this process model
are abcdef and acdghf. Suppose that during a particular execution of the process
represented in Figure 4.3, the process performers intend to carry out the sequence
abcdef, but forgot to perform step b. In this situation, the first erroneous step is c since
it was performed after a instead of the omitted b. A deviation cannot be detected,
however, until e is performed (resulting in acde being the sequence of performed
steps), because acd is a legal sequence through the process model. Thus, there is a
deviation detection delay with respect to when an error is committed and we call this
situation delayed deviation detection.
Given that the intent of process performers is often unknown, there are situations,
like the one in the above example, when a deviation detector cannot determine which
branch(es) should be taken at a branch point during a particular process execution.
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Such situations might arise in real HIPs when, for example, decisions need to be made
based on subjective, and sometimes error-prone, human judgement, perhaps under
uncertainty or in the absence of evidence-based guidelines. In some cases, additional
information could be collected in such situations to determine which branch should be
taken. For example, process performers could be asked to declare their intent at such
branch points. In other situations, however, collecting such additional information
may be impractical and, thus, we assume that there will be branch points at which a
deviation detector will not know which branch should be taken.
Such branch points can cause deviation detection delays. For instance, if at such
a branch point a human makes a commission error consisting of performing steps
from a non-intended branch and then performs the steps from the intended branch,
a deviation detector will not be able to detect the commission error until the human
performs the first step of the intended branch, or possibly until even later, if the two
branches have common steps. Similarly, if a process performer omits a step from the
beginning of the intended branch (as is the situation in the above example based on
the model in Figure 4.3), a delayed deviation detection could also arise.
To understand and characterize the issue of delayed deviation detection, it is useful
to have a way to measure a deviation detection delay. A deviation detection delay
could be measured in terms of real time, e.g., number of seconds between the moment
when the first erroneous step was performed and the moment when a deviation is
detected. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, real-time issues are outside the scope
of the deviation detection and explanation approach and, thus, we decided to not use
this kind of measurement of deviation detection delay. Instead, we are interested in
deviation detection delay in terms of the number of steps between the first erroneous
step in the sequence of performed steps and the step where the deviation is detected.
For instance, in the example based on the model in Figure 4.3 discussed above, the
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deviation detection delay is 2 steps, given that the first erroneous step in the sequence
of performed steps acde is c, but a deviation is not detected until e is performed.
It is important to note that even though delayed deviation detection can arise in
real process executions, the existence of delayed deviation detection and the delay
itself cannot be determined without knowing the intent of process performers. Under
some assumptions about the errors that can occur during the execution of a process,
for example the number and kind of errors, it might be possible to determine what
the maximum delay might be upon the detection of a deviation. For instance, if
we assume that process performers can make at most one error per execution of the
process modeled in Figure 4.3 and this error is omission of a single step, then upon
detecting a deviation at the end of the sequence of performed steps acde, it can be
determined that the maximum delay is 2 steps. It cannot be determined, however,
whether the deviation detection delay is indeed 2 steps without knowing whether
process performers intended to perform the abcd. . . or the acdg. . . sequence of steps
through the process model.
The issue of delayed deviation detection leads to situations where the deviation
detection approach might not be able to detect deviations before harm is done as a
result of an error. In principle, deviation detection delay can be arbitrarily long (if the
two branches in Figure 4.3 had a longer sequence of identical substeps—in this case
this sequence is cd—the deviation detection delay could be even longer) and serious
harm could potentially occur before the deviation is detected. It is important to study
the issue of delayed deviation detection to understand to what extent it constitutes
an obstacle for the proposed deviation detection approach (e.g., how often delayed
deviation detection arises and what the severity of the consequences from the delay
is) and to also identify strategies for dealing with delayed deviation detection.
Some important research questions related to delayed deviation detection are:
• What are the characteristics of deviation detection delays in complex HIPs?
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– How often might deviation detection delays occur in complex HIPs?
– How long could such deviation detection delays be?
– How critical/harmful could such deviation detection delays be?
– What are the causes for potential deviation detection delays?
• How can deviation detection delays be reduced or avoided?
– How can a process model be statically analyzed to determine potential
deviation detection delays?
– How can a process be changed to reduce the potential for deviation detec-
tion delays?
– What can be done during an execution of a process to avoid deviation
detection delays?
In this work, we focus on the first set of research questions. The second set is
discussed under future work.
4.1.2.2 Potential Harm When Deviations Are Immediately Detected
Even when deviations are immediately detected as the errors that cause them
are committed, harm could potentially still occur. Such a situation can arise when
an omission error is made before a potentially harmful step. For example, in the
simplified blood transfusion process shown in Figure 4.2, one of the checks that need
to be performed before infusing the blood is to ensure that the blood product has not
expired. The process model allows this check to occur immediately before infusing
the blood. If the nurse forgets to check whether the blood product has expired, the
deviation will be detected when the nurse starts the infusion. Even though there is no
deviation detection delay (based on the above definition of deviation detection delay),
harm could still occur as the patient might receive expired blood. This is an example
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of a vulnerability in the process model or in the process itself (assuming the model
is accurate) with respect to the proposed deviation detection approach—a deviation
cannot be detected until a potentially harmful step is already started.
Another situation where harm could occur, even if the deviation is immediately
detected, is when the error is a commission of a harmful step (e.g., administer a
drug). In this case, a deviation cannot be detected before the harmful step is started
because the sequence of steps up to that point would be a legal sequence through the
process model.
In this work, we explore the following research questions related to the above issue:
• How often do situations where harm could occur, even when deviations are
immediately detected, arise in some complex HIPs?
• What can be done to reduce or avoid such situations?
4.1.2.3 Performance of the Deviation Detector
It is important that the Deviation Detector does not take too long to compute
whether a deviation has occurred after a new step is added to the sequence of per-
formed steps. Otherwise, if a deviation occurs, the warning about that deviation
might get issued after harm is already done as a result of the deviation.
Models of realistic HIPs and the corresponding search space that the Deviation
Detector needs to explore while traversing a process model could be of significant
size, possibly requiring more information to be stored at runtime than the available
computer memory allows.
We explore the following research questions related to the performance of the
Deviation Detector:
• What is the size and the complexity of HIPs that can be handled by the Devi-
ation Detector?
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• What are the running time and the space requirements of the Deviation Detector
when applied to some realistic HIPs?
4.2 Deviation Detection Framework
To study the above issues, ideally, we would need (1) a realistic model of a HIP and
(2) a set of step sequences with errors that correspond to erroneous real executions
of the modeled HIP. We were able to create several realistic models of HIPs by using
the process elicitation and modeling techniques discussed in Chapter 3. We were not
able to obtain, however, step sequences that correspond to real process executions
with errors. Obtaining such sequences for HIPs is challenging as some important
process steps, such as cognitive activities (e.g., verifying the patient stated name
matches the name on the patient’s ID band), are difficult to automatically capture
and often require time-consuming, expensive, and potentially error-prone manual
observations of an executing process. Furthermore, obtaining real process executions
that contain errors might increase the number of executions that need to be observed
as it is unethical to encourage process performers to commit errors. The recognition
of potential errors in real process executions could be a challenging task on its own.
By interviewing domain experts and surveying domain literature, we identified
several plausible errors that could occur in HIPs and roughly where in a process
execution such errors might occur. We used this set of errors in our evaluation of
the deviation detection approach, but we did not deem this set to be comprehensive
enough by itself to serve as the basis for this evaluation.
To overcome the above obstacles in obtaining realistic process executions with
errors, we created a deviation detection experimental framework (shown in Figure 4.4)
that supports the generation of synthetic sequences of steps based on the model of a
HIP and the seeding of errors in such generated sequences. The characteristics of the
generated sequences and the number and kinds of seeded errors can be controlled,
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Figure 4.4: Deviation detection experimental framework.
so that the previously discussed deviation detection issues can be studied in various
circumstances.
In this framework, a Sequence Generator takes as input the Process Model and
a set of Sequence Specifications and then produces a sequence of steps from the
Process Model that satisfies the given Sequence Specifications. The Process Model is
a low-level process model translated from a Little-JIL process model. The translation
procedure and the low-level model are described in Appendix C.
The Sequence Specifications are used to control the characteristics of a generated
sequence and include the minimum/maximum length of that sequence, whether the
sequence should be generated by a random walk through the process model or by a
non-random walk favoring or avoiding certain steps. For example, if the goal is to
study deviation detection issues on the nominal flow of a given process, it can be
specified that a sequence corresponding to a process execution with no exceptions
should be generated.
A synthetically generated sequence corresponds to a legal process execution. We
will refer to such a sequence as a legal sequence. To obtain a sequence that corresponds
to a process execution with error(s), a legal sequence is processed by the Error Seeder.
87
The Error Seeder also takes as input Error Seeding Specifications, which are used to
control the kinds and number of errors that get seeded into the given legal sequence.
Examples of the kinds of errors that could be seeded are omission of a step, commission
of a step, or omission of several steps that pertain to a given subprocess.
A sequence with seeded errors (also referred to as a mutant) represents a process
execution with errors. The Deviation Detector takes a sequence of steps as input
and determines whether that sequence is a legal sequence. The Deviation Detector
can also be instrumented to collect various Deviation Detection Statistics, such as
whether there was a deviation detection delay, how long that delay was, and how
much time it took to detect the deviation.
In this experimental framework, a generated legal sequence can be considered to be
an intended process execution, a mutated sequence can be considered to be a sequence
of performed steps, a mutation can be considered to be an error, and the index of the
(first) mutation can be considered to be the index of the first erroneous step. These
interpretations allow us to experimentally evaluate the deviation detection approach
with respect to the issues described in section 4.1.2, and in particular with respect
to delayed deviation detection where the delay can only be measured if the intended
sequence of steps is known.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe how we utilized the deviation detection framework to
experimentally study the deviation detection issues discussed in section 4.1.2.
4.3.1 Experimental Design
To perform an initial evaluation of the proposed deviation detection approach, we
used the experimental framework to apply the approach to models of chemotherapy
and blood transfusion processes elicited from and validated by domain experts in-
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volved in these processes [14,31,34,70]. We generated various sequences of steps from
these models and then mutated these sequences to represent process executions with
errors. The kinds of mutations we used are described below.
Our evaluation method is somewhat related to mutation testing [52] and fuzz
testing [94]. Mutation testing is a common software engineering technique where
a computer program is systematically mutated (usually by making a predefined set
of simple changes to the source code) to evaluate software test suites and software
testing and analysis approaches. All mutated versions of a program are executed with
the inputs from a test suite and the smaller the number of mutated versions that pass
the test suite, the higher quality the test suite is considered to be. This reasoning
can be extended to assess the quality of software testing approaches for assisting with
the creation of test suites.
Fuzz testing is a form of random testing for evaluating the robustness of a pro-
gram. Inputs for a program are usually randomly generated and can include values
outside the program’s set of legal inputs. The goal is to find inputs that can “break”
the program, e.g., cause the program to crash or halt, and then determine the vul-
nerabilities in the program code that are responsible for the breaking of the program
given the randomly generated inputs.
Our evaluation method is similar to mutation testing in that we apply a predefined
set of mutations. Unlike mutation testing, however, we do not mutate the process
model (which is the analog of a computer program), but we mutate sequences of
steps from that model (which are the analog of computer program execution traces).
Furthermore, we do not evaluate the collection of inputs to a program (which is what
a test suite is), but we evaluate the deviation detection approach that takes as input
a program (the process model) and an execution of that program (the sequence of
performed steps).
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If we consider the Deviation Detector (which implements the proposed deviation
detection approach) and not the process model to be the analog of a computer pro-
gram and the sequence of performed steps and the process model to be the analog of
input/test data for that program, then our evaluation method shares some similarities
with fuzz testing—we “stress-test” the Deviation Detector by giving it as inputs a
large number of synthetically generated sequences of steps to evaluate the Deviation
Detector (and the approach it implements). We are interested, for example, in find-
ing sequences of steps that represent process executions with errors, such that the
Deviation Detector cannot detect a deviation at the index of the sequence where the
error is seeded. We are then interested in finding vulnerabilities in the process model
(but not the deviation detector, which is the analog of the program in this case) that
cause such delayed deviation detections.
The following sections describe in more detail the artifacts we used in the exper-
imental evaluation—the process models and the generated synthetic sequences with
errors—and the experiments we performed.
4.3.1.1 Process Models
We used two realistic models of a chemotherapy and a blood transfusion processes
to evaluate the deviation detection approach. The chemotherapy process model was
elicited from medical professionals participating in a chemotherapy ordering and ad-
ministration process in a regional cancer center in Western Massachusetts. The elic-
itation took place over the course of a year and multiple interviews with domain
experts were conducted until the domain experts expressed satisfaction with the ac-
curacy and the completeness of the process model4. For additional validation of
4The process model was created in Little-JIL. Some domain experts, who felt comfortable with the
notation, reviewed pasts of the Little-JIL model in addition to the corresponding natural language
description of that model; others preferred to review only the natural language description.
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the process model, some domain experts were also observed while performing some
activities from the process.
The blood transfusion process model was part of a benchmark for studying the
applicability of software engineering techniques to improving medical processes [34].
We developed that benchmark with a nursing faculty member working on patient
safety [70]. This elicitation also took place over a year and multiple interviews with
the nursing faculty member were performed until she expressed satisfaction with the
accuracy and the completeness of the process model.
The two selected process models are of significant size and complexity. At the time
of writing this dissertation, the chemotherapy process model covers multiple phases of
the chemotherapy process, including diagnosing the patient and ordering chemother-
apy; thorough review of the treatment plan and medication orders by a medical
assistant, a nurse, and a pharmacist; conducting an informational/teaching session
with the patient and obtaining informed consent form; preparing chemotherapy drugs,
performed by a pharmacist and pharmacy technicians; assessing the patient and ad-
ministering the drugs, performed by a clinical nurse. The chemotherapy Little-JIL
process model includes 283 steps performed by human process performers and spec-
ifies 59 exception handling situations5. The corresponding low-level representation
(discussed in Appendix C) has 2,358 nodes and 701,887 edges.
The blood transfusion process model is based on a standard blood transfusion
checklist from the medical literature [130] and includes additional information about
problems that might arise during the process and their handling. This model covers
the process activities starting from receiving a physician order for transfusion to dis-
charging the patient. It specifies multiple phases of the process, including verifying
5An exception handling situation usually involves multiple steps to deal with the exception. A
step (e.g., assess patient), can occur both on a nominal process execution and on an execution where
an exceptional situation arises (e.g., patient develops an allergic reaction). Furthermore, a step can
also be part of different exception handling situations.
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that the patient blood type and screen are available (and if they are not, performing
the subprocess of obtaining and labeling a blood specimen); ordering and obtaining
a blood product from the blood bank; performing various verifications on the patient
and on the blood product before starting the transfusion; monitoring the patient dur-
ing the infusion and appropriately reacting if a transfusion reaction is suspected. The
blood transfusion Little-JIL process model includes 102 steps (including 63 exception
handling situations) and the corresponding low-level representation has 97,237 nodes
and 242,442,845 edges. Even though the blood transfusion model has fewer steps
than the model of the chemotherapy process, the exception handling behavior in the
blood transfusion process is more complex, requiring a large number of nodes and
edges in the low-level representation to express this behavior.
4.3.1.2 Synthetic Sequences with Errors
To evaluate the deviation detection approach, we applied it to synthetic sequences
of steps containing typical planning errors. Although there is a disagreement in
the human error literature about a standardized taxonomy of human errors [71, 82],
two error kinds appear in the intersection of most of the proposed planning error
taxonomies [77, 78, 82]—omission and commission errors. An omission error occurs
when a step(s) that should be performed is not performed; a commission (planning)
error occurs when the wrong step(s) is performed.
In our initial evaluation of the deviation detection approach, we focused on several
kinds of planning errors that involve a single step and on the error of omission of a
single subprocess. This decision was based on blood transfusion errors identified in the
medical literature [70] and on conversations with blood transfusion and chemotherapy
domain experts.
4.3.1.2.1 Single-Step Errors. From each of the two process models, we gener-
ated two kinds of legal sequences of steps—sequences that represented randomly se-
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lected process executions and sequences that represented nominal process executions,
i.e., executions where no exceptions occur. We generated 50 different sequences of
each kind for a total of 100 legal sequences per process model. There were no com-
mon sequences between the 50 sequences that represented randomly selected process
executions and the 50 sequences that represented nominal process executions—the se-
quences that represented randomly selected process executions all contained at least
one exceptional situation, due to the high number of exceptional situations in both
process models. All generated sequences represented full process executions. We con-
sider a process execution to be full if after the last step in that execution, the process
model does not allow any additional steps be performed. Statistics about the lengths
of the generated sequences are shown in Figure 4.5.
The number 50 for generated sequences of each kind was arbitrary, but consid-
ered to be large enough based on an exploratory analysis we performed before the
experimental evaluation. In this analysis, we generated sequences from the process
models, seeded errors in them, applied the Deviation Detector to these sequences
with seeded errors, and analyzed the results. We were observing whether there was a
deviation detection delay, and if there was, we noted the length of the delay, whether
harm could occur as a result of the delay, and the causes for that delay. We were
also observing how situations could arise where harm could potentially occur even
when there is no deviation detection delay and what the performance of the devia-
tion detector was in terms of execution time and memory used. After having applied
the deviation detector to about 30-40 sequences with seeded errors from each process
model, we stopped obtaining any new findings as part of the above observations—a
sign of data saturation. Thus, for the experimental evaluation of the deviation detec-
tion approach, we decided to generate 50 different sequences of each kind (described
above) for each model. After systematic mutations, each set of 50 sequences resulted
in a much larger set of sequences with seeded errors—between 1000 and almost 8000
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sequences in a set—which is a much larger number of sequences with seeded errors
than the 30-40 after which we reached data saturation in our exploratory analysis.
For the experimental evaluation of the deviation detection approach, three dif-
ferent single-step mutations—deletion, insertion, and substitution of a step—were
applied to each generated sequence to represent three different kinds of single-step
errors—an error of omission, commission, and substitution respectively. Each muta-
tion kind was applied at each index of a sequence to represent situations where errors
occur at different points of a process execution. Thus, for each of the two sets of 50
randomly selected sequences from the two process models, we created three sets of
mutated sequences (mutants), one set for each mutation kind, resulting in one set of
deletion mutants, one set of insertion mutants, and one set of substitution mutants.
Similarly, for each of the two sets of 50 sequences that represented nominal process
flow through the two process models, we created three corresponding sets of deletion,
insertion, and substitution mutants. These mutations resulted in six sets of mutants
for each process model and the number of mutants in each of these sets in shown in
Figure 4.5 in the columns labeled “Experiment 1” through “Experiment 6”.
A deletion mutant was created by deleting a step from a sequence. A step from
every sequence index (except the last index) was deleted from each of the original
sequences. A deletion of the last step in a sequence was not performed because that
would leave the sequence a legal process execution. An insertion mutant was created
by inserting a step, chosen uniformly and at random from all process steps, into a
sequence. A step was inserted between every two steps (including before the first
step, but not after the last step) in each of the original sequences. If the inserted
step was the same as the subsequent step in the sequence, this would always result in
a delayed deviation detection; so, in these cases another step instead was randomly
chosen for insertion. A substitution mutant was created by substituting a step in a
sequence with a different step chosen uniformly and at random from all process steps.
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A substitution mutation was done at every index of each of the original sequences.
For all three mutation kinds, mutants that remained legal sequences were discarded.
4.3.1.2.2 Subprocess Errors. In addition to studying the Deviation Detection
approach on sequences that represent process executions with single-step errors, we
were also interested in studying the approach on sequences that represent process
executions with more complex errors. One such kind of errors reported in the litera-
ture [70] and identified in discussions with domain experts is the omission of an entire
subprocess.
We identified 5 blood transfusion and 5 chemotherapy subprocesses deemed most
likely to be omitted, based on common blood transfusion and chemotherapy errors re-
ported in the medical literature and on our interaction with domain experts involved
in these processes. The selected blood transfusion subprocesses were: (1) ensure
correct patient is present (performed by a nurse before notifying the blood bank to
prepare the blood to prevent the possibility the blood product to expire because the
patient is not available for transfusion or the wrong patient is in the room); (2) verify
patient ID band and (3) verify blood product information (part of the bedside checks
performed by the nurse before beginning the infusion); (4) assess patient and (5) eval-
uate patient clinically (part of the clinical evaluation prior to the infusion, performed
again by the nurse). The selected chemotherapy subprocesses were: (1) record height
and weight (performed during patient registration by a clerk); (2) confirm all neces-
sary information is present (part of the consultation and assessment, performed by an
oncologist before creating the treatment plan and chemotherapy orders); (3) confirm
pretesting has been done and (4) confirm existence and not staleness of height/weight
data (part of the treatment plan and orders verifications performed by a Practice
Registered Nurse (RN)); (5) obtain patient informed consent (performed by a Nurse
Practitioner or a Clinic Nurse prior to chemotherapy administration).
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For each identified subprocess, we generated 50 different sequences (allowing ex-
ceptions) from the corresponding process model, such that these sequences contained
the steps from the subprocess. We then mutated each generated sequence by deleting
all steps pertaining to the specific subprocess selected to be omitted. Thus, we created
250 mutants for each of the two process models. We call these mutants subprocess
omission mutants.
4.3.1.3 Experiments
Using the deviation detection framework, the deviation detection approach was
applied to each mutant and various statistics were collected. We performed seven ex-
periments with the mutants from each process model. In experiments 1 through 3, we
applied the deviation detection approach to the deletion, insertion, and substitution
mutants generated from the 50 random sequences. In experiments 4 through 6, we
applied the approach to the deletion, insertion, and substitution mutants generated
from the 50 nominal flow sequences. In experiment 7, we applied the approach to the
subprocess omission mutants.
4.3.1.4 Potentially Harmful Steps
To address the question of whether/how often harm might occur due to delayed
deviation detection, we identified a set of potentially harmful steps from the blood
transfusion and chemotherapy processes. These are steps, such that if an error has
occurred prior to their performance, performing them could potentially result in im-
mediate harm. One such step from the blood transfusion process is begin infusion of
blood product. If, for example, the nurse has forgotten to verify the patient’s identity
prior to infusing the blood or forgotten to verify that the blood product matches
the one listed in the blood transfusion order, the nurse can potentially infuse the
wrong blood into the patient. An example of a potentially harmful step from the
chemotherapy process is administer chemotherapy drug.
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The set of potentially harmful steps for the blood transfusion process we used in
this analysis is: {begin infusion of blood product, administer pre-transfusion medica-
tions, administer medications (during the transfusion), draw blood specimen}. The set
of potentially harmful steps for the chemotherapy processes is: {administer chemother-
apy drug, administer chemotherapy pre-medications, administer emergency medica-
tions, start IV, draw blood specimen}. The steps draw blood specimen and start IV
are not as dangerous as the other ones in the two sets above, but could still cause
significant inconvenience to the patient, if performed when they should not be per-
formed.
Having identified the sets of potentially harmful steps for the blood transfusion
and chemotherapy processes, we then inspected the mutated sequences described
above to determine whether a potentially harmful step occurs between the mutation
index and the index of deviation detection. For sequences for which this was the case,
we manually analyzed whether the error (the mutation) could affect the potentially
harmful step. If harm could occur as a result of the error, we counted the mutated
sequence as one for which deviation detection delay could be potentially harmful.
4.3.2 Results
Figure 4.5 shows the results of applying the deviation detection approach to the
blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes. The definition of deviation detection
delay from section 4.1.2 is used, where the first erroneous step is the step at the
mutation index (the index in a sequence of steps where the mutation was done for
single-step errors or the index of the first mutation for subprocess errors).
4.3.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results from the experimental evaluation with re-
spect to the deviation detection issues presented in section 4.1.2.
97
Figure 4.5: Applying the deviation detection approach to blood transfusion and chemotherapy
process models.
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4.3.3.1 Delayed Deviation Detection and Potential Harm Due to Delay
Delayed deviation detection occurred infrequently—in less than 1% of the mutants
from all experiments. We analyzed each mutated sequence with deviation detection
delay by tracing that sequence through the corresponding process model to deter-
mine the reasons for the delay. There were three main reasons: exception handling,
optional steps, and shuffled steps. All of these three process structures were a source
of branching similar to the one in Figure 4.3 that could potentially cause a deviation
detection delay. For example, consider exception handling. Suppose a process can be
performed by executing step sequence abcd, when there are no exceptional situations.
If an exceptional situation arises while performing b, however, then the sequence of
steps xyz should be performed to address this situation before continuing with steps
c and d, resulting in sequence abxyzcd. If the legal sequence abcd is mutated by in-
serting step x after step b, the deviation cannot be detected until step c is performed
(which is one step after the mutation index) because abx is a prefix of a legal sequence.
Optional steps caused deviation detection delay in an analogous way.
The third reason for deviation detection delays was shuffled steps. Shuffled steps
are steps that should be done sequentially but are allowed to occur in any order.
Sequences of steps that are generated from a process model and that contain shuffled
steps have subsequences, which we call shuffle subsequences, such that the steps in
these subsequences are allowed to occur in any order. For example, suppose that
a process is performed by doing step a, followed by steps b, c, and d in any order,
and then step e. There are six allowable sequences of steps to execute that process,
corresponding to the six permutations of steps b, c, and d. One such allowable
sequence is abcde. The subsequence bcd is a shuffle subsequence6. If the step sequence
6A shuffle subsequence does not have to be a contiguous subsequence of the sequence of performed
steps. For example, if other steps can be performed in parallel with the shuffled steps, these other
steps might be interleaved with the shuffled steps in the sequence of performed steps. For instance,
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abcde is mutated by deleting step b, a deviation will not get detected until step e is
performed because acd is a prefix of a legal sequence. This results in a deviation
detection delay of 2, given that in our experimental evaluation we consider abcde
to be the intended sequence, acde the sequence of performed steps, and c the first
erroneous step in the sequence of performed steps.
Shuffled steps are different from other branch points in a process where there are
more than one steps to perform next, because any of the shuffled steps is acceptable
to be performed next during an execution of the process on which the shuffled steps
need to be performed. In other branching situations when shuffled steps are not
involved, for example when one branch is nominal flow and the other exceptional
flow, one branch needs to be performed on certain process executions and the other
branch needs to be performed on other process executions, but a deviation detector
might not be able to determine which branch should be performed on the particular
execution that is being monitored7.
Given that shuffled steps are common in the processes we studied (e.g., a nurse
needs to perform several checks, but the order in which these checks are performed
does not matter), we decided that deviation detection delays due to shuffled steps
should be measured in a special way; otherwise the results related to delayed de-
viation detection would be distorted. If a mutation deletes a step from a shuffle
subsequence, we measure the delay as the number of steps between last step in the
shuffle subsequence and the step where a deviation is detected. If a mutation inserts
or substitutes into a shuffle subsequence a step that is one of the steps in that shuffle
subsequence, we measure the delay as the number of steps between the last occur-
rence of the inserted step in the shuffle subsequence and the step where a deviation is
if a and b are shuffled steps and x can occur in parallel with a and b, the sequence of performed
steps might be axb, where ab is a shuffle subsequence.
7Section 4.1.2.1 discusses how this might happen.
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detected. The results in Figure 4.5 reflect this modified way of measuring deviation
detection delay when a mutation was performed in a shuffle subsequence.
In our analysis of the experimental results, we defined templates that could au-
tomatically recognize situations where a mutation was performed in a shuffle subse-
quence. Shuffled steps were explicitly annotated in the process models from which
sequences of steps were generated and, thus, we knew which steps in a mutant corre-
spond to a shuffle subsequence.
For the mutants where there was a deviation detection delay, the length of that
delay was small—at most 2.31 steps after the mutation index on average and in most
cases close to 1. In critical processes, such as medical procedures, however, even a
delay of 1 could be harmful, if some potentially dangerous step, such as administer
chemotherapy medications, is performed before detecting the deviation. In the per-
formed experiments, however, there were no cases where the delay could result in
harm (fourth row from the bottom in both tables in Figure 4.5).
4.3.3.2 Potential Harm When Deviations Are Immediately Detected
We found some mutated sequences for which the deviation is detected at the index
of mutation, i.e., the deviation is immediately detected, but harm could potentially
still be done (third row from the bottom in both tables in Figure 4.5). In experiments
2, 3, 5, and 6 for the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes, this was due to
mutating a sequence by inserting or substituting in a harmful step.
In experiments 1, 4, and 7 for the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes,
the cases where potential harm could occur even when the deviation is immediately
detected were due to omitting a step or a subprocess that can immediately precede a
harmful step and can affect that harmful step. For example, in the blood transfusion
process model, the subprocess of verifying the blood product immediately precedes
the step begin infusion of blood product. Thus, if steps from this subprocess (such as
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ensure that blood product has not expired) are omitted, or the subprocess is omitted
altogether, the deviation cannot be detected until the step begin infusion of blood
product is started. For the blood transfusion process, the 50 cases in experiment 7
(the experiment where subprocess omission errors were seeded) of mutants in which
harm could occur even when the deviation is immediately detected are due to omitting
the subprocess verify blood product information. In the chemotherapy process model,
we encountered similar structure, where the step confirm that the patient ID band
matches the drug label can immediately precede the step administer chemotherapy
drug.
Such structures represent real process vulnerabilities as there is little opportunity
for process performers to realize that an error is made before they start a potentially
harmful step. A possible strategy to deal with such process vulnerabilities is to
introduce a non-harmful step before the potentially harmful one. This could be a step
that requires verifying that all the preconditions for starting the potentially harmful
step are met. In fact, such steps are already in place in some medical procedures, such
as surgeries where the different surgical teams are required to stop at certain points
of the procedure and confirm that every team has performed the necessary steps and
is aware of the relevant information before proceeding further. The presence of such
verification steps would allow the proposed deviation detection approach to detect
deviations when such verification steps are performed and before potentially harmful
steps are started.
Current process vulnerability analysis approaches, such as FTA and FMEA, do not
take into account the vulnerabilities discussed above. It would be interesting, however,
to explore how such approaches could be extended to identify such vulnerabilities
and potentially even automate the identification. For example, if domain experts list
potentially harmful steps in a process and the dependencies of these steps on other
steps that affect the harmful steps, then a process model could be algorithmically
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explored to discover situations where a step that affects a potentially harmful step
can immediately precede or occur “shortly before” (for a domain-specific definition
of “shortly-before”) that harmful step.
4.3.3.3 Performance of the Deviation Detector
The experiments were performed on a MacBook laptop with 2.4 GHz Intel Core
2 Duo processor. The deviation detection experimental framework is implemented in
Java and the experiments were run with maximum heap size of 2.5 GB.
The running time results are shown in the last two rows of the tables in Figure 4.5.
For the blood transfusion process, it took less than 6 seconds to determine whether a
sequence of about 21.5 steps, on average, is a legal sequence; for the mutated sequences
where exceptions were disallowed (these were longer sequences), it took around 13
seconds to determine whether a sequence of about 70.5 steps, on average, is a legal
sequence. This amounts to less than a third of a second per step in a sequence.
The running time of the deviation detector was similarly low for the chemotherapy
process. Given that humans usually take more than a third of a second to perform a
process activity, the running time results indicate that the deviation detector could
detect deviations in real time and before harm is done as a result of a deviation for
non-trivial processes of size and complexity similar to the ones we studied.
4.3.4 Threats to Validity
There are several threats to the validity of the obtained experimental results.
The experimental evaluation was synthetic—we did not monitor a real executing
process and did not apply the deviation detection approach to real executions of
such a process. Despite our best efforts to create realistic process models using the
process elicitation and modeling methods described in Chapter 3, it is likely that the
models used in the experimental evaluation still contain some inaccuracies or miss
some information potentially relevant to deviation detection. This would mean that
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some of the synthetically generated sequences might be inaccurate representations of
real process executions.
The experimental evaluation was based on only two models from a single domain.
Even though these models were relatively large and complex in terms of covering
a large set of process executions (including exceptional executions and concurrency
within a single process execution), the results would change if the size and complexity
of the models increases or if other models from the same domain or from different
domains are used.
We “stress tested” the deviation detection approach by applying various kinds of
mutations at every index of the synthetically generated sequences to represent various
errors at various points of a process execution. The applied mutations, however, do
not all correspond to realistic errors. For example, to create an insertion mutant
we selected uniformly at random a step from all process steps and inserted it at a
given index of a synthetically generated sequence. In some cases, however, such an
insertion might not correspond to a realistic error (e.g., inserting the step order blood
from blood bank in a part of the process where the blood transfusion has already been
started and no additional transfusions have been ordered).
We mutated the generated sequences by performing single-step deletions, inser-
tions, and substitutions and deletions of a subprocesses to represent errors of omission,
commission, substitutions of a single step and omission of an entire subprocess. Other
kinds of errors, however, can also occur during the execution of HIPs and we did not
study the deviation detection approach in the presence of such errors.
4.4 Limitations of the Deviation Detection Approach
Even though the preliminary investigation of the proposed deviation detection
approach is promising, there are several research challenges that need to be tackled
before the approach can be applied in practice. The deviation detection approach
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relies on receiving an accurate sequence of performed steps of interest from the Pro-
cess Execution Monitor. Capturing accurately and in a timely manner what human
process performers do, however, is difficult. We expect the introduction of more
electronic devices in processes would facilitate process execution monitoring. For ex-
ample, in a medical process, starting to receive infusion data from an infusion pump
could be automatically interpreted as having started the step begin infusion of blood
product ; similarly, when patient height and weight data appear in an electronic med-
ical record, this could be an indication that the step measure height and weight has
been performed.
While the use of electronic devices in processes increases the opportunities for
monitoring process executions, events from electronic devices could be misinterpreted.
Furthermore, electronic devices cannot capture certain steps in processes, such as
cognitive steps (e.g., a doctor making sure the patient information on two pieces of
paper matches). A promising approach to capturing process steps more accurately
than electronic devices and capturing steps that electronic devices cannot capture is
the use of human scribes, which seems to be increasing in popularity [65] in medical
processes.
Even in processes where human scribes are used, capturing the performance of
cognitive steps remains a significant challenge. For example, suppose a human scribe
is observing a nurse performing the simplified blood transfusion process depicted in
Figure 4.2. To perform the step check blood product expiration date the nurse might
look at the expiration date and time on the label of the blood product container
and then reason whether the current time is before or after the expiration time (the
nurse might obtain the current time by checking a watch, a wall clock, the clock on a
computer screen, or perhaps rely on memory of a recent time check). A human scribe
observing the nurse perform this step might notice that the nurse looked at the label
on the blood product and at the patient orders, but would not be able to discern
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exactly what information the nurse looked at and what kind of mental processing the
nurse did with this information. Thus, the scribe might not be able to determine that
the nurse checked the blood product expiration date. Such cognitive steps could be
critical for the successful completion of a process and for ensuring that no harm is
caused and, thus, often need to be included in models used for deviation detection
and their performance needs to be captured as a process is being executed.
Several approaches for capturing such cognitive steps could be used. One is to
have a device, instead of a human, perform such a step. For example, in some medical
processes, certain verifications, such as checking that the blood has not expired or
making sure that the patient information on the ID band matches the patient infor-
mation on the drug label, are done by bar code scanners. Such scanners can send an
event once the scan has been performed. Another approach is to have process per-
formers use a think-aloud protocol, i.e., announce out loud, when performing critical
cognitive steps. A human scribe or a voice recognition system can then hear such
an announcement and then issue a corresponding event to the deviation detection
system.
The success of the proposed deviation detection approach depends on the accu-
racy and the completeness of the process model as well. If the process model captures
incorrect sequences of steps or misses sequences of steps that human performers are
allowed to perform, then the deviation detection approach may suffer from false pos-
itives and false negatives. Given the complexity of processes, creating a high-quality
process model is challenging. As discussed in Chapter 3, we have been investigating
techniques for eliciting and validating process models and applied them successfully to
several real-world processes [31,35,93]. We believe the criticality of certain processes,
such as medical processes, warrants the time and effort needed to create high-quality
process models that can in turn be leveraged to support continuous process improve-
ment via various static analyses (e.g., model checking [37], fault-tree analysis [128],
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and failure-mode and effets analysis [121]) and to support deviation detection and
other aspects of online process guidance (e.g., smart checklist [15]).
4.5 Deviation Explanation
Detecting a deviation and issuing a warning to process performers that an error
might have occurred could be useful to prevent harm resulting from an error. Upon
receiving such a warning, process performers can try to recover from the potential
error before performing potentially harmful activities that they would have otherwise
performed, if a deviation had not been detected. As discussed in section 4.1.1, how-
ever, depending on the level of expertise of the process performers and the complexity
of the error and of the process, just a warning that an error might have been occurred
might be insufficient to identify an error and recover from it. This section discusses
approaches for providing additional information upon deviation detection to assist
process performers with error identification and recovery. Being able to provide such
assistance is particularly important in time-critical processes, where harm could be
done if process performers do not recover from an error within a short period of time
after the existence of an error has been recognized.
4.5.1 Error Localization
One kind of information that could be useful for error identification upon deviation
detection is where in the sequence of performed steps an error occurred, i.e., at what
index(es) in the sequence of performed steps a step(s) was performed that causes
the sequence of performed steps to differ from the intended sequence. We call such
indexes potential error indexes (PEIs). As previously discussed, the intent of process
performers is often unknown and, thus, determining PEIs usually cannot be done
with certainty. In this section, we discuss a preliminary approach, which we call error
localization, for identifying and ranking PEIs.
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The error localization approach consists of three phases: legal sequence selection,
alignment computation, and PEI identification. The legal sequence selection phase
selects a set of legal sequences from the process model that are likely candidates
for the sequence of steps the process performers had planned to carry out, i.e., the
intended sequence of steps. Intuitively, the more similar a legal sequence is to the
sequence of performed steps, the more likely it is that that legal sequence is the
intended sequence. The notion of similarity between two sequences is essential to the
proposed error localization approach. We use the edit distance [118] (described in
more detail in section 4.5.1.1) between two sequences as a measure of similarity.
The differences between the sequence of performed steps and the selected legal
sequences could suggest potential errors. To identify such differences, the align-
ment computation phase finds alignments (defined in section 4.5.1.2) between the
sequence of performed steps and each of the selected legal sequences. These align-
ments minimize the edit distance between the sequence of performed steps and each
legal sequence.
Finally, the PEI identification phase interprets the differences between the se-
quence of performed steps and each of the selected legal sequences to hypothesize
PEIs. Each PEI is based on a pair (sequence of performed steps, legal sequence) and
is ranked according to the edit distances between the sequence of performed steps
and the legal sequence in that pair.
4.5.1.1 Legal Sequence Selection
After a deviation has been detected, i.e., the sequence of performed steps has
been detected to not be a legal sequence through the process model, the first phase
of the error localization, namely legal sequence selection, starts. This phase involves
choosing a subset of all the legal sequences specified by the process model. The
comparison of the legal sequences from this subset to the sequence of performed steps
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will then be used to hypothesize PEIs. For a simple process model, like the one in
Figure 4.2, it is feasible to obtain all possible legal sequences and compare them to
the sequence of performed steps. A more realistic process model, however, can specify
a very large, or even infinite, number of legal sequences and comparing all of them
to the sequence of performed steps may be infeasible. Thus, criteria for selecting a
subset of legal sequences are needed.
Based on the intuition given earlier, we expect that legal sequences that are more
similar to the sequence of performed steps will be more useful for obtaining infor-
mation about errors. We use the edit distance between two sequences [118] as the
measure of similarity, where the edit distance is a function of the costs of the opera-
tions (often called edit operations) needed to transform one sequence into the other.
Other measures of similarity could be chosen for the purposes of legal sequence selec-
tion, but how this choice is made requires further investigation.
Computing edit distance is expensive (the worst case complexity of the algorithms
is usually quadratic in the length of the two sequences [118]) and computing the
edit distance between the sequence of performed steps and a large number of legal
sequences could certainly be infeasible. There are techniques, however, for computing
the edit distance incrementally and discarding a large number of sequences before
they need to be compared in full length to the sequence of performed steps. One such
technique is to keep track of legal sequences similar to the sequence of performed steps
during the breadth-first exploration of the process model that is performed during
deviation detection (this technique is used in [42] for process model validation). In
addition to legal sequences that match the sequence of performed steps so far (i.e.,
legal sequences that are exactly the same as the sequence of performed steps), other
legal sequences that are within some edit distance of the sequence of performed steps
can also be kept under consideration.
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(a) Distances between the sequence of
performed steps psu and selected pro-
cess legal sequences.
(b) Alignments between the
sequence of performed steps
(2nd column) and the closest
legal sequences (1st column).
Figure 4.6: Example application of the error localization approach given the sequence of performed
steps psu and the process model in Figure 4.2.
There are different kinds of edit distances, depending on the kinds of edit opera-
tions allowed. Edit operations could be used to encode different kinds of errors (e.g.,
deletion of a single step vs. deletion of multiple steps could encode omission of a single
step vs. omission of an entire subprocess respectively). Different edit operation costs
could be used to represent domain knowledge about errors, such as the likelihood or
the severity of an error.
Figure 4.6(a) shows the edit distances between the sequence of performed steps
psu and the legal sequences from the model in Figure 4.2 within edit distance of 2.
In this example, for simplicity, only the edit operations of deletion, insertion, and
substitution of a single step all with the same cost of 1 are used to compute the
edit distance. In particular, the Levenshtein edit distance [87] is used to measure of
similarity between the sequence of performed steps and the legal sequences from the
process model. The Levenshtein distance is the minimum sum of the costs of the edit
operations (where the edit operations are deletion, insertion, and substitution of a
single step) needed to transform one sequence into another.
Deciding what set of edit operations and what associated costs to use depends on
factors such as the availability of domain knowledge (e.g., common errors and their
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(a) Distances between the sequence of
performed steps acde and some legal
sequences.
(b) Alignments between the
sequence of performed steps
(2nd column) and the closest
legal sequences (1st column).
Figure 4.7: Example application of the error localization approach given the sequence of performed
steps acde and the process model in Figure 4.3.
frequency) and the richness of the information in the process model. For instance,
if it is known that process performers omit subprocess A as frequently as they omit
the single step x and the process model contains information (such as hierarchical
decomposition) to determine what steps are part of subprocess A, then deletion of
the single step x and deletion of all the substeps of A could be used as edit oper-
ations. Furthermore, these edit operations could be given equal cost since the two
corresponding errors are known to be equally likely. Empirical evaluation could also
be used to choose the set of edit operations and associated costs, but how to make
this choice is certainly an issue that requires further research.
4.5.1.2 Alignment Computation
Once a set of legal sequences is selected, each legal sequence in that set is compared
to the sequence of performed steps to examine how that legal sequence differs from
the sequence of performed steps. This is done by computing alignments between each
selected legal sequence and the sequence of performed steps. An alignment of two
sequences is a list of ordered pairs (a, b) such that (i) a is an element of the first
sequence or is the “blank” element “–”, (ii) b is an element of the second sequence or
is “–”, (iii) the pair (–, –) does not appear in the list, and (iv) the order of the non-
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blank elements in the first and second slots of the pairs in the list is the same as the
order of elements in the first and second sequences, respectively. Figure 4.6(b) shows
some alignments. An alignment indicates how one sequence could be transformed
into the other, where the blank elements indicate that elements were inserted in one
sequence or deleted from the other at the corresponding places.
Optimal alignment(s) (i.e., the alignment(s) that minimize the edit distance be-
tween two sequences) are computed by sequence comparison techniques for computing
edit distances [118]. There could be more than one alignment between the same two
sequences depending on the choice of edit operations and their associated costs. In
fact, there could be more than one optimal alignment between two sequences for a
fixed set of edit operations and costs. As mentioned earlier, this choice of edit op-
erations and associated costs depends on various factors, such as domain knowledge,
and approaches to make this choice require further research.
4.5.1.3 Potential Error Index Identification
Once alignments are computed, they can be used to obtain information about
PEIs. The intuition behind using alignments to obtain PEIs is that non-matching
alignment pairs (such as the shaded pairs in Figure 4.6(b)) may represent locations
where an error has been committed.
For example, based on the three alignments in Figure 4.6(b), it could be hypothe-
sized that the nurse adhered to the recommended ways to perform the process while
performing the first two steps, p and s, but not after that. Thus, 3 could be a PEI as
the nurse might have committed an error by performing the third step. This seems
to be a reasonable hypothesis in this example as the nurse performed u (check blood
product expiration date) when the nurse should have performed t (verify patient’s
identity) instead, which would have kept the sequence of performed steps a legal
sequence.
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An alignment can have more than one non-matching alignment pair and, thus,
more than one PEI could be identified based on these pairs. A strategy that we
currently use is to select a single PEI per alignment. This PEI is based on the first non-
matching alignment pair. One reason for this strategy is the assumption that if the
first non-matching alignment pair represents the first erroneous step, then subsequent
non-matching alignment pairs might be less informative about possible errors. This is
because after the error, the process performers might not have “returned to” the legal
sequence in the alignment under consideration, assuming this was the legal sequence
they were following before the deviation. Thus, comparing the suffixes of the sequence
of performed steps and the legal sequence after the first non-matching alignment pair
might not reveal useful error information. Deciding how PEIs should be identified
from an alignment is subject to further research.
Given that the set of selected legal sequences could be large (especially for a
realistic process model and a realistic sequence of performed steps), that there could
be multiple alignments between each selected legal sequence and the sequence of
performed steps, and that there could be multiple PEIs per alignment, the number
of PEIs could be large. Providing all PEIs to process performers upon deviation
detection, however, could be overwhelming rather than useful. Thus, a strategy may
be needed to rank the possible PEIs in terms of usefulness for error localization.
The ranking strategy currently used in the error localization approach is based on
the edit distance between the sequence of performed steps and each of the selected
legal sequences. A PEI is ranked according to the minimum edit distance to a legal
sequence with an alignment suggesting that PEI. Using this PEI ranking strategy
and the strategy discussed above for identifying a PEI from an alignment, 3 would
be the single top-ranked PEI in the sequence of performed steps psu in the example
in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.8: Deviation detection and error localization experimental framework.
In general, there could be multiple top-ranked PEIs, however. For example, in
Figure 4.7 the alignments based on aligning the sequence of performed steps acde
to the closest legal sequences suggest two PEIs—2 and 4. Some research questions
related to PEI identification are how often there are multiple equally top-ranked
PEIs and how many PEIs there are in such cases in realistic process models and
sequences of performed steps. These questions are also related to the issue of delayed
deviation detection since multiple highly-ranked PEIs seem to arise in situations where
the deviation is detected with delay (as is the case in Figure 4.7). A preliminary
investigation of these questions is discussed in the next section.
4.5.2 Evaluation of Error Localization Approach
To evaluate the error localization approach, we used the experimental framework
described in section 4.2 and extended it by adding the Error Localizer component,
which implements the three error localization phases described above. The extended
framework is shown in Figure 4.8.
The Error Localizer takes as input a Process Model and a sequence of steps that
the Deviation Detector has determined to not be a legal sequence through the Process
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Model. The Error Localizer outputs a ranked list of potential error indices (PEIs) for
the given sequence of steps and can also be instrumented to collect error localization
statistics, such as percentage of sequences with multiple PEIs and average number of
PEIs per sequence.
The current implementation of the Error Localizer uses a brute-force approach to
accomplish the Legal Sequence Selection phase—the Error Localizer simply obtains
all legal sequences up to a certain length. This brute-force approach does not scale for
process models containing a large number of sequences and this limitation is discussed
in section 4.5.2.4. As mentioned in section 4.5.1.1, however, there exist approaches for
incrementally computing the edit distance between the growing sequence of performed
steps and legal sequences from the process model, discarding legal sequences whose
edit distance to the sequence of performed steps exceeds a threshold. Utilizing such
an approach during the Legal Sequence Selection phase is an interesting direction for
future research.
To compute alignments between the sequence of performed steps and the set of le-
gal sequences obtained during the Legal Sequence Selection phase, the Error Localizer
uses a standard dynamic programming algorithm ( [118], page 23) to compute the
edit distance between two sequences, which also computes the optimal alignments
associated with the optimal edit distance. The current implementation of the Er-
ror Localizer uses the Levenshtein edit distance [87], where different weights for the
deletion, insertion, and substitution edit operations can be set.
Once alignments between the sequence of performed steps and the set of selected
legal sequences are computed, PEIs are identified and ranked as described in sec-
tion 4.5.1.3.
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4.5.2.1 Experimental Design
To perform an initial evaluation of the proposed error localization approach, we
applied it to the model of the blood transfusion process used for the evaluation of
the deviation detection approach and described in section 4.3.1.1. We replaced each
of the verify patient’s identity and specimen labeling subprocesses by a single step
to make the model smaller. We did that because the current implementation of the
Legal Sequence Selection phase of the error localization approach is brute force, i.e.,
it finds all sequences of steps through the model up to certain length. Removing the
above two subprocesses reduced the size and the complexity of the model, allowing
for longer sequences of steps to be obtained in a reasonable amount of time during
the Legal Sequence Selection phase.
The resulting model was still of significant size and complexity. It contained
144 Little-JIL steps (53 leaf steps) and it specified 18 exception handling situations.
All legal sequences consisting of up to 15 leaf steps (a total of 164 such sequences)
were generated8. These generated legal sequences were then mutated to represent
sequences of performed steps where the process performers have made an error. We
applied the same single-step mutations—deletion, insertion, and substitution of a
single step at (almost) every position of every legal sequence—as in the evaluation of
the deviation detector. These mutations are described in detail in section 4.3.1.2.1.
For all three mutation kinds, mutated legal sequences (mutants) that remained legal
sequences through the process model were discarded. Mutating the generated legal
sequences resulted in more than 1,700 mutants for each mutation kind (Figure 4.9).
8Only leaf steps were included in generated sequences, because in Little-JIL, the leaf steps are
the ones that agents perform and are thus most likely the steps to be recorded. Non-leaf steps
are primarily used to provide abstraction and specify control flow among leaf steps in a Little-JIL
process model. The length of the generated sequences could increase by up to 9 steps if non-leaf
Little-JIL steps are counted, depending on the depth of the subprocesses in which the leaf steps in
a given sequence are located.
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Figure 4.9: Applying the error localization approach to a blood transfusion process model.
The error localization approach was applied to each mutant and statistics related
to PEI identification were collected. To compute PEIs, all legal sequences from the
process model up to 17 steps long were selected to be compared against the mutants.
The Levenshtein distance was used as a sequence similarity measure. The edit oper-
ations were deletion, insertion, and substitution of a single step with equal cost of 1.
The PEIs for each mutant were based on the alignments between that mutant and
the legal sequences that have minimum distance to it. For each such alignment, a
single PEI was produced based on the first non-matching alignment pair.
4.5.2.2 Results
Figure 4.9 shows the results of applying the error localization approach to the
blood transfusion process.
4.5.2.3 Discussion
For most of the insertion and deletion mutants (more than 97.5%), a single top-
ranked PEI was identified. For almost 75% of the deletion mutants a single top-ranked
PEI was identified. The percentage for deletion mutants is lower, again, mostly due
to mutations in shuffle subsequences. For all three kinds of mutants with a single
top-ranked PEI, that PEI was the same as the mutation index. These results mean
that in most cases the error localization approach was able to accurately identify the
location of the error in the sequence of performed steps. Furthermore, in these cases
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there were no spurious top-ranked PEIs that could distract process performers in
diagnosing the error. In the cases when there were more than one top-ranked PEIs,
the number of PEIs was small—maximum 3 and less than 2.1 on average—and the
mutation index was always among the top-ranked PEIs.
4.5.2.4 Threats to Validity
The threats to the validity of the evaluation of the deviation detection approach,
discussed in section 4.3.4, also apply to the evaluation of the error localization ap-
proach, given that the experimental design was essentially the same. The fact that
only a single process model was used to evaluate the error localization approach is a
further threat.
As previously discussed, the Legal Sequence Selection phase was implemented by
finding all legal sequences of steps up to a certain length. In particular, all legal
sequences of up to 17 steps were found9. Given that the longest generated mutant
was 16 steps long (the longest generated sequence was 15 steps long and the single-
step mutations can increase the size of a sequence by at most one step), the original
sequence from which a mutant was created was always among the set of legal se-
lected sequences. This inevitably affected favorably the error localization results in
Figure 4.9. In a real-world situation, however, where large and complex HIPs are in-
volved and process executions could be much longer than 16 steps, an error localizer
would not have the luxury to compare the sequence of performed steps against a set
of legal sequences that is guaranteed to contain the intended sequence of steps, which
would diminish the accuracy of the error localization results.
Since the mutations applied to the generated sequences of steps were known, we
knew what corresponding edit operations to use for computing edit distances utilized
9As mentioned in section 4.5.2.1, the generated sequences contained only Little-JIL leaf steps,
because in Little-JIL leaf steps correspond to the activities done by process performers.
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in the error localization approach. When the error localization approach is applied to
a real executing process, however, the errors that could occur might not be known in
advance and, thus, selected edit operations might not be as useful as in our evaluation
for accurately identifying PEIs.
4.5.3 Limitations of the Error Localization Approach
The limitations of the deviation detection approach discussed in section 4.4 are also
limitations of the error localization approach—the error localization approach needs
to receive from the Process Execution Monitor an accurate sequence of performed
steps of interest and the success of the approach also depends on the accuracy and
the completeness of the process model.
The error localization approach is highly dependent on the selection of edit op-
erations and their costs, which are used in the computation of edit distance. If the
selected edit operations do not accurately represent the kinds of errors that might oc-
cur during a process execution and/or the costs of these edit operations do not reflect
characteristics of process errors, such as frequency and severity, then the top-ranked
PEIs computed by the error localization approach might not represent the locations
in the sequence of performed steps where errors have occurred. Thus, it is important
that domain knowledge about process errors is available when the error localization
approach is applied to a real executing processes. Ways to obtain information about
process errors include discussions with domain experts, surveying literature on com-
mon errors in the domain, process vulnerability analysis approaches such as fault-tree
analysis [128] and failure mode and effects analysis [121], and mining process execu-
tion logs. The deployment of a deviation detection and explanation system could
contribute to obtaining higher quality process execution logs than currently existing
ones as the Process Execution Monitor would need to collect various events of interest
to support deviation detection and explanation.
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CHAPTER 5
VISUALIZATION OF PROCESS EXECUTION STATE
5.1 Overview
Providing information about the state of a system is a widely used practice to
assist humans who operate within complex systems. For example, consider the system
consisting of vehicles operated by human drivers on a given road. A typical vehicle
has means to provide the driver with various kinds of information about the state of
different components of the system for the sake of the safety of everyone on the road
and for efficiency. The various indicators on the dashboard (e.g., fuel level indicator,
oil level indicator, tire pressure indicator, engine temperature indicator) provide the
driver with information related to the state of the vehicle to help the driver make
decisions whether it is safe to continue to operate the vehicle and if not, what the
potential problems are, so that the driver can plan how to address these problems. The
speedometer provides the driver with information to help decide whether the driver
is complying with a regulation established within the system, namely the speed limit.
The mirrors provide the driver with information about the state of other components
of the system, namely the position of other vehicles, to assist the driver with planning
maneuvers on the road. The seat-belt signs and audio warnings provide the driver
with information related to the safety of the humans in the vehicle. GPS units, which
are widely used nowadays, provide driving directions information that could help the
driver plan road maneuvers ahead of time and could also be very helpful for navigating
in areas new for the driver, including detours that the driver needs to take in case
some exceptional condition arises, such as temporary road closures.
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We believe that such an approach for providing information about the state of
a system could be particularly useful for performers of HIPs, especially given the
criticality of some HIPs (e.g., medical processes) and their increasing complexity.
Such an approach could help reduce the number of errors in HIPs and improve their
efficiency. For example, consider the HIP of treating a patient in a hospital. This
HIP involves the patient and could involve various medical professionals, such as
physicians, nurses, and medical assistants, various kinds of medical equipment, such
as X-ray machine and lab equipment, and various information systems such as an
electronic medical record system, a scheduling system, and a computerized order
entry system. Information about the execution state of that HIP could be useful to
the medical professionals carrying it out. For instance, a list of activities that medical
professionals need to perform can reduce the number of omission errors committed by
these medical professionals. Information about the progress of activities that others
are performing and who is performing them could help each medical professional
determine the overall progress of the process, improve team communication, and
facilitate planning. Information about deadlines, such as that the blood product needs
to be administered within certain period of time after it has been prepared by the
blood bank, could reduce errors related to timing constraint violations. Information
about process execution history, such as who performed which activity using what
resources and at what time, could help process performers understand exceptional
conditions and choices that might affect future decision. Process execution history
information could also be helpful for identifying errors, identifying the root causes of
errors, and planning error recovery. Information about resource availability, such as
the availability of an X-ray machine, could help with scheduling, thus improving the
efficiency of the HIP.
Providing information about the state of an executing HIP to process perform-
ers, however, is challenging. It is difficult to decide what information about process
121
execution state would be useful to process performers at different points of a process
execution, to design effective process state visualizations, and to determine the state
of an executing HIP.
Deciding what process execution state information to show process per-
formers. The execution state of a HIP has multiple components. These include the
state of process activities (e.g., performed, currently being performed, pending), the
state of the resources utilized in the process (including who is responsible for which
process activities), the state of the artifacts that have been produced in the course
of the process execution, problems that have arisen and the status of the handling
of these problems. The execution state of a HIP can also have domain-specific
components, such as the physiological condition of a patient who is part of a medical
HIP.
Deciding what information pertaining to a process execution state component and
what combination of these components would be useful to show process performers is
challenging. The decision might need to depend on multiple factors, such as charac-
teristics of individual process performers (e.g., role and level of expertise), the current
process execution state itself (e.g., if a problem arises, then different kinds of infor-
mation might need to be shown compared to when the process execution is nominal),
and the domain. Furthermore, in some circumstances it might be useful to show
information about not only the current process execution state, but also information
about past or even possible future process execution states.
Designing visualizations of process execution state. Besides deciding what
process execution state information to show process performers, it is also important
to consider how this information could be effectively presented to process performers.
There are multiple ways, for example, to visualize process activities and their rela-
tionships, to make salient pending deadlines or problems that arise during a process
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executions, and to display information related to process resources. The design of
effective process execution state visualizations needs to involve the use of human fac-
tors approaches, user studies to empirically evaluate alternative visualizations, and
consideration of visual metaphors with which process performers in a given domain
are already comfortable.
Determining process execution state. To show information about the state of
an executing HIP, that state needs to be first determined. To keep track of the
changing state of a HIP as that HIP is being executed, a process execution monitor,
like the one used in the Deviation Detection and Explanation approach (Chapter 4), is
needed. This process execution monitor needs to be able to capture process execution
events. The human element of HIPs, however, poses difficulties for capturing such
events. For example, determining when certain process activities have been performed
could be very difficult, because certain process activities performed by humans are
difficult to observe. Cognitive steps, discussed in section 4.4, are an example of such
activities.
In addition to capturing process execution events, a representation of process exe-
cution state is needed so that this representation can serve as the basis for selectively
providing process execution state information to process performers. This represen-
tation needs to be rich enough to capture the various aspects of process execution
state discussed above. In particular, this representation needs to be able to capture
process activities (past, current, and possibly even upcoming), information about ar-
tifacts created or resources utilized during the execution of the process, as well as
information about problems that might have arisen and how they have been handled.
Appropriately updating the state of such a representation based on the events re-
ceived from a process execution monitor and keeping the state of that representation
“in sync” with the state of the unfolding process is also an important challenge.
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5.2 The Smart Checklist Metaphor
To address the problem of human errors in HIPs discussed in Chapter 1, we
are investigating an approach that uses a smart checklist metaphor for visualizing
process execution state. This approach is based on the observation that checklists have
been long used to successfully support human process performers of HIPs in certain
domains, such as aviation and space. Checklists have also been recently introduced
in HIPs from other domains where human errors can have critical consequences,
such as medical processes [22, 67], but these checklists are known to have important
limitations [68,132].
The smart checklist approach aims to address these limitations. A smart checklist,
like a traditional checklist, focuses on the process activities. To guide process per-
formers during a process execution, the smart checklist shows activities that process
performers need to do, activities that have already been performed, and potentially
activities that might need to be performed in the future. Unlike traditional checklists,
however, which tend to be static and to specify only the major steps during normal
flow, omitting important details such as exceptional scenarios and concurrent process
execution [31, 70], the smart checklist is dynamic, context-sensitive, and it provides
guidance on a larger set of process scenarios. This is achieved by basing the smart
checklist on a detailed process model and relying on a mechanism for capturing a rich
set of process execution events as a process is being executed. In addition to showing
process activities, the smart checklist provides capabilities for accessing other kinds
of process execution state information, such as the resources needed to perform activ-
ities, the artifacts produced by activities, problems that have arisen while performing
activities and how such problems should be or have been handled.
The smart checklist approach is part of the process improvement environment dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 2.1. The Interpreter takes as input a Process
Model and feeds the Process State Visualizer with the next step(s) that need to be
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performed based on the current execution state of the Process Model. A step in this
context encapsulates not only the name of an activity, but also other associated infor-
mation, such as resources needed to perform that activity and problems (exceptions)
that might arise while performing that activity. Given this information, the Process
State Visualizer issues the appropriate updates to the corresponding visual elements
of the Process State Visualization (represented by the visuals to the immediate left
of the stick figures in Figure 2.1).
As process performers are executing the process, they interact with the Process
State Visualization. There could be different instances of that visualization. Some
instances could be tailored to individual process performers and each such instance
would be used only by the corresponding individual. Other instances could be used by
multiple process performers and could show information related to the activities done
by all these performers. Process performers could use the Process State Visualization
to see what steps need to be done and access other process execution state information.
Process performers could also indicate that a step has been successfully completed or
that problems have arisen while performing the step and what these problems are.
The Event Interaction Manager captures the input of process performers and then
sends the appropriate events to the Interpreter to inform the interpreter how the
process execution has advanced (e.g., done steps, or problems that have arisen). The
Interpreter then consults the Process Model and, given the current execution state
of the Process Model and the newly received information, the Interpreter determines
what steps need to be done next or whether the process has been completed. The
Interpreter then feeds the Process State Visualizer with the next step(s) that need to
be performed and starts the cycle described above again.
The Process State Visualizer could query the Retrospector to obtain and then
visualize information about the process execution history, such as performed activi-
ties, time when they were performed, problems that have arisen and how they have
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been handled, and resources that have been used while performing process activities.
Similarly, the Process State Visualizer could query the Prospector to obtain infor-
mation about the potential future of the current process execution, such as possible
upcoming activities and resources that might be needed.
The next section presents an initial prototype of the smart checklist approach and
section 5.4 discusses a preliminary evaluation of that approach with respect to the
above issues.
5.3 The Smart Checklist Prototype
5.3.1 Back-end Implementation
The smart checklist prototype is implemented within the Little-JIL process execu-
tion environment [27]. In this environment, the Little-JIL interpreter takes as input a
Little-JIL process model and based on that model assigns work to process performers
(called agents in Little-JIL terminology). A work item is encapsulated in a Little-JIL
step, which contains the name of the activity to be performed, but also additional
information such as any resources needed to perform that activity, artifacts that the
activity needs to produce, and problems (called exceptions in Little-JIL terminology)
that might arise while the agent is performing the activity and that the agent can
report to the Little-JIL interpreter. A step is assigned to an agent by placing that
step on the agent’s agenda. The Agenda Management System (AMS) is the interface
between agents and the Little-JIL interpreter, defining the communication protocol
between them. The AMS is the instantiation of the Event Interaction Manager in the
prototype implementation of the smart checklist approach.
5.3.2 Visualization
As a first step towards designing, implementing, and evaluating the smart checklist
approach, we concentrated on a visualization for a single process performer. This
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visualization focuses on the activities that are assigned to that process performer. As
previously discussed, however, the smart checklist is intended to support other kinds
of visualizations, such as ones that could be used by multiple process performers
at the same time and that contain process execution state information relevant to
multiple process performers. Such visualizations are left for future work.
Figure 5.1 shows the smart checklist GUI automatically generated from the Little-
JIL process model of the simplified blood transfusion process shown in Figure 2.3
and discussed in Chapter 1. This GUI is from the perspective of the nurse who
is about to start performing the blood transfusion process and has not performed
any steps yet. The visualization in Figure 5.1 consists of three main parts—the
domain-specific top panel, the process header panel, and the bottom checklist panel.
For this particular example from the medical domain, the domain-specific top panel
contains the personal information of the patient who is receiving the transfusion as
well as patient physiological data. The process header panel contains the name of
the process (“blood transfusion process”), the status of the process (in this example,
“in progress”), and a notes button that the process performer can use to enter notes
about the current process execution.
Below the process header panel is the checklist panel. The checklist panel shows
process steps that need to be (or have been) performed. To provide context to process
performers, the checklist panel also shows the hierarchical decomposition of process
steps. A concrete step (corresponding to a leaf Little-JIL step1) is shown as a solid
rectangle. Subprocesses (corresponding to non-leaf Little-JIL steps), which contain
concrete steps and can also contain other subprocesses, are shown as transparent
rounded rectangles enclosing the contained concrete steps and subprocesses. The
1As discussed in Chapter 4, in Little-JIL, the leaf steps are the ones that agents perform. Non-
leaf steps are used primarily to provide abstraction and specify control flow among leaf steps in a
Little-JIL process model.
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Figure 5.1: The smart checklist at the beginning of executing the simplified blood transfusion
process.
first concrete step that the nurse needs to perform according to the smart checklist in
Figure 5.1 is contact lab for patient’s blood type. This step is part of the subprocess
obtain patient’s blood type, which in turn is part of the overall blood transfusion process.
Each concrete step has several buttons that the process performer can use to
interact with the smart checklist. The rounded button with the checkmark can be
clicked to indicate that a step has been successfully completed. Steps during whose
performance a problem can arise have a rounded button with an “X” on it (this
button is explained later in this discussion). The rounded-rectangular note button
(the right-most button on the rectangle corresponding to the step contact lab for
patient’s blood type in Figure 5.1) can be clicked to bring up a text editor that allows
process performers to write notes related to the performance of the current step.
Figure 5.2 shows the smart checklist for the simplified blood transfusion process
after the nurse has already performed several steps. Once a step has been performed,
the buttons on the right are replaced with a status indicator symbol and a time stamp.
The status indicator symbol could be a checkmark, indicating that a step has been
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Figure 5.2: The smart checklist after the nurse has performed several steps from the simplified
blood transfusion process.
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Figure 5.3: The smart checklist after the nurse has successfully completed the simplified blood
transfusion process.
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successfully completed, or a red “X”, indicating that problems arose while performing
the step. The time stamp indicates the time when the step was successfully completed
or the time when the problems arose. For example, in Figure 5.2, the steps contact
lab for patient’s blood type, order blood from blood bank, pick up blood from blood
bank, and verify patient’s identity have all been successfully completed and, thus,
their buttons on the right have been replaced by the status indicator for successful
completion, the checkmark, and a time stamp next to that checkmark. The height
of the rectangle corresponding to steps that have already been completed is also
decreased to save vertical space. Once a step has been performed, its corresponding
solid rectangle changes background color to distinguish performed from currently
active steps. Currently active steps are shown in green, whereas grey background
indicates that a step has already been performed2.
Figure 5.2 illustrates two more visualizations part of the smart checklist—support
for shuffled steps and artifacts. The steps check expiration date and check product info
match patient info are shuffled steps, meaning that the nurse needs to perform both of
them, one after the other, but they can be performed in any order. The smart checklist
visualizes this shuffle concept by showing all shuffled steps as currently available to
perform (indicated by their corresponding green rectangles with rounded buttons on
the right) and by showing the text “Perform all of the following in any order” on the
subprocess that encloses the shuffled steps.
The briefcase icon on some of the steps in Figure 5.2 represents resources that are
needed to perform the step. For example, clicking on the briefcase icon on the step
check product info match patient info, brings up a list of resources needed for that
step—in this case there is only one resource on the list, namely the blood product.
2The colors may not be easily distinguishable if the figures are printed in black and white, but
the substitution of the buttons on the right of the step rectangle with a status indicator and a time
stamp are visual cues that unambiguously distinguish currently active from already performed steps.
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Figure 5.3 shows the smart checklist after the nurse has successfully completed
the blood transfusion process. All steps in the checklist panel that had buttons on
the right now have a status indicator and a time stamp instead. Also, the background
color of all steps is now grey. Furthermore, the process status in the process header
also changes—it now says “Successfully completed” and it shows a status indicator
icon (a checkmark) and a time stamp for the overall process completion time.
Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show a scenario where problems arise while the nurse is
performing the blood transfusion process. Figure 5.4 shows the smart checklist at the
same stage of the process as Figure 5.1, but this time when the nurse contacts the lab
for the patient’s blood type, the patient’s blood type is unavailable. The nurse can
bring up a list of potential problems that could arise during the performance of a step
by clicking the rounded button with the “X”. In the example in Figure 5.4, this list
contains only a single problem—“patient blood type unavailable”—but, in general,
there could be more problems, depending on how many exceptions are specified in
the corresponding step in the process model.
Once the nurse indicates that the “patient blood type unavailable” problem has
arisen, the smart checklist dynamically updates the next steps that need to be per-
formed. Figure 5.5 shows the smart checklist for the scenario when this problem
has arisen and the nurse has subsequently performed several other steps. Note that
unlike the scenario in Figure 5.2 where the next step to perform after contact lab for
patient’s blood type is order blood from blood bank, in the scenario in Figure 5.5 the
nurse needs to perform the test patient’s blood type subprocess. This subprocess con-
sists of two substeps—obtain blood specimen from patient and send blood specimen to
lab for testing—and needs to be performed to handle the problem that the patient’s
blood type is unavailable. After the nurse tests the patient’s blood type, the process
execution goes back to normal process flow with the step order blood from blood bank
to be performed next.
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In the scenario shown in Figure 5.5, another problem arises, this time while
the nurse checks that the information on the blood product matches the patient
information—this information does not match and the nurse indicates that product
check has failed. The smart checklist then suggests that the blood transfusion process
should be terminated as there is the risk of giving wrong blood to the patient. In the
snapshot of the smart checklist in Figure 5.6, there are no more active steps, the pro-
cess status message in the process header panel has updated to “Failed to complete
because of problems”, and the process status indicator icon next to that message is
now an “X”. In this simplified example, the process model we wrote assumes that
the process terminates after a problem arises during the subprocess of checking the
blood product. A more realistic process model, however, would specify behavior for
handling problems that arise during the blood product check. If this is the case, the
smart checklist would provide guidance to the nurse based on this specified behavior
in the process model.
5.4 Preliminary Evaluation
We have performed a preliminary evaluation of the smart checklist approach and,
in particular, of the single-agent smart checklist visualization. In the process of
building the smart checklist prototype, several informal presentations of the smart
checklist were given to a medical doctor, a nursing professor, an industrial engineer-
ing professor, and several computer science professors and students (both graduate
and undergraduate), to seek their comments and update the prototype accordingly.
The initial prototype was formally demonstrated to a panel of medical experts (four
medical doctors and a registered nurse (RN)), who would be potential users of such
a smart checklist, and they were asked for feedback.
The example process used during the panel meeting was the subprocess of set-
ting up an infusion pump for patient-controlled analgesia (PCA), usually performed
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Figure 5.4: The smart checklist at a point of the executions of the simplified blood transfusion
process where the nurse is about to indicate that problem has arisen.
134
Figure 5.5: The smart checklist after the nurse has performed several steps from the simplified
blood transfusion process and is about to indicate that another problem has arisen.
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Figure 5.6: The smart checklist after the simplified blood transfusion process was not successfully
completed due to problems during the execution of the process.
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by a nurse as part of an overall infusion therapy process. The subprocess of setting
up the infusion pump includes activities such as obtaining the pump, assessing pa-
tient infusion-related hazards, physically preparing the pump, and performing various
safety checks before the infusion can be started. This process was captured in the
Little-JIL process modeling language [27] (Little-JIL is described in detail in sec-
tion 2.3) and the resulting process consisted of 37 Little-JIL steps, 24 of which were
leaf steps.
A smart checklist was automatically generated from the Little-JIL model of the
subprocess of setting up the infusion pump. Several process scenarios, including
scenarios where problems arose (such as there are patient infusion-related hazards and
extra work needs to be done to assess whether it is safe to perform the infusion) were
shown to the panel of domain experts. The RN in the panel had extensive experience
with performing the process of setting up the infusion pump and the medical doctors
had experience with ordering such infusions and overseeing their execution. The
domain experts in the panel were encouraged to provide open feedback on the smart
checklist and our research group had also prepared a detailed list of questions related
to the issues discussed in section 5.1.
The smart checklist was well received at the panel meeting as well as at the infor-
mal demonstrations. The domain experts recognized the potential of the approach
to reduce errors, improve process documentation, and serve as a training aid. In the
rest of this section, we discuss the smart checklist approach with respect to the issues
presented in section 5.1 and based on the feedback obtained during the preliminary
evaluation.
Deciding what process execution state information to show process per-
formers. The domain experts confirmed that it would be useful to show past process
activities in addition to the activities that need to be currently performed. They
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thought that being able to access the process execution history would be particularly
helpful during hand-offs.
Some of the domain experts suggested that the smart checklist should support
different modes, depending on the level of expertise of the process performers who
use it. For example, a smart checklist for novice process performers can provide more
detail than a smart checklist for expert process performers. The domain experts
pointed out, however, that a detailed list of possible problems that might arise during
the performance of a step would be useful even for expert process performers.
As previously discussed, the smart checklist GUI in the current implementation
of the prototype is from the perspective of a single process performer. The domain
experts confirmed our expectations that in some situations it would be useful to access
the tasks of other performers as well to get a better sense of the overall execution state
of the process. Furthermore, it might be useful if the smart checklist supports ways
for communication between different process performers that are working together
as a team, even suggesting integration of the smart checklist with existing hospital
communication systems.
Designing visualizations of process execution state. Domain experts found
the step hierarchy useful as a way to visualize the structure of the process. Some
of them mentioned that the hierarchy would be particularly useful when browsing
through the process execution history as this history could be potentially long, but
the hierarchy may not be necessary for the currently active steps, as usually there
will be a small number of such steps. In fact, some of the domain experts proposed
providing an even stronger distinction between current and past process steps—for
instance, by placing them on different tabs as opposed to having them in the same
scrollable hierarchical list.
The icons used in the smart checklist prototype were controversial. Some domain
experts found them intuitive, whereas others did not. For instance, the RN who
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participated in the panel meeting mentioned that the green checkmarks and red “X”s
were similar to the ones that appear on the interface of a pump that this RN had used.
Some of the physicians, however, found the checkmark and the “X” icons confusing—
one physician, for example, pointed out that it is not clear whether a red “X” means
that a step was not performed or that the step was performed, but unsuccessfully.
There will not be a single set of icons that will be intuitive for all users and, thus,
training will be required regardless of which set of icons is selected. The iconography
used on the smart checklist GUI, however, requires further research.
The current smart checklist prototype supports several customizations, including
user-selected colors for representing the different states of process steps and deciding
which intermediate Little-JIL steps to hide from the step hierarchy shown in the smart
checklist GUI. The domain experts found the support for customization useful, but
pointed out that decisions about what should be customizable and by whom should be
made very carefully. For example, not every process performer should be allowed to
change the colors of process step states, because this might be confusing to another
process performer taking over after a handoff. Different hospitals, however, might
want to use different colors, perhaps based on the user interfaces of other systems
deployed in a particular hospital. Thus, customizing the colors of steps on the smart
checklist should be allowed to an administrator responsible for deploying the system
in a given hospital.
Determining process execution state. Our focus for the initial smart check-
list prototype and its evaluation was on the first two issues described above, namely
deciding what information related to process execution state to show and how to
visualize this information. To determine the state of an executing process, the cur-
rent prototype of the smart checklist makes the simplifying assumption that process
performers would provide all process execution events of interest by interacting with
the smart checklist GUI. For example, for every successfully completed step, process
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performers need to indicate that the step has been successfully completed by clicking
the green button with checkmark. Reporting all process execution events, however,
would add to the workload of already busy process performers. Thus, in future re-
search we plan to investigate ways to automatically recognize some process execution
events. For example, if a nurse starts an infusion pump, that pump could directly
send an event to the smart checklist that the step perform infusion has been started.
To automate the capturing of some process execution events, the smart checklist ap-
proach would benefit from a mechanism for monitoring a process execution like the
one required for the deviation detection and explanation approach and discussed in
section 4.4.
An interesting issue related to keeping track of process execution state is support
for undo. Both at the demonstration to the panel of domain experts and at other
informal demonstrations of the smart checklist prototype, it has been requested that
the smart checklist allows process performers to roll back the smart checklist by
indicating that an event that has been reported to have happened has not actually
happened. For example, if process performers have indicated via the smart checklist
GUI by mistake that they have performed a step, they should be able to indicate that,
in fact, this step has not been performed. There are important concerns that need to
be considered, however, when providing support for undo. Unlike a word processor,
where any editing action, such as typing or deleting a character, can be easily undone
and redone, in the domain of HIPs it is not clear what it means for a step to be undone.
For example, if a medication has been administered to a patient, that medication
cannot easily be “unadministered” to the patient. Even if a step is not performed
in reality, supporting undo might still need to be done with extra care, because the
sheer indication that a step has been performed might have side effects and influence
the process execution. For instance, suppose a nurse indicates by mistake that the
step “administer medication” has been performed, but the medication was never
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given. The nurse would then want to undo the step “administer medication”, but
if indicating that this step has been done triggered the smart checklist system to
show other process performers that they can start new activities, and some of these
activities are actually started, undo becomes problematic. Thus, the support for undo
in the context of HIPs is a challenging issue that requires further investigation.
Another interesting issue related to determining the state of an executing process
is determining possible future executions. Knowing what steps are coming up ahead
of time can help process performers better plan their work. It is difficult, however,
to predict how a process execution will unfold and, thus, some strategies are needed
to determine which of the possible future executions should be shown to process
performers. Furthermore, there seems to be a controversy between domain experts
of whether showing information about potential future process executions would be
helpful. Some of the domain experts with whom we interacted, for example, suggested
that it might be useful to be able to see on the smart checklist GUI what steps in the
process are left to be done, whereas others were skeptical of how accurately future
executions can be predicted. This issue about determining and showing possible
future executions also requires further research.
141
CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
This chapter starts with an overview of related work on process elicitation and
modeling. It then continues with a discussion of existing approaches for online process
guidance, including recent work on visualization of process execution state and work
on traditional checklists and process guides. Existing approaches for dealing with
process deviation are presented next, followed by a discussion of approaches related to
error localization. The chapter concludes with an overview of work on characterizing
and classifying human errors.
6.1 Process Elicitation and Modeling
6.1.1 Process Elicitation
Eliciting information about complex HIPs is important for reasoning about them
and for potentially improving them. Methods to facilitate such elicitation have been
proposed. For example, Woods and Hollnagel discuss detailed observations of activi-
ties of process performers in context as a key method of discovering patterns of work
in what they call “joint cognitive systems” [133]. In an investigation of approaches
towards measuring macrocognition (where macrocognition is a set of cognitive pro-
cesses that occur across multiple individuals involved in a complex task), [103] outlines
several techniques for observing macrocognition processes. These techniques include
presenting humans with scripted scenarios and asking them to solve a problem or
make a decision within the presented scenarios; gradually presenting new data and
asking humans to look for connections and patterns; or asking humans to prepare a
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plan for accomplishing a task. Graesser and Murray report that a question-answering
methodology was able to provide rich information on human-computer interaction
tasks, such as logging into a computer and creating and modifying a text file [63].
This methodology was a form of semi-structured interviews as several rules were used
to determine what questions to ask in what situations.
The process elicitation techniques that we studied in this work (section 3.1) build
on the techniques described above for eliciting information about complex socio-
technical systems. We focused, however, on three particular kinds of information—
nominal steps, exceptional situations, and responses to exceptional situations—that
need to be included in process models that can drive the proposed online process
guidance approaches. We then compared qualitatively and quantitatively the process
elicitation techniques we studied in terms of their ability to elicit these particular
kinds of information.
6.1.2 Process Modeling
In this section, we discuss other work related to the process modeling aspects
we investigated in this thesis, namely the modeling of exception handling in HIPs
and the use of different process model representations to facilitate process model
understanding.
6.1.2.1 Exception Handling in HIPs
Exceptional situations arise frequently during the execution of HIPs. Thus, many
process and workflow languages include constructs to allow for the definition of ex-
ception handlers (for example, Little-JIL [27], WIDE [26], OPERA [66], GAT [95]).
While researchers continue to study how best to provide exception handling mech-
anisms within process languages, exception handling has become more mainstream
with its inclusion in languages like WS-BPEL [10, 46] and products like IBM’s Web-
Sphere [58].
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The need to identify exception handling patterns in processes has also been rec-
ognized. Russell, van der Aalst, and ter Hofstede [116] discuss exception handling
patterns in workflows. They approach exception handling patterns by identifying four
dimensions associated with exception handling mechanisms: the nature of the excep-
tion, if and how the work item that encounters the exception continues, whether other
work items are cancelled as a result of the exception, and whether there is any roll-
back or compensation performed. Based on this analysis, they suggest that these four
dimensions be used to derive a universe of exception handling patterns. They suggest
essentially that each of the different combinations of the possible choices from each
of these four dimensions be considered to be an exception handling pattern, without
regard to whether these combinations are commonly used in practice and without
providing a description of the workflow problems that the pattern might be suitable
for addressing. Thus, it is still left to the workflow designer to understand the mech-
anisms at their most basic level. Identifying those combinations may be useful as a
benchmark to determine the exception handling capabilities of a process language.
On the other hand, these combinations do little to aid process designers in identifying
and reusing existing high-level solutions since no general higher-level purpose for a
particular combination is provided to guide the designer in choosing a pattern to use.
The combinations that Russell et al. identify also lack names that might suggest their
usefulness. Instead, they name the patterns with acronyms derived from the choices
made out of each of the four dimensions. For example, they identify 30 patterns
associated with expired deadlines alone, two of which are called OCO-CWC-NIL and
ORO-CWC-NIL. Our approach differs from the approach of Russell at al. in that it is
driven by recognition of patterns that we have identified through our work in defining
processes in multiple domains. We thus approach the identification of patterns in
a top-down manner, analyzing uses of exception handling to generalize and extract
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patterns that we believe to be useful beyond the specific processes in which we have
found them.
6.1.2.2 Process Model Representations
The importance of describing processes to various stakeholders, perhaps from
different backgrounds, is well-established. In some early efforts to accomplish this,
organizations created paper-based process guides or manuals that describe, largely
in natural language, the process of interest. It has been observed, however, that
such paper-based descriptions are difficult to navigate (due to their inherently linear
structure and significant size), are time-consuming to develop, are hard to keep in
sync with the evolving process (or its formal description), and are nearly impossible
to customize. Thus, such paper-based descriptions are not very effective and rarely
created or used [80].
To alleviate some of the disadvantages of paper-based process descriptions, orga-
nizations have resorted to electronic process guides (EPGs), which usually contain
hyperlinks that facilitate navigation. Using hyperlinks addresses to some extent the
navigation problems with paper-based process descriptions. Manually creating and
maintaining EPGs remains a large problem. For example, [20] reports that during
the maintenance of a V-Modell guide, “when changing the glossary structure to tool-
tip style, some 2000 links had to be updated.” As a result, some tools have been
proposed to automatically generate EPGs, such as Adonis [1], ARIS [2], Eclipse Pro-
cess Framework (EPF) Composer [69], and Spearmint [19]. Such tools use a process
model as input to a generator that automatically creates a hyperlinked EPG based
on that process model. The process model is usually captured in some notation that
supports constructs such as activities and their hierarchical decomposition, artifacts
and resources, roles, and the relationships between these constructs (e.g., which role
is responsible for which activity, what resources are needed to perform an activity,
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and what artifacts are produced by an activity). Process engineers can then associate
detailed natural-language descriptions with each such component of a process model.
Once a process model is in place, an EPG generator can use that model to create
a hyperlinked document describing the process. EPF Composer and Spearmint, for
instance, create a document that has a section showing the decomposition of the
process activities (as a summary view of the process) and another section with a
detailed natural-language description of the selected activity/artifact/role. These
sections, however, contain little indication of the order, or the flow of control among
the process activities. The section that provides a summary view of the process, for
example, shows the hierarchical decomposition of the process activities, but not the
order in which they need to be executed. The detailed, natural-language description
of the selected activity may contain some information about control flow, but this
information is included in a non-systematic way as it is up to the person who writes
the description to decide how much control flow information to include.
Another concern with the process descriptions generated by the tools mentioned
above is related to the lack of semantic richness of the process notations used to create
the process models that are in turn the basis for the generation of EPGs. Such process
notations often lack support for complex exception handling behavior, concurrency
and synchronization mechanisms, or even mechanisms for simpler constructs such as
looping. For example, [106] reports that the EPF Composer was not able to represent
parts of a software development process because EPF Composer could not adequately
model the looping at the activity level.
The Little-JIL narrative and visual representations described in section 3.2 contain
information about resources, artifacts and agents, similar to the EPGs generated by
the tools discussed above, but also include a detailed description of the control flow.
This is due to the fact that the Little-JIL language provides complex control flow
constructs, such as support for exceptional behavior, concurrency, synchronization,
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and recursion. The Little-JIL narrative and visual representations are automatically
generated from the process model, eliminating the issues related to manual creation
and maintenance mentioned above.
6.2 Online Process Guidance for HIPs
In this section, we discuss existing approaches for providing online process guid-
ance. We first discuss several approaches for providing guidance by visualizing the
state of executing HIPs. Then, we discuss several approaches for what we call passive
guidance, which are approaches where there is limited or no automated support and
process performers are responsible for making sure they adhere to a process specifi-
cation.
6.2.1 Visualization of the Execution State of HIPs
6.2.1.1 Trauma Center Process Guidance System
Fitzgerald et al. have designed and deployed a process guidance system in a trauma
center to guide medical professionals during the first 30 minutes of trauma resuscita-
tion [57]. Trauma resuscitation medical algorithms have been modeled what Fitzger-
ald et al. call “branch tree logic” (no reference to that logic is provided in [57], but it
seems that this logic is similar to a decision tree representation). The process guid-
ance system has been used by a team of 6-7 medical professionals with an emergency
physician as a team leader and a senior trauma nurse acting as a scribe to document
the resuscitation. The visualization of the process guidance system (Figure 6.1) has
been displayed on a 40-inch LCD monitor. The process guidance elements were a set
of action prompts (rectangular buttons, around 3-4 on the screen at a time). The
screen also contained patient data such as name and DOB, readings of patient phys-
iological conditions (heart rate, blood pressure, etc.), the patient diagnosis(es), and
the drugs and treatments given to the patient.
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Figure 6.1: Visualization of the process guidance system used during trauma resuscitation at the
Alfred Trauma Center, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia (2006 – 2008).
Using statistical hypothesis testing, Fitzgerald et al. demonstrate that the intro-
duction of process guidance improves adherence to medical guidelines/algorithms.
The reduction in morbidity and mortality was not significant, except one aspect of
morbidity—morbidity from shock management. The process guidance system also
provides the ability for semi-automated documentation of process executions. The
scribe nurse inputs the activities performed by the medical team via a touch screen
using standardized activity names and the systems strings together the sequences of
activities that correspond to process executions. The sequences of activities accumu-
lated over time could be analyzed to support continuous process improvement [119].
The process guidance system described by Fitzgerald et al. supports relatively
simple control flow. It does not seem to support more complex concurrent process
execution, for example. It also focuses on the nominal flow, with little support for
handling exceptional scenarios outside the scope of the encoded medical algorithms.
Examples of such exceptional scenarios are cases when the patient has been misiden-
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tified or when the required type of medical professional is unavailable (e.g., a doctor)
and he/she needs to be substituted by a different type of medical professional (e.g.,
a nurse).
6.2.1.2 Visualization of Patient Flow
Baffoe et al. [17] describe an approach for inferring process execution state based
on a process model and events generated by what they call “business process manage-
ment (BPM) technology” (e.g., patient registration systems, computerized physician
order entry systems, scheduling systems) and real time location systems (RTLSs).
The process model is essentially a finite-state machine, where transitions are trig-
gered when a set of events are reported by the BPM technology and/or RTLSs. By
correlating such events with the transitions in the process model, the state of an
executing process can be tracked as events are recorded.
A prototype of the approach was implemented for a medical process. In particular,
the flow of cardiac patients through the Emergency Department and the Cardiac
Care Unit was modeled and a case study was conducted with a community hospital
in Ontario, Canada. The prototype measured service and wait times and compared
them against target times for the hospital. A visualization was developed for the
duration of each stage of the care process for a given patient. Color coding was used
to distinguish between stages whose measured duration is within an acceptable range
(green), stages whose measured duration is approaching the target limit (yellow),
and stages whose measured duration has exceeded the target limit (red). Figure 6.2
shows an example of this visualization. A similar visualization is also generated for
aggregate statistics, such as average time for a given process stage for all patients.
The prototype of the patient flow visualization approach focused on the nominal
process flow and it appears that the underlying process model captured a single
process execution. It will be interesting to evaluate the ability of this approach
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Figure 6.2: Visualization of cardiac patient flow.
to support process performers on more complex flow, such as when non-nominal
situations arise or when concurrent execution is involved. The process model used in
the evaluation case study is also very high-level. It will be interesting to investigate
how the approach could support process performers when tasks at lower level of
granularity are taken into account.
We believe the patient flow visualization approach nicely complements the smart
checklist approach to process execution state visualization presented in section 5.2.
The two approaches focus on different kinds of process information—the former on the
patient flow and the latter on the activities of various process performers—and if used
together, they could improve the overall situational awareness of process performers.
6.2.1.3 Visualization of Patient Location During Perioperative Clinical
Processes
PERICLES [6] was a research initiative between 2009 and 2011 whose main ob-
jective was to facilitate clinicians’ process awareness. A surgical procedure is modeled
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using the YAWL process modeling language [8] and a tag is attached to a patient,
so that an ultrasound-based realtime locating system can determine in which room
a patient is. The patient location information or information manually entered by
process performers is used to determine which steps from the process model are be-
ing performed. As a result, a visualization is created that shows the location of the
patient in the hospital. Resource information captured in the process model is used
to assist operating room coordinators with resource assignments [100].
According to [5], PERICLES has been implemented in the central operating fa-
cility of a German partner hospital. We were not able to find published studies that
report the results of this implementation. Based on the project’s description ( [5, 6])
and the publications resulting from this project ( [84, 100, 101]) it appears that the
process model that was used in PERICLES was relatively small and simple—it con-
tained about a dozen steps and did not capture exceptional situations.
6.2.2 Traditional Checklists and Process Guides
In the above approaches for visualization of process execution state, the informa-
tion provided to process performers is to some extent dynamically updated depend-
ing on how the current process execution unfolds. Traditional checklists and process
guides, on the other hand, are static in the sense that information about potentially
several complete process executions is provided and it is up to process performers to
decide what information applies to the current process execution and to keep track
of the progress of that execution.
6.2.2.1 Checklists
Checklists have been widely used for real time-process guidance. Examples of such
checklists include the Procedure Checklist for Administering Blood Transfusion [130]
included in a standard nursing reference [131], the Surgical Safety Checklist advocated
by the World Health Organization (WHO) and used during surgery worldwide [136],
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and the Pilot’s Abbreviated Flight Crew Checklist for OV-10A aircrafts used in the
Vietnam war [124]. Checklists have been effective in reducing the number of errors
in aviation and are now “universally employed in commercial and military aviation
and space flight” [23]. Checklists have also proven beneficial in improving safety and
efficiency in other industries, such as product manufacturing [67].
Recently, healthcare has started the adoption of checklists as well. Various studies
have reported the success of checklists in different domains of medicine. The use of a
checklist by a nurse for obtaining medication history during the initial patient assess-
ment has been linked to the reduction of patient medication histories that contain
medication discrepancies [123]. The implementation of a Quality Rounds Check-
list in an ICU has been linked to the decrease in the number of pneumonias [54].
In another ICU study, a checklist was used to ensure adherence to standard pro-
cedures (such as hand-washing and removing unnecessary catheters) and the rate of
catheter-related infections decreased after the medical professionals started to use the
checklist [108]. [51] reports improvement in patient outcomes after a comprehensive
surgical checklist was introduced in six hospitals. This checklist included not only
information about what needs to be done in the operating room, but also information
related to pre- and post-surgery tasks.
The role of checklist in healthcare and their direct impact on reduction of errors,
however, have been more controversial than in other industries. Birkmeyer [22] ac-
knowledges that checklists have been linked to reduction in errors in healthcare but
also points out limitations of some of the studies in terms of controlling for con-
founding factors (such as concurrent implementation of outcomes measurement and
feedback and Hawthorne effect [85]), and lack of correlation between level of compli-
ance with checklists and extent of improvement in outcomes. In addition, Birkmeyer
raises a concern about the lack of studies supporting the durability of improvements
linked to checklists. He argues that “It is . . . conceivable that the benefits of surgical
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checklists could wane over time as they lose their novelty and become a perfunctory
component of care.”
Hales et al. [67] point out that despite reported positive outcomes, checklists are
not routinely used in the clinical setting. [67] suggests that some of the factors for
checklist adoption resistance in healthcare include operational barriers, such as the
difficulty to standardize certain medical processes, as well as cultural barriers. Hales
et al. write that “. . . there is often an assumption that the use of memory aids is an
admission of weakness or lack of medical skill or knowledge, which can contribute to
negative attitudes toward the implementation of these types of resources. Further-
more, clinicians often view standardization, or the use of standardized tools such as
checklists, as a limitation to their clinical judgment and autonomous decision mak-
ing.” We believe the detailed and semantically rich process model used in our proposed
approach for process state visualization could capture the different acceptable varia-
tions of performing a medical process, and thus the resulting smart checklist would be
more flexible in terms of supporting clinical judgment and autonomous decision mak-
ing than traditional checklists. Furthermore, clinicians may opt to not use a smart
checklist and rely only on guidance provided by the deviation detection and explana-
tion approach, which does not require medical professionals to explicitly use memory
aids and interferes only when a deviation from the acceptable ways to perform the
process is detected.
Traditional checklists are also often incomplete and tend to focus on the normative
workflow, omitting important details about exceptional scenarios [31]. Checklists
could also contain ambiguities. For example, the tasks specified in the Surgical Safety
Checklist by the WHO [136] are often high-level and ambiguous. The accompanying
implementation manual [135] provides a more detailed natural language description
of each task on the checklist, but there are still some ambiguities. For example, at
one point the manual says that “the coordinator verbally confirms patient identity”
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but it does not specify how exactly that should be done—e.g., how many patient
identifiers (and which) should be used. There has been evidence that even simple
processes such as verifying patient identity are error-prone [72, 74] and leaving their
specification ambiguous in process guides could lead to undesired process outcomes.
Another deficiency of checklists is that they primarily help with avoiding errors
of omission [23]. However, other kinds of errors, such as commission errors, occur in
HIPs [59,71,73,111].
Our approaches for online process guidance can help address some of the lim-
itations of checklist discussed above. The process models we use are written in a
rich language, which could enable the inclusion of complex execution behaviors, in-
cluding normative flow, exceptional flow and concurrent execution. Thus, a smart
checklist generated from such a process model can support process performers on a
larger variety of scenarios that traditional checklists do. A smart checklist is also
context-sensitive and dynamically updated, thus, making relevant information salient
and removing information that is not relevant to the current process execution. The
use of a formal process model can also address the ambiguity problem from which
some checklists suffer.
6.2.2.2 Process Guides
The process guides and manuals described in section 6.1.2.2 can also be used
to assist process performers while a process is being executed, but they suffer from
the limitations also described in section 6.1.2.2—the paper-based process guides are
difficult to navigate, whereas the electronic ones are often incomplete as they tend to
not represent complex control flow information well, or not at all. For complex HIPs,
such as medical processes, precise activity ordering or control flow information can be
very important. Medical guidelines, for instance, can define strict constraints on the
order of performing certain activities. Also, medical processes exhibit a high degree
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of concurrency (as different medical professionals can work on the same process in
parallel) and non-deterministic choices made by agents at runtime. Thus, a process
guide that does not provide in a systematic way sufficient amount of control flow
information might not be able to provide the level of guidance to process performers
necessary to reduce control-flow related errors (e.g., the performance of activities out
of order and simultaneous performance of activities that should not be performed at
the same time).
6.2.3 Approaches for Dealing with Process Deviation
This section discusses formal approaches that have been used to deal with process
deviation. Most of these approaches have not been directly used for process guidance
(except for the approach to deal with deviation in software design processes), but the
techniques they utilize could potentially be useful. In fact, our approach for error
localization shares commonalities with Cook and Wolf’s approach for validation of
software process models [42].
6.2.3.1 Software Process Validation
Cook and Wolf studied techniques for measuring the discrepancies between process
models and process executions [42]. In particular, they investigated how to measure
the difference between an a sequence of performed steps and a sequence of steps from
a process model, and given a sequence of performed steps, how to find the “closest”
sequence of steps from the process model.
The problem of comparing two sequences of steps is cast as a string comparison
problem and a standard dynamic programming algorithm [83] is used to compute
the difference between two strings in terms of insertion and deletion edit operations.
Two validation metrics for sequence difference are defined based on the number of
insertion and deletions needed to transform one sequence into another. These metrics
contain tuning parameters that can be adjusted based on properties of the process
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and of the domain. In Cook and Wolf’s study, the values of the tuning parameters
are set based on what has been observed to work in their case studies, but a rigorous
and systematic approach to determine these values is not discussed.
The problem of finding the process model sequence that is “closest” to a se-
quence of performed steps is cast as a search problem. The model is assumed to be
a finite-state machine. A state in the search space is then determined by a triple—a
model state, an index in the sequence of performed steps and an operation (dele-
tion/insertion/match) that led to the current state in the search space. A varia-
tion of best-first search [117] is used to estimate the closest process model sequence.
Heuristics are used to estimate the solution cost and to prune the search space.
6.2.3.2 Dealing with Deviations in Software Design Processes
Da Silva et al. have been studying the problem of dealing with deviations in soft-
ware design processes [47–49]. Their general approach is based on defining deviation
rules in terms of logical formulas and checking in real time whether a process exe-
cution sequence satisfies these logical formulas. The deviation rules are expressed in
LTL in [49], in Praxis (a language defined by the authors) in [48] and as Prolog rules
in [47].
In [47], a risk level and a cause for a deviation can be specified in the deviation
rules. The risk level is an estimate of the risk of not achieving the process outcomes
given that the deviation occurs. The cause for a deviation is an activity that led to
the deviation. For example, suppose that in a given process, activity a should precede
activity b. A deviation rule (which is a logical formula) can be written saying that
activity b occurs before activity a has occurred and that the cause for this deviation is
activity b. Such a deviation rule will be checked at runtime as a sequence of activities
is performed and if at one point this rule is satisfied, a deviation will be reported and
its cause will be determined as activity b.
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Once a deviation has been detected, [47] proposes an approach for identifying
sequences of corrective actions to address the deviation. This is achieved by specifying
another set of rules (called generator functions), where each rule specifies a sequence
of actions that need to be taken once a specific deviation caused by a specific activity
occurs. There could be multiple sequences of actions (called correction plans) for
a given (set of) deviation(s) and these correction plans are ranked by risk level of
the deviations they fix—a correction plan that leaves the least number of high-risk
deviations unfixed is considered the best one.
Instead of proposing correction plans once a deviation has been detected, in [49]
the idea of tolerance is used. There are two kinds of logical rules—deviation rules,
based on the constraints coming from the process model, and tolerance rules, which
are relaxations of the deviation rules based on some predefined tolerance levels for
the violation of a given deviation rule. Both the deviation and tolerance rules are
checked at runtime. Two separate reports are produced at each step — a deviation
report shows the deviation rules (i.e. original process constraints) that are violated;
the tolerance report shows the tolerance rules that are violated. These reports are
shown to the process performer who can decide to address the deviations listed in the
reports or to ignore them and continue with the process execution.
In the general approach presented by Da Silva et al., only deviations for which cor-
responding deviation rules have been created statically (before executing the process)
can be detected at runtime. In [47] and [48] creating these rules could be error-prone
and time-consuming, especially for larger and more realistic process models, since
most of the work needs to be done manually. Also, only “expected” deviations could
be detected since deviations for which there are no deviation rules defined cannot
be detected. These problems are addressed in [49], where the deviation rules are
automatically created from a process model.
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The strategy for identifying the cause for a deviation presented in [47] seems
limited since the cause for a given deviation is hardcoded into the corresponding
deviation rule. This approach will not be able to handle the issue of delayed deviation
detection (described in section 4.1.2.1), where there could be several plausible, and
perhaps equally likely, causes for the deviation. In general, da Silva et al. assume that
the intent of process performers is always known—if a process model has multiple
branches, at runtime it is always known which branch the process performers intend
to execute. This way, it can be unambiguously determined what deviation rule is
violated and consequently what the deviation and its causes are. In the approach
presented in this thesis, we assume that the intent of process performers is not known,
thus, there could be multiple plausible explanations for a detected deviation.
The correction plans that are generated upon detection of a deviation in [47]
are based on rules defined prior to process execution. This is similar to specifying
exception handling in process languages with rich semantics. The process guidance
approach presented in this thesis uses process models specified in a language with
rich semantics and it is assumed that any exception handling information is already
part of the process model. A deviating sequence represents a behavior not described
by the process model and therefore there is no static hardcoded knowledge about
how this behavior should be addressed. Upon deviation detection, we aim to provide
process performers with information to help them decide how to recover from the
potential errors based domain knowledge and expertise.
6.2.3.3 A Framework for Formalizing Inconsistencies and Deviations in
HIPs
Cugola et al. [45] present a framework for formalizing the notions of deviations and
inconsistencies between a HIP (e.g., a software development process) and a process
model-based automated system that supports the execution of the corresponding
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HIP (e.g., a process-based integrated development environment). To accomplish this
formalization, the HIP and its process-based support system (PBSS1) are represented
as state machines (possibly with infinite number of states). In addition there are two
relations, Rs and and Rt, that relate states and transitions respectively from the
HIP state machine and the PBSS state machine. These state machines and relations
comprise an environment.
A deviation is a concept related to transitions and an inconsistency is a concept
related to states. An environment deviation occurs when a transition in the PBSS
state machine does not correctly reflect a transition in the HIP state machine. For
instance, a design document is created, but the PBSS is not updated with that
information. Environment deviations can lead to environment inconsistencies. An
environment inconsistency occurs when the HIP and its PBSS become inconsistent,
i.e., the state of the PSS does not correspond to the state of the HCS as described
by Rs. For example, the HIP is in a state where a design document exists, but the
PBSS is in a state where a design document does not exist.
Cugola et al. also define domain deviations and inconsistencies. A domain devia-
tion is an event that deviates from the expected behavior of the HIP. An example of
a domain deviation is a developer writing the source code before writing its design,
assuming that there is a process rule saying that design should be written before
code. Unlike environment deviations, domain deviations can occur even when when
no PBSS is used, but some domain rule or policy is violated. Domain deviations can
lead to domain inconsistencies. An example of a domain inconsistency is a situation
where the source code does not have a corresponding design file.
While the presented framework formalizes the notions of deviation and inconsis-
tency, there are difficulties in utilizing it to provide online process guidance. To detect
1The names and the abbreviations are ours. Cugola et al. call the HIP a Human Centered System
and the PBSS a Process Support System.
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deviations, the state machines that model the HIP and the PBSS must exist. The
model of the HIP must capture all possible executions, including deviating/erroneous
executions, so that these deviations can be detected when comparing the transitions
of the HIP state machine to the transitions of the PBSS state machine. Having such a
HIP state machine that captures all possible executions is impractical and we believe
that the approach of using just one execution event sequence to represent what is
happening in the HIP is more feasible.
6.2.3.4 Conformance between Process Executions and Process Models
Similar to Cook and Wolf [42], Rozinat and van der Aalst [113–115] have studied
methods for quantifying the conformance between a process model and executions of
the modeled process. In particular, they focus on the problem of comparing a process
model to an execution log (a collection of observed process executions). Like Cook
and Wolf, they are interested in measuring fitness (“Does the observed process com-
ply with the control flow specified by the process model?”) but also appropriateness
(“Does the model describe the observed process in a suitable way?”).
Rozinat and van der Aalst use a Petri net [104, 105] process model and compare
it to an execution log. Each execution sequence in the log is “replayed” in the Petri
net and things like number of consumed tokens, number of produced tokens, and
average number of enabled transitions during the replay of the event log are counted.
In addition, the authors define precedes and follows between two activities in the
Petri net and in the event log. These relations and the counts mentioned above as
well as the total number of places and transition in the Petri net and the part of
them that correspond to events from the log are then used to compute fitness and
appropriateness.
In [115], Rozinat and van der Aalst are interested in comparing a process model
to multiple and complete process executions. They use aggregate information, such
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as average number of enabled transitions, to compute conformance metrics. On the
contrary, our deviation detection approach operates on a single and partial process
execution, which gets compared to a process model as it grows.
6.2.3.5 Adherence to Medical Guidelines
In the medical domain, Advani et al. [12] have investigated methods for determin-
ing adherence of clinicians to medical guidelines by examining information in medical
charts. Guidelines are represented as a hierarchical decomposition of intentions (e.g.,
a high-level intention of a hypertension guideline could be “Manage Hypertension”
and a leaf-level intention could be “prescribing a particular drug”). The patient record
is examined to determine whether the leaf-node intentions have been satisfied. The
information from the leaf nodes is then propagated up the hierarchy to determine to
what extent the high-level intentions have been satisfied.
Advani et al.’s approach is based on examining the patient chart “after the fact”,
i.e., after process execution to determine conformance with medical guidelines. Also
the representation of guidelines they use doesn’t seem to support ordering and more
complex control flow. Thus, their approach does not seem applicable to checking in
real time, as a process is being executed, the kind of adherence to process models
we are interested in—detecting deviations and providing information to help explain
these deviations.
6.2.4 Error Localization
This section describes approaches that are related to the the error localization
approach described in section 4.5.1.
6.2.4.1 Fault Localization
The task of locating faults in programs (commonly referred to as fault localization)
shares commonalities with the task of identifying possible indexes in a sequence of
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performed steps where an error might have occurred. In the usual fault localization
setting, a program is being tested prior to deployment or executed after being de-
ployed. Some of the program executions fail, which indicates that there is a fault in
the program. The exact location of the fault, however, is not known and locating this
fault could be difficult and time-consuming. Thus, recent research has investigated
techniques for automatically identifying program statements that are most likely to
be faulty.
There have been various approaches to automated fault localization (e.g., [13,39,
79, 102, 112]). The Tarantula approach [79] uses information about the number of
times a given program statement is executed in passing and failing test cases. A
simple formula is then used to compute the “suspiciousness” of a given statement to
be faulty. Set union, described in [112], computes a “suspicious” initial set of program
statements by removing the union of all statements executed by all passed test cases
from the set of statements executed by a single failed test case. The nearest neighbor
approach [112] arbitrarily chooses any single failed test case and then finds the passed
test case that has most similar coverage to the coverage of the failed test case. Then,
the set of statements executed by the passed test case is removed from the set of
statements executed by the failed test case and the remainder becomes set of most
“suspicious” statements. In many fault localization approaches, the “suspiciousness”
score is used to rank program statements hoping to save the programmer time and
effort in locating the fault.
There are two main differences between the work on fault localization and the
proposed approach for error localization. Fault localization aims to identify possible
faulty locations (statements) in a program given a set of “good” (passing) and a set
of “bad” (failing) program executions (test runs). In the proposed error localization
approach, we aim to identify possible indexes in a process execution where an error
might have occurred, assuming that the program (i.e., the process model) is correct.
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Fault localization also assumes that a computer program is always executed correctly
by the hardware, and thus, a failing program execution must be due to a fault in the
software. The second difference is that in the fault localization case, we are given
multiple “good” and “bad” program executions to identify the faults, whereas in
the online process guidance case, we are given a prefix of a single execution. Thus,
fault localization techniques do not seem to be directly applicable to the problem of
identifying possible indexes in a sequence of performed steps where an error might
have occurred. Some fault localization work could be useful, however, in incorporating
historical information about deviating executions into a strategy for identifying in
real time possible indexes in a sequence of performed steps where errors might have
occurred.
6.2.4.2 Anomaly Detection
Some work from the area of anomaly detection is relevant to the proposed error
localization approach. Given a failing program execution (e.g., an execution that has
not passed a test case), the goal of anomaly detection is to identify likely anomalous
events (in the failing program executions) that caused the observed failure. Unlike
fault localization, which aims to directly locate a fault in a program, anomaly de-
tection aims to identify events in a program execution that led to the failure of that
execution. Knowing such events can then help locate the fault in a program.
Some anomaly detection techniques synthesize a behavioral model of the program
from correct program executions and then compare a failing program execution with
that model to identify likely anomalies that caused the failure. One such technique
[90] takes as input a failing program execution and a finite-state automaton (FSA)
synthesized from correct executions. It then uses the kBehavior algorithm [91] to
augment the FSA model so that it accepts the failing execution. The subsequences of
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the program execution that correspond to the FSA augmentations are then considered
to be the anomalies and are presented to the developers for inspection.
Just the anomalous events by themselves, however, are often not very useful as
they “do not capture the structure and the rationale of the differences between the
correct and the failing executions” [16]. The AVA technique [16] performs an auto-
mated interpretation of anomalies to provide developers with a higher-level anomaly
information. For instance, if an expected event is missing from an earlier part of an
execution but appears later on, then AVA could automatically interpret these two
anomalies as one higher-level anomaly, namely that the event was postponed.
One difference between the approach for anomaly detection discussed above and
the error localization approach we propose is that the anomaly detection approach
identifies one set of possible anomalies per program execution. The kBehavior algo-
rithm greedily augments the FSA to make it accept the failing program execution
and, thus, produces one set of anomalies. The error localization approach we propose
can identify several likely error indexes in a sequence of performed steps that could
correspond to different, mutually exclusive errors. It might be interesting to explore
the question whether the kBehavior algorithm can be extended so that it produces
several likely sets of anomalies and apply it to the problem of identifying likely expla-
nations for a deviation. Also, some of the techniques that AVA uses to infer high-level
anomaly patterns might be useful in identifying possible human errors and not just
error indexes based on a sequence of edit operations that transform a process model
sequence into a deviating sequence.
6.2.4.3 Plan and Policy Recognition Approaches
The artificial intelligence community has studied approaches for the tasks of plan
and policy recognition. These tasks are related to the task of identifying the most
likely intended sequences of steps from a process model, given a sequence of steps that
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process performers have executed. Identifying the most likely intended sequence of
steps is a component of the approach for error localization discussed in section 4.5.1.
6.2.4.3.1 Policy Recognition Using Markov Models. Bui et al. [25] explore
an approach for policy recognition based on an Abstract Hidden Markov Model, a
formalism that they define. The goal is to infer agent’s policies at different levels
of abstraction based on a sequence of states that an agent visits. The approach has
been applied to recognizing human behavior (e.g., the person is using a computer vs.
the person is passing by the computer (low-level policy), person intends to exit the
building through the north exit (high-level policy)) based on a sequence of locations
of the person, as recorded by video cameras.
Luhr et al. [89] use Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models (HHMMs) [56] to learn
and recognize human activity. They apply their approach in the context of eldercare
aiming to identify behaviors such as eating dinner, watching television, and cooking.
An HHMM is learned for each high-level activity (e.g., cooking) based on sequences
of observations, where an observation is a person’s location in the room at a given
time. The HHMMs are then used to classify new sequences.
While the approaches proposed by Bui et al. and Luhr et al. seem promising for
recognizing the intended policy/plan of process performers, they do not support the
notion of error in the sense that they consider all recorded sequences of events (or
states of process performers) to be error free. A sequence of events/states is considered
to be more likely to follow one policy/plan than another, but no sequence can be a
deviating sequence where process performers have deviated from the recommended
ways to perform the process due to errors. Thus, it would be difficult to reason about
human errors using the above approaches.
6.2.4.3.2 Plan Recognition Using Bayes Nets. Work in the domain of intel-
ligent tutoring systems has also addressed similar problems. Gertner et al. [62] tackle
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the problem of deciding what the tutoring system should say when a student needs
help solving a problem. To achieve that, an attempt is made to estimate the student’s
knowledge and the solution path the student is pursuing. The model used to do the
estimation is a Bayes net that consists of different kinds of nodes to represent infor-
mation such as the facts that the student knows, the student’s goals, rules that the
student can apply to solve a problem, and so on. When a student’s action is observed
(e.g., the student computes some quantity needed for the problem solution), the value
of the corresponding nodes in the Bayes net (e.g., the student knows fact A) is set.
Nodes, whose values are not known are assigned a probability that represents the
confidence that the student has performed the task associated with the node. When
a student asks for help, the Bayes net is used to infer what part of the problem the
student is currently working on and what the student should do next.
Similar to the approaches discussed above, Gertner et al.’s approach focuses on
recognizing the intended execution sequence. Gertner et al. go one step further by
proposing a hint about how to perform the supposed next activity when a student
gets stuck and asks for help. No sequence of recorded actions of the process performer,
however, is considered a deviation from the recommended ways to perform the process
and no error identification is supported.
Gertner et al. also seem to assume that given an observation, the corresponding
node in the Bayes net model can be uniquely identified. In the situations we propose
to address with our deviation detection and explanation approach, an observed ac-
tion can correspond to different nodes in a flow graph, as the example described in
section 4.1.2.1 illustrates.
6.2.4.3.3 Plan Recognition Using DFAs and a Bayesian Classifier. Phua
et al. [107] present a process guidance approach to assist dementia patients in smart
homes. Information about the patient’s activities is collected by a variety of sensors,
such as video cameras, RFID sensors, and pressure sensors. Activity recognition
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techniques are applied on the sensor data to deliver in real time an activity sequence
to a plan recognition system.
A plan is defined as a sequence of activities to achieve a goal. Example activities
are moving chair, sitting, eating food, standing, walking. Example plans are prepare
food, consume food, and prepare utensils. The authors point out that plan definitions
are subjective in terms of aspects such as breadth (type of constituent activities) and
depth (granularity of constituent activities).
The main goal of Phua et al.’s approach is Erroneous Plan Recognition (EPR)—
recognizing erroneous plans (subsequences of the sequence of recorded activities) in
real time (as a dementia patient is performing activities of daily living) and sending
timely audio and visual prompts to the patient (and potentially the caregiver) to cor-
rect the erroneous execution of a plan. To achieve this goal, they propose a 2-stage
EPR system. The first stage is matching subsequences of the full activity sequence
against a set of whitelist and a set of blacklist deterministic finite-state automata
(DFAs). The whitelist and blacklist DFAs represent behaviors that correspond to
correct and incorrect plan executions respectively. If the subsequence under consider-
ation matches2 a blacklist DFA, then the EPR system will issue an error warning3. If
the subsequence under consideration does not match neither a whitelist nor a blacklist
DFA, then the sequence is passed to a trained machine learning classifier which gives a
probability of the subsequence being an erroneous plan execution. If this probability
is higher than a pre-specified threshold, a general error warning is issued4.
The EPR system is constructed via a training process. A plan library is populated
with a set of plans which are manually labeled as correct or erroneous. The plans
can be created by domain experts or machine learned from recorded patient behavior.
2The authors do not provide details what exactly matches means in this context.
3No details are provided about the kind of warning that is issued.
4Again, no details are provided about the kind of warning that is issued.
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The whitelist and blacklist DFAs discussed above are constructed from these plans.
The plans are also used to train the classifier.
6.3 Human Errors
This section presents an overview of work on human errors. Taking into account
the theoretical underpinnings of human errors is important for the proposed deviation
detection and error localization approaches as their main goals are to catch errors
before harm is done and provide information to help identify potential errors. The
potential error indexes identified by the error localization approach are based on the
edit operations that transform sequences from the process model into the sequence
of performed steps. Taking into account the kinds of human errors identified by
human error researchers could be useful with the selection of edit operations and cost
function, so that the selected edit operations provide more realistic representation of
the real-world errors.
For instance, knowing that omitting an activity or doing an extra activity are com-
monly made errors can justify the selection of deletion and insertion edit operations.
In addition, recognizing that sometimes due to inattention people do a sequence of
routine activities on autopilot in situations when they are actually not supposed to
do this sequence of activities could justify using an edit operation that inserts an
entire sequence of steps into a sequence from the process model. Also, the cost of
such an edit operation could be set to be lower than the sum of the costs of individual
insert operations that accomplish the same transformation. This way, such an edit
operation will be favored by a sequence comparison algorithm, which would increase
the probability that potential error indexes corresponding to the corresponding error
interpretation will be ranked higher.
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6.3.1 “Human Error” by James Reason
The work of James Reason [111] has been one of the most influential treatments of
human error and is heavily used in the IOM report “To Err Is Human” [82] mentioned
earlier to formalize the discussion of errors in healthcare. Reason classifies human
errors based on a model of human cognition. According to that model, humans
operate cognitively at three different levels—skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-
based level—and each level has a corresponding category of errors. Humans work at
the skill-based level when they perform routine actions in a familiar environment. A
lot of the actions at this level are done subconsciously (since they’ve been done many
times before) and only from time to time attention is needed to perform a check to
decide which subconscious path of actions should be taken. Errors that occur at this
level are called SLIPS and LAPSES and they are usually due to either inattention
(a check is not done properly) or “overattention” (“when the human consciously
interrogates the progress of an action sequence when control is best left to automatic
pilot”).
Humans enter the rule-based level of cognition when a problem is detected at the
skill-based level. At that level, the human process performer considers the current
state of the process execution (situation) and tries to find a memorized rule that
says ”IF (situation) THEN (actions)”. Errors that occur at this level are called RB
MISTAKES. RB mistakes are usually due to either a “misapplication of good rules
or application of bad rules”.
Humans enter the knowledge-based level of cognition when NO appropriate rule
for the current situation is found at the rule-based level. Working at this level requires
most attention (not auto pilot) since no prior knowledge (rule) about how the address
the problem is available and the human needs to perform more complex analysis of
the current situation and decide on future actions. Errors at this level are called
KB MISTAKES. KB mistakes occur for various reasons—selectivity (giving attention
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to the wrong features of a problem), mental workspace limitations (finite resources
of the conscious workspace), availability heuristic, confirmation bias, overconfidence,
etc.
6.3.2 The Eindhoven Classification Model
Another influential work on classifying errors has been the Eindhoven classifi-
cation model [126]. It was originally designed to categorize errors in the chemical
industry, but has been subsequently used in other industries. For example, it has
been customized for use in healthcare [127] and used in the context of event reporting
systems [18,21].
The Eindhoven model builds on Reason’s error classification by incorporating or-
ganizational and technical factors in addition to individual human errors made during
process execution. Errors are divided into two main categories—latent errors and ac-
tive (human) errors. Latent errors are technical and organizational errors and result
from administrative decisions that affect technical issues, organizational policy, or
allocation of resources [71]. Active errors are human errors made by individuals dur-
ing process execution. The sub-classification of active errors follows closely Reason’s
categories—skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based errors.
Even though the Eindhoven error classification model extends the model presented
by Reason with additional error categories, there has been evidence that it is not
effective in categorizing errors in complex HIPs such as healthcare processes [71]. In
addition, both Reason’s error classification and the Eindhoven model focus on the
cognitive aspect of errors, on what is happening in the human’s mind that led to the
error. For instance, an example of a skilled-based error in Reason’s error classification
scheme is failing to perform a mental check that the right course of action is taken
for the given circumstances; the Eindhoven model has an error category described as
“the inability of an individual to apply existing knowledge to a novel situation.”
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This cognitive specification of human errors makes it different to operationalize
the error categorization for the purposes of deviation detection and error localization
because such cognitive errors cannot be observed or detected by an automated system.
What seems to be needed is a categorization based on the manifestation of errors that
can be observed during process execution, rather than based on the cognitive causes
of errors. In Reason’s terms, an error classification at the behavioral level rather than
the conceptual level is what seems to be needed.
6.3.3 Error Causes vs. Error Manifestations
Hollnagel recognizes this problem [77] and points out the lack of an operational
taxonomy of human errors. He distinguishes between error cause and error manifes-
tation and introduces the terms error genotype and error phenotype to refer to these
two aspects of human errors respectively. He then proposes a set of error phenotypes
and discusses their use in a system for on-line detection of errors in a process domain.
This system, called RESQ [75,76], is based on plan recognition. As actions of process
performers are recorded in real time, they are matched against a plan library and
the plan that is most likely to be currently under execution is identified. Actions
that do not conform to this most likely plan are considered erroneous and an attempt
to determine the kind of error that occurred is made by using a knowledge base of
phenotypes. The error kinds that the RESQ system could potentially diagnose are
intrusion (when the action does not belong to any plan in the plan library or is not
expected in the current plan), repeated action, omitted step, a sequence of omitted
steps, goal-not-as-specified (the goal of the erroneous actions does not match the goal
specified by the process performer), goal-not-as-preferred (the erroneous action does
not contribute to the goal recommended by the system).
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Human-intensive processes (HIPs) are critical for our societal infrastructure. Un-
fortunately, most, if not all, important HIPs, such as medical processes, suffer from
human errors, leading to compromised quality of the services or of the products de-
livered by these processes. In medical processes, for example, human errors result in
serious harm, including disabling injuries and even death.
Considerable efforts have been made to reduce the number and impact of human
errors in HIPs. One approach has been to improve the design of HIPs and to train
process performers to follow the resulting improved processes. Despite such efforts,
however, there is evidence that human process performers still make errors while
performing some important HIPs, due to various reasons such as cognitive overload,
distraction, and fatigue.
To address this problem, this thesis investigates two approaches for providing
guidance to human process performers while a process is being performed. The first
approach, deviation detection and explanation, detects when process performers devi-
ate from the recommended ways to perform a process. Such deviations could reflect
errors and, thus, notifying process performers about detected deviations could make
them aware of potential errors before harm is done. The approach also provides pro-
cess performers with information to help them identify potential errors, which in turn
could facilitate planning recovery from such errors. Such help could be particularly
useful in complex and time-critical HIPs. The second approach, process state visual-
ization, proactively guides process performers by showing them information relevant
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to the current process execution. The goal of this approach is to reduce the number
of errors.
Both of these approaches base the online guidance they provide on a detailed
formal model of the recommended ways to perform the process. Creating such mod-
els is challenging and this thesis also investigates process elicitation techniques to
help create such models. We studied several techniques for eliciting a process from
domain experts—unstructured interviews, three kinds of structured interviews, and
observations—in the context of a process for treatment plan review, part of an overall
chemotherapy preparation and administration process. We found that using combi-
nation of elicitation techniques leads to obtaining richer process information than
using any technique alone and we also compared the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of these techniques in terms of eliciting different kinds of process information,
such as activities on the nominal process flow, exceptional situations, and responses
to exceptional situations. We also conducted a small user study to compare two pro-
cess modeling notations, a diagrammatic notation and a natural language notation,
in terms of their ability to facilitate process understanding. For study subjects with
technical background, using the diagrammatic notation was associated with better
process understanding than using the narrative notation.
We identified important issues related to the deviation detection and explanation
approach and developed an experimental framework to evaluate the approach with
respect to these issues. Models of two medical processes—a blood transfusion process
and a chemotherapy preparation and administration process—and synthetic process
executions with seeded errors were used for the evaluation. We found that in the
performed experiments deviations were detected with delay infrequently, the delays
were short and not harmful. We also found some cases where harm could occur even if
a deviation is immediately detected, recognized these cases as process vulnerabilities,
and proposed ways to deal with some of these vulnerabilities. We focused on one kind
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of deviation explanation, namely error localization. The preliminary experimental
evaluation of the proposed error localization approach indicates that this approach can
successfully identify error locations under some assumptions about potential errors
that could occur in a process.
We implemented an initial prototype of the approach for visualization of process
execution state and demonstrated the approach on several case studies from the med-
ical domain. In one of these case studies—patient controlled analgesia—the approach
was evaluated by a panel of medical experts. The feedback was positive and several
interesting research directions were identified (discussed below).
In the rest of this chapter, we describe some future research directions.
Process elicitation and modeling. We compared several process elicitation tech-
niques—unstructured interviews, structured interviews, and observations—in terms
of their ability to elicit certain kinds of process information. These kinds of infor-
mation were steps on the nominal process flow, exceptional situations, and responses
to exceptional situations. It would be interesting to compare the above elicitation
techniques in terms of eliciting other kinds of process information, such as the order
between steps and how artifacts are used in a process. A particularly interesting
future research direction would be to investigate techniques for eliciting information
about process errors, such as the kinds of errors that are of concern in a particular
domain, in what part(s) of the process they typically occur, and what the likelihood
of such errors is. Such information could be utilized to determine potential deviation
detection delays, to fine tune the error localization approach, and to inform the design
of process execution state visualizations.
In our evaluation of the process elicitation techniques, we applied them in a specific
order. The results might change if these techniques are applied in a different order
and subsequent studies are needed to explore the effect of the order.
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Deviation detection. In this work, we studied the issues related to deviation
detection and explanation empirically. It would be interesting, however, to explore
some of these issues analytically. For instance, it will be useful to develop analytical
approaches for determining an upper bound on possible deviation detection delays
given a process model and assumptions about the errors that might occur during
a process execution. Such approaches could reveal how vulnerable a process is to
delayed deviation detection, how harmful these vulnerabilities might be, and how a
process can be modified to reduce such vulnerabilities. We have begun investigating
such approaches, but their feasibility seems to be a major challenge due to the very
large number of situations that need to be explored to determine what the deviation
detection delay would be when different kinds of errors occur that could involve
potentially any step in a process.
Deviation explanation. There are several aspects of the error localization ap-
proach described in this work that need further research. For large and complex
process models, criteria for selecting legal sequences to compare to the sequence of
performed steps are needed, because such models can contain a large, or even po-
tentially infinite, number of legal sequences and, thus, choosing a subset of all legal
sequences would be required to keep the approach feasible. As previously discussed,
one possible technique to deal with this issue is to incrementally compare prefixes
of legal sequences to a prefix of the sequence of performed steps and discard legal
sequences whose edit distance to a prefix of the sequence of performed steps is above
a certain threshold. Such technique is based on the assumption that there will be
a small number of distinct legal sequence prefixes up to a certain length, which is
usually the case as many processes have a relatively small number of initial steps.
The proposed error localization approach is highly sensitive to the measure of
similarity between two sequences and deciding what measure of similarity to use under
what circumstances requires further research. We used the edit distance between two
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sequences as the measure of similarity, where the edit distance is a function of the
costs of the edit operations needed to transform one sequence into the other. The
choice of edit operations and their costs also significantly affects the accuracy of the
error localization approach and, thus, further research into how to make this choice
is needed. One possible strategy is to base the edit operations on typical errors that
might occur during the performance of a process and to base the edit operation costs
on characteristics of these errors, such as error frequency and severity.
While the information that the error localization approach provides could help
process performers identify potential errors and plan recovery actions, richer deviation
explanations could be even more useful. For example, a ranked list of hypotheses
about actual potential errors, such as step X was omitted or subprocess Y was omitted,
in addition to a ranked list of possible indexes in the sequence of performed steps
where an error might have occurred, could further facilitate recovery from potential
errors.
Classification of human errors. Most of the existing classification schemes for
human errors focus on the cognitive aspect of errors, but such aspects cannot be ob-
served while a process is being performed. There has been some work on categorizing
errors based on their manifestation during a process execution, but further research is
needed to identify error classification schemes, such that the different error kinds cap-
tured by such schemes are observable during process execution, cover important errors
that could occur in a given process, and, if detected by an online guidance system,
informing process performers about such errors could prevent potential harm. Con-
structing such error classification schemes would have direct impact on the deviation
detection and explanation approaches—it could facilitate the analytic determination
of bounds of deviation detection delays by potentially decreasing the number of pos-
sible error situations that need to be considered, and it would direct the selection of
edit operations and associated costs used for error localization.
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Process model optimizations. A search through a process model is performed
for the purposes of both deviation detection and deviation explanation. For large and
complex HIPs, the search space could be large, negatively affecting the performance
of deviation detection and deviation explanation. In this work, we performed some
optimizations to reduce the size of the low-level model that is translated from a Little-
JIL process model and some optimizations to specifically reduce the size of the search
space determined by this low-level model. Further optimizations might be needed to
apply the deviation detection and explanation approach to models of larger and more
complex HIPs than the ones used in this work. Such optimizations would also be
useful for the offline analysis part of the process improvement environment.
Visualization of process execution state. The current prototype for visualiza-
tion of process execution state supports visualization from the perspective of a single
agent, but domain experts who saw that prototype indicated that it might be useful
to have a view with information about the overall process, such as different activities
that have been or are currently being performed by different process performers. Such
a view might improve the overall understanding of an executing process as well as fa-
cilitate team communication. Supporting different process state visualization modes,
for example based on the expertise of a process performer, is also an interesting future
research direction to explore.
The design of the user interface for visualization of process execution state also
needs further improvement and evaluation. For instance, some domain experts ex-
pressed concerns about ambiguity of some of the iconography in the current prototype
and also expressed preference for stronger distinction between the visualization of cur-
rent process execution state and the visualization of process execution history. It is
very unlikely that a single set of visualizations will appeal to all performers of a given
process and, thus, the user interface needs to be carefully designed, by using human
factors approaches and performing user studies.
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Determining how a process might unfold and visualizing information related to
possible future process execution states could be useful to process performers to plan
their work. Supporting such visualization would require developing approaches for
exploring the process model that drives the visualization and determining most likely
future process executions based on the current process execution.
An interesting issue to explore is the issue of undo—sometimes process performers
might need to roll back the process state visualization because an event has mistakenly
been reported to have happened (e.g., a process performer marked the wrong step as
completed). Supporting undo for systems that visualize the state of human-intensive
processes and also guide process performers, however, is not trivial, because reporting
by mistake that a process event has occurred might influence the process execution, in
some cases rendering the action of mistakenly reporting that process event irreversible.
Impact of the proposed process guidance approaches. The ultimate goal
of the deviation detection and explanation approach is to catch human errors before
harm is done; the goal of the process state visualization approach is to prevent human
errors. Thus, studies need to be performed to evaluate the effect of these approaches
on human errors in HIPs. Ideally, these approaches would be deployed in real HIPs
and error rates will be compared between cases when the online guidance approaches
are used and cases when they are not. Before these approaches can be deployed in
critical HIPs, such as a medical process, however, pilot studies in a simulated setting
would need to be performed.
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APPENDIX A
ARTIFACTS USED IN PROCESS ELICITATION STUDY
A.1 Open-ended Prompts
1. A triage MA leaves a treatment plan and orders for a patient in your tray. You
confirm that pretesting has been done. What do you do next?
2. A triage MA leaves a treatment plan and orders for a patient in your tray. You
confirm that pretesting has been done, confirm existence and not staleness of
height/weight data in CIS, confirm treatment plan is created from a careset.
What else, if anything, do you do before signing the treatment plan?
3. What steps do you take to verify the doses?
4. A triage MA leaves a treatment plan and orders for a patient in your tray. You
notice that labs have not been done for the patient. The chemo drugs for this
patient are not platinum-based. How do you proceed?
5. A triage MA leaves a treatment plan and orders for a patient in your tray. You
notice that labs have not been done for the patient. The chemo drugs for this
patient are platinum- based. How do you proceed?
6. A triage MA leaves a treatment plan and orders for a patient in your tray. You
notice that a scan has not been done for the patient. How do you proceed?
7. When you go to check that a patients height and weight have been entered in
the CIS, you notice they are missing. How do you proceed?
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8. When you go to check that a patients height and weight have been entered in
the CIS, you notice they were taken in another building. How do you proceed?
9. When you go to check that a patients height and weight have been entered in
the CIS, you notice a patients height and weight measurements are stale. How
do you proceed?
10. You receive new height and weight measurements for a patient. There is a 6%
change in the dose based on these new values. How do you proceed?
11. While reviewing a patients treatment plan, you notice that the treatment plan
was not created from a careset. How do you proceed?
12. While reviewing a patients treatment plan, you notice that orders are missing
for the patient. How do you proceed?
13. While reviewing a patients treatment plan and orders, you notice the orders
were entered by a Fellow. How do you proceed?
14. While verifying doses for a patient, you notice that the height and weight in the
treatment plan doesnt match the height and weight in the CIS or in the patient
chart. How do you proceed?
15. While verifying doses for a patient, you calculate the BSA for the patient and
notice the calculated dose is greater than the dose in the orders. How do you
proceed?
A.2 Complete Process Traces
A.2.1 Trace 1
1. You pick up treatment plan and orders that Triage MA has left.
2. You confirm that labs have been done.
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3. You confirm that the scans have been done.
4. You confirm existence of patient height/weight data in CIS.
5. You confirm that height/weight are not stale (i.e more than 2 weeks old).
6. You confirm that the treatment plan is created from a careset.
7. You confirm existence of chemo orders for the patient.
8. You confirm that the orders have been entered by an Attending.
9. You verify the doses:
(a) You confirm that height/weight on treatment plan, in CIS, and in the
patient chart all match.
(b) You calculate BSA using height/weight from CIS.
(c) You calculate doses using the BSA just calculated and the information
form the treatment plan.
(d) Confirm calculated doses match the ones on the chemo orders.
(e) Confirm dose base on treatment plan is consistent with doses on orders.
10. Check sticky notes to make sure that everything is completed and it turns out
that the labs have been done.
11. You sign the treatment plan.
12. You leave the treatment plan in Triage MAs tray.
A.2.2 Trace 2
1. You pick up treatment plan and orders that Triage MA has left
2. You confirm that labs have been done.
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3. You confirm that the scans have been done.
4. You confirm existence of patient height/weight data in CIS.
5. You confirm that height/weight are not stale (i.e more than 2 weeks old). You
find that height/weight are stale.
6. You tell Clinic MA to schedule an appointment with patient to measure height/weight.
You put a sticky note on treatment plan that height/weight need to be remea-
sured. You stop here and wait until height/weight are remeasured.
. . .
7. You get up-to-date height/weight
8. You confirm that the treatment plan is created from a careset. You confirm
existence of chemo orders for the patient.
9. You verify the doses:
(a) You confirm that height/weight on treatment plan, in CIS, and in the
patient chart all match.
(b) You take BSA from the patient record on CIS.
(c) You calculate doses using the BSA and the information form the treatment
plan.
(d) Confirm calculated doses match the ones on the chemo orders. You sign
the treatment plan.
10. You leave the treatment plan in Triage MAs tray.
A.2.3 Trace 3
1. You pick up the treatment plan and the orders that the Triage MA has left.
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2. You confirm that labs have been done.
3. You discover that a lab result is missing and the drugs are not platinum based.
4. You tell an MA to draw the labs next time the patient comes.
5. You find out that the patient does not have a scheduled appointment and you
tell the MA to schedule one.
6. You put a sticky note on the treatment plan to check for the labs before signing
the plan.
7. You confirm that the scans have been done.
8. You confirm the existence of patient height/weight data in the CIS.
9. You confirm that the patients height/weight are not stale (i.e more than 2 weeks
old).
10. You confirm that the treatment plan is created from a careset.
11. You confirm the existence of chemo orders for the patient but you find out that
they are missing.
12. You call the MD to enter the orders in the system.
13. You put a sticky note on the treatment plan to check for the orders.
14. You stop your work on the treatment plan for this patient and wait until the
MD enters the orders.
. . .
15. (in 2 days) You find out that the MD has entered the orders for that patient.
16. You confirm that the orders have been entered by an Attending. 18. You verify
the doses:
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(a) You confirm that the height/weight on treatment plan, in CIS, and in the
patient chart all match.
(b) You calculate the patients BSA using height/weight from CIS.
(c) You calculate doses using the BSA just calculated and the information
from the treatment plan.
(d) You confirm that the calculated doses match the ones on the chemo orders.
(e) You confirm that the dose base on treatment plan is consistent with the
doses on orders.
17. You check all sticky notes to make sure that everything is completed and you
confirm that the labs have been done.
18. You sign the treatment plan.
19. You leave the treatment plan in Triage MAs tray.
A.3 Complete Process Model (Textual Description)
1. Pick up treatment plan and the orders.
2. Confirm labs have been done
(a) If labs haven’t been done and the chemo drugs are not platinum-based
i. Tell MA to draw labs next time when patient comes. (keep tr. plan)
ii. If the patient does not have a scheduled appointment, either the MA
or the Practice RN schedules an appointment.
iii. Put a sticky note on the treatment plan to check for the labs before
signing it.
iv. Continue to 3 (if not done yet)
(b) If labs haven’t been done and some of the chemo drugs is platinum-based
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i. Tell MA to draw labs next time when patient comes.
ii. If the patient does not have a scheduled appointment, either the MA
or the Practice RN schedules an appointment.
iii. Stop here and wait for the labs before continuing with the rest of the
steps.
3. Confirm scans have been done
(a) If some of the scans haven’t been done
i. Obtain signed scans order from MD
ii. Give scans order to an MA (outtake MA, downstairs)
iii. MA schedules a separate appointment for the scans.
iv. Put a sticky note on treatment plan to check for scans before signing
v. Continue to 4
4. Confirm existence of patient’s height/weight data in CIS
(a) If patient height/weight are not entered in CIS but they have been mea-
sured in the building
i. Enter in CIS height/weight from patient chart
ii. Continue to 5
(b) If the patient’s height/weight haven’t been measured in the building
i. Option 1
• Schedule an appointment before teaching so that the patient’s
height/weight will get measured (whoever can reach the patient
will schedule it either Triage MA or Practice RN)
• Continue to 6
ii. Option 2
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• Indicate height/weight need to be measured during teaching (the
patient gets scheduled for teaching (but not chemo) and his/her
height/weight get measured then.)
• Put a sticky note on treatment plan to ensure height/weight re-
measured before signing
• Continue to 6
5. Confirm height/weight are not stale.
(a) If height/weight are stale
i. Tell clinic MA to schedule an appointment with patient.
ii. Put a sticky note on the treatment plan that height/weight need to
be remeasured
iii. Wait for height/weight to be remeasured
6. Confirm that treatment plan is created from careset.
(a) If treatment plan is not from a careset
i. Check if the doctor gave a reference to the primary literature in the
treatment plan.
ii. If there is no reference
• (Optionally) look on Google or Pubmed for reference.
• If there is no reference on Google or PubMed
– (Optionally) call the Pharmacy and then MD.
– Continue to 7.
• Continue to 7.
7. Confirm existence of chemotherapy orders for that patient in CIS.
(a) If there are no orders
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i. Call MD to enter the orders in the system
ii. Put a sticky note to check for orders
iii. Wait until orders are entered
8. If the orders are entered by a Fellow MD, confirm existence of an MD-to-RN
order in CIS saying that the Attending MD has approved the Fellow MD’s
orders.
(a) If there is no MD-to-RN order
i. E-mail both attending and fellow MDs.
ii. Put a sticky note on the treatment plan to ensure that MD-to-RN
order is entered before signing.
iii. Continue to 9.
9. Verify doses (make sure they are correct for the patient’s height/weight)
(a) Confirm height/weight on treatment plan, in CIS, and in the patient chart
all match
i. If they don’t match
• Contact MD and ask how to continue from that point on.
• Option 1
– Physician enters an order expressing awareness of the difference
in height/weight
– Continue to 9b
• Option 2
– Physician enters new orders with dose change
– Put a sticky note to check for orders
– Wait until a new order is entered
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– Continue to 9
(b) Calculate BSA using height/weight from CIS.
(c) Calculate doses using the BSA just calculated and the information from
the treatment plan.
(d) Confirm calculated doses match the ones on the chemo orders.
i. If there is more than 5% discrepancy
• Contact MD to resolve the discrepancy.
• Option 1
– MD says he/she will enter an MD-to-RN order that the current
dose is OK
– Continue to 9e
• Option 2
– MD enters new orders with dose change
– Put a sticky note to check for orders
– Wait for the new orders
– Continue to 9d
(e) Confirm dose base on treatment plan is consistent with doses on orders.
i. If the dose base is not consistent
• Contact MD to resolve the mismatch.
• Option 1
– MD enters new order with correct dose base.
– Wait until new order is entered
– Continue to 9e
• Option 2
– MD decides to keep the dose on the order
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– MD re-enters the treatment plan and the process starts over.
10. Check sticky notes and make sure that everything is done
(a) If something is still not done
i. Continue to 10.
11. Sign treatment plan. (All the pretesting needs to be completed at this point,
all issues with height and weight need to be resolved, and doses on the orders
need to be verified.)
12. Leave treatment plan in Triage MA’s tray.
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APPENDIX B
ARTIFACTS USED IN PROCESS REPRESENTATIONS
STUDY
B.1 Training Materials
B.1.1 Process Model—Diagram
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B.1.2 Process Model—Diagram, Training script
Training script for the diagrammatic notation 
 
 
 
In the Little-JIL diagrammatic notation, a process is described as a hierarchical 
decomposition of steps. A step represents an activity, or a unit of work that needs to be 
performed as a part of a process. Higher-level steps are decomposed into lower-level 
steps, which could be further decomposed to an arbitrary level of detail. A step is 
diagrammatically represented as a black bar (illustrate with an example). 
 
A step can be started and later completed. When a higher-level step is started, it cannot be 
completed until all or some of its substeps (depending on the step’s sequencing badge, 
explained next) are started and then completed themselves. 
 
The badge on the left side of the step bar (called sequencing badge) specifies the order in 
which the substeps need to be performed. An arrow means that the substeps need to be 
performed in left-to-right sequential order and all substeps need to be completed before 
the parent step can be completed. (Illustrate with an example: start parent, start substep 
1, complete substep 1, start substep 2, complete substep 2, complete parent). 
 
An equal sign means that the substeps can be performed in any order, including 
simultaneously, and all substeps need to be completed before the parent step can be 
completed. (Example: start parent, start substep 1, start substep 2, complete substep 1, 
start substep 3, etc). 
 
A circle with a horizontal line across means that one of the substeps need to be chosen to 
complete the parent step. If the chosen substep fails to complete successfully, then one of 
the remaining substeps can be chosen and this process can repeat until one of the substeps 
completes successfully. (Example: …) 
 
Steps can have prerequisites. A prerequisite is usually another step that needs to be 
completed before the step with the prerequisite can start. A prerequisite is represented 
diagrammatically with a filled triangle to the left of the step name and an annotation 
above that triangle explains what the prerequisite is. (Example) 
 
Steps can also have cardinality, where the cardinality of a step specifies how many times 
the step should be/can be done. The cardinality is shown as a symbol associated with the 
edge between the step and its parent. A “*” means that the step can be done 0 or more 
times; “+” means that the step can be done 1 or more times; “?” means that the step is 
optional, i.e. that it can be done 0 or 1 times. The default cardinality is 1, i.e., the step 
needs to be done exactly once. (Example) 
 
Steps can use and produce artifacts (also referred to as “parameters”). Artifacts represent 
objects that are required to perform some real-world activity or are produced as a result 
of performing a real-world activity. There are several kinds of artifacts: in-artifacts 
(represented by an arrow pointing to the left, example) are input parameters to the step 
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passed from the parent step and are required before the step can start. Out-artifacts 
(represented by an arrow pointing to the right, example) are output parameters of a step 
and are passed from the step to its parent when the step completes. In-out artifacts 
(represented by a bi-directional arrow, example) are both input and output parameters of a 
step. In-out artifacts are required before the step can start, can be modified during step 
execution, and are then passed to the parent step when the step completes. 
 
Steps can throw exceptions. Exceptions represent the occurrence of unusual or abnormal 
circumstances during process execution that might need to be dealt with outside of the 
normal flow of the process. If a step throws an exception, this is specified in the 
annotation associated with the step (example). Once an exception is thrown, it needs to be 
dealt with by an exception handler. The exception is propagated up the step tree until a 
matching exception handler is found (example). Exception handlers are connected to a 
red X on the right side of a step bar. An exception handler could be another regular step 
that needs to be performed in response to the exception, and once a matching exception 
handler is found, it is executed in response to the exception. 
 
Once an exception handler completes, the process can resume normal execution. Where 
the process starts from is determined by the continuation action associated with the 
handler. If the continuation action is “restart”(illustrated by a “restart” annotation on the 
edge that connects the exception handler to a parent step), then the parent step of the 
exception handler is restarted once that exception handler completes. If the continuation 
action is “complete” (illustrated by a “complete” annotation on the edge that connects the 
exception handler to a parent step), then the parent step of the exception handler is 
completed. 
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B.1.3 Process Model—Narrative
Table Of Contents
perform yellow
perform cyan
perform blue
perform maroon
perform white
handle exception P
perform orange
perform grey
perform black
perform purple
perform red
perform brown
perform pink
handle exception Q
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PERFORM YELLOW
1 of 1
193
Legend       Index of step names
Perform Yellow
   To "perform yellow", perform cyan and then perform purple (This step is optional.) .
Perform Cyan
   To "perform cyan", one of the following should be chosen to perform: perform blue or perform orange.
Perform Blue
   To "perform blue", perform maroon and then perform white.
Perform Maroon
E  If Exception P Occurs, then handle exception P and then restart "perform blue".
Perform White
Handle Exception P
Perform Orange
   To "perform orange", the following need to be done in any order (including simultaneously), perform
grey and perform black.
Perform Grey
  The artifact a is required to "perform grey".
  Successful completion of the step "perform grey" should yield the artifact c.
  The artrifact b is required to "perform grey" and may be modified during this step.
Perform Black
  Successful completion of the step "perform black" should yield the artifact a and artifact b.
Perform Purple
   To "perform purple", perform red, then perform brown (This step must be done at least once.) , and
finally perform pink (This step is optional.) .
Perform Red
   Before beginning to "perform red", the step "perform violet" must be completed successfully.
PERFORM YELLOW
1 of 2
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E  If Exception Q Occurs, then handle exception Q and then complete "perform purple".
Perform Brown
Perform Pink
Handle Exception Q
PERFORM YELLOW
2 of 2
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B.1.4 Process Model—Narrative, Training script
Training script for the narrative notation 
 
In the Little-JIL narrative notation, a process is described as a hierarchical decomposition 
of steps. A step represents an activity, or a unit of work that needs to be performed as a 
part of a process. Higher-level steps are decomposed into lower-level steps, which could 
be further decomposed to an arbitrary level of detail. The step decomposition is shown in 
the table of contents of the narrative (illustrate with an example). The highest-level step 
is listed on top. Its substeps are listed underneath, slightly indented to the right and are at 
the same level of indentation (example). The substeps of the substeps are listed in a 
similar way using indentation (example). Each step shown in the Table of Contents has a 
dedicated section on the right-hand side containing more detailed information about that 
step. (example) 
 
A step can be started and later completed. When a higher-level step is started, it cannot be 
completed until all or some of its substeps (depending on the step’s sequencing 
requirements, explained next) are started and then completed themselves. The order in 
which substeps need to be done is described on the right side of the narrative in the 
section describing the parent step (this section can be reached by clicking on the parent 
step in the Table of Contents) (example). 
 
Each step section starts with the name of the step in large-size, bold font (example). The 
substeps and the order in which they need to be started and completed are described by a 
sentence. There are several options for the order in which substeps need to be performed 
before the parent step can be completed. 
 
One option is that the substeps need to be started and completed in a sequential order and 
the parent step can be completed only when all of its substeps are completed. In this case, 
the sentence looks like this (example). In this case, the order of execution is (Illustrate 
with an example: start parent, start substep 1, complete substep 1, start substep 2, 
complete substep 2, complete parent). The arrow pointing to the right at the start of the 
sentence is an iconic representation that all the substeps need to be completed in the listed 
sequential order and this arrow is also shown in the table of contents. 
 
Another option for the order of substep execution is that the substeps can be performed in 
any order, including simultaneously, and all substeps need to be completed before the 
parent step can be completed. (Example: start parent, start substep 1, start substep 2, 
complete substep 1, start substep 3, etc). A sentence describing this situation looks like 
this (example). The equal sign represents this situation. 
 
Another option for the way substeps need to be executed is that one of the substeps needs 
to be chosen to complete the parent step. If the chosen substep fails to complete 
successfully, then one of the remaining substeps can be chosen and this process can 
repeat until one of the substeps completes successfully. (example). A sentence describing 
this situation looks like this (example). The circle with a horizontal line across represents 
this situation. 
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Clicking on the step names in the substep section would take you to the detailed 
description of the corresponding step. 
 
In addition to having a sentence describing the order in which substeps need to be 
performed, each step section has a sentence (at the end) describing what needs to be done 
next after the step itself is completed. For example, the sentence at the end of the section 
corresponding to the step “perform yellow” indicates that after successful completion of 
that step, the entire process is considered completed. This is consistent with the Table of 
Contents, where we can see that “perform yellow” is the top-level step. 
 
Similarly, looking at the end of the section for the step “perform white”, a sentence 
indicates that after “perform white” is completed, its parent, “perform blue” is completed. 
We can then click on “perform blue” and look at the sentence at the end of its section to 
determine what needs to be done after “perform blue” is completed. In this case, the step 
“perform orange” needs to be done next. 
 
A step section can contain other information related to a step. A step can have a 
prerequisite. A prerequisite is usually another step that needs to be completed before the 
step with the prerequisite can start. A prerequisite is represented diagrammatically with a 
filled triangle to the left of the step name and is expressed with a sentence like this. 
(example) 
 
Steps can also have cardinality, where the cardinality of a step specifies how many times 
the step should be/can be done. The number of times a step should be done is listed in the 
substep section of the parent step. For instance (example). The default number of times a 
step should be done is exactly once. A step can be done 0 or more times; 1 or more times 
(i.e. at least once); a step can be optional, i.e. that it can be done 0 or 1 times. 
 
Steps can use and produce artifacts (also referred to as “parameters”). Artifacts represent 
objects that are required to perform some real-world activity or are produced as a result 
of performing a real-world activity. There are several kinds of artifacts: in-artifacts are 
input parameters to the step passed from the parent step and are required before the step 
can start. In-artifacts are described with a sentence like (example) and are represented by 
an arrow pointing down. Out-artifacts are output parameters of a step and are passed from 
the step to its parent when the step completes. Out-artifacts are represented by a sentence 
like (example) and an arrow pointing up. In-out artifacts are both input and output 
parameters of a step. In-out artifacts are required before the step can start, can be 
modified during step execution, and are then passed to the parent step when the step 
completes. In-out artifacts are described by a sentence like (example) and are represented 
by a bi-directional arrow. 
 
Steps can throw exceptions. Exceptions represent the occurrence of unusual or abnormal 
circumstances during process execution that might need to be dealt with outside of the 
normal flow of the process. If a step throws an exception, this is specified by a sentence 
like (example) and the big red “E” denotes the section dedicated to exceptions. Once an 
exception is thrown, it needs to be dealt with by an exception handler. An exception 
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handler could be another regular step that needs to be performed in response to the 
exception (example). 
 
Once an exception handler completes, the process can resume normal execution. The 
sentence associated with the exception that a step throws specifies how the process 
should continue after the exception has been handled. For example, this sentence may 
specify that certain step is completed (example). In that case, we can click on the step that 
is completed, and then look towards the end of its section to see what needs to be done 
next. Alternatively, the table of contents can be examined to determine the parent of the 
completed step, click on that parent step and see what its description says about the step 
that needs to be started after the completed step. (example). 
 
In another case, the sentence associated with the exception might specify that a certain 
step needs to be restarted after the exception has been handled. (example). 
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B.2 Materials on which the study subjects were evaluated
B.2.1 Process Model 1—Diagram
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B.2.2 Process Model 1—Narrative
Table Of Contents
perform blue
perform yellow
perform pink
perform brown
perform white
perform red
perform violet
perform black
perform cyan
handle X
handle Y
perform green
perform azure
perform beige
perform orange
perform bronze
perform ruby
perform purple
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PERFORM BLUE
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Legend       Index of step names
Perform Blue
   To "perform blue", the following need to be done in the listed order
perform yellow
perform red
This step must be done at least once.
perform green
perform orange
Perform Yellow
   To "perform yellow", perform pink, then perform brown, and finally perform white.
Perform Pink
  Successful completion of the step "perform pink" should yield the artifact 2 and artifact 1.
Perform Brown
   Before beginning to "perform brown", the step "perform turquoise" must be completed successfully.
  Successful completion of the step "perform brown" should yield the artifact 3.
Perform White
  The artifact 3 is required to "perform white".
  Successful completion of the step "perform white" should yield the artifact 4.
  The artifact 2 and artifact 1 are required to "perform white" and may be modified during this step.
Perform Red
   To "perform red", perform violet, then perform black, and finally perform cyan.
Perform Violet
E  If Exception X Occurs, then handle X and then continue with the next step.
Perform Black
E  If Exception Y Occurs, then handle Y and then restart "perform red".
Perform Cyan
PERFORM BLUE
1 of 2
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Handle X
Handle Y
Perform Green
   To "perform green", one of the following should be chosen to perform: perform azure or perform
beige.
Perform Azure
Perform Beige
Perform Orange
   To "perform orange", the following need to be done in any order (including simultaneously), perform
bronze, perform ruby and perform purple.
Perform Bronze
Perform Ruby
Perform Purple
PERFORM BLUE
2 of 2
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B.2.3 Process Model 1—Questions
Participant ID: _________ 
Questions for process definition 1 
 
Answer the first six questions using the following steps (these are the lowest-level steps in the process 
description and are listed in alphabetical order here): 
• perform azure 
• perform beige 
• perform black 
• perform bronze 
• perform brown 
• perform cyan 
• perform pink 
• perform purple 
• perform ruby 
• perform turquoise 
• perform violet 
• perform white 
 
For some of the answers, you might need to provide a sequence, or several sequences, of steps. List the 
steps in a sequence on the same line, separating consecutive steps by commas. If an answer consists of 
more than one sequence, write “#” at the end of every sequence and list different sequences on separate 
lines. For instance, if there are two possible sequences, list them in the following way: 
perform violet, perform cyan, perform beige # 
perform violet, perform beige, perform violet, perform bronze # 
 
1. What step will be completed first? (Remember to answer questions 1-6 using only steps from the 
bulleted list above). 
  
2. What are the possible sequences of the next 3 completed steps (i.e., sequences of the second, third 
and fourth completed steps in the process)? 
 
3. Suppose the step “perform orange” has been started. What are the possible sequences of the next 
3 completed steps? 
 
4. Suppose the step “perform green” has been started. What are the possible sequences of the next 2 
started steps? 
 
5. Suppose that after the step “perform violet” has been started, the exception X occurs and that this 
exception is handled by completing step “handle X”. What step should be started next? 
 
6. Suppose after the step “perform black” has been started, the exception Y occurs and that this 
exception is handled by completing step “handle Y”. What step should be started next? 
 
7. How many times should the step “perform yellow” be completed? How many times should the 
step “perform red” be completed? 
 
8. What artifacts are required to start step “perform white”? 
 
9. What artifacts are required to start step “perform brown”? 
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B.2.4 Process Model 2—Diagram
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B.2.5 Process Model 2—Narrative
Table Of Contents
perform maroon
perform khaki
perform indigo
perform grey
perform gold
handle X
handle Y
perform magenta
perform ecru
perform denim
perform ivory
perform aqua
perform rose
perform platinum
perform scarlet
perform teal
perform auburn
perform cobalt
TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR PERFORM MAROON
1 of 1
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Legend       Index of step names
Perform Maroon
   To "perform maroon", the following need to be done in the listed order
perform khaki
This step must be done at least once.
perform magenta
perform ivory
perform scarlet
Perform Khaki
   To "perform khaki", perform indigo, then perform grey, and finally perform gold.
Perform Indigo
Perform Grey
E  If Exception X Occurs, then handle X and then continue with the next step.
Perform Gold
E  If Exception Y Occurs, then handle Y and then restart "perform khaki".
Handle X
Handle Y
Perform Magenta
   To "perform magenta", one of the following should be chosen to perform: perform ecru or perform
denim.
Perform Ecru
Perform Denim
Perform Ivory
   To "perform ivory", perform aqua, then perform rose, and finally perform platinum.
Perform Aqua
  Successful completion of the step "perform aqua" should yield the artifact 1.
Perform Rose
PERFORM MAROON
1 of 2
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   Before beginning to "perform rose", the step "perform vanilla" must be completed successfully.
  The artifact 1 is required to "perform rose".
  Successful completion of the step "perform rose" should yield the artifact 2 and artifact 3.
Perform Platinum
  The artifact 3 is required to "perform platinum".
  Successful completion of the step "perform platinum" should yield the artifact 4.
  The artifact 2 and artifact 1 are required to "perform platinum" and may be modified during this step.
Perform Scarlet
   To "perform scarlet", the following need to be done in any order (including simultaneously), perform
teal, perform auburn and perform cobalt.
Perform Teal
Perform Auburn
Perform Cobalt
PERFORM MAROON
2 of 2
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B.2.6 Process Model 2—Questions
Participant ID: _________ 
Questions for process definition 2 
 
Answer the first six questions using the following steps (these are the lowest-level steps in the process 
description and are listed in alphabetical order here): 
• perform aqua 
• perform auburn 
• perform cobalt 
• perform denim 
• perform ecru 
• perform gold 
• perform grey 
• perform indigo 
• perform platinum 
• perform rose 
• perform teal 
• perform vanilla 
 
For some of the answers, you might need to provide a sequence, or several sequences, of steps. List the 
steps in a sequence on the same line, separating consecutive steps by commas. If an answer consists of 
more than one sequence, write “#” at the end of every sequence and list different sequences on separate 
lines. For instance, if there are two possible sequences, list them in the following way: 
perform teal, perform gold, perform auburn # 
perform teal, perform auburn, perform teal, perform grey # 
 
1. What step will be completed first? (Remember to answer questions 1-6 using only steps from the 
bulleted list above). 
 
2. Suppose that step “perform ivory” has been started. What are the possible sequences of the next 3 
completed steps? 
 
3. Suppose the step “perform scarlet” has been started. What are the possible sequences of the next 
3 completed steps? 
 
4. Suppose the step “perform magenta” has been started. What are the possible sequences of the 
next 2 started steps? 
 
5. Suppose that after the step “perform grey” has been started, the exception X occurs and that this 
exception is handled by completing step “handle X”. What step should be started next? 
 
6. Suppose after the step “perform gold” has been started, the exception Y occurs and that this 
exception is handled by completing step “handle Y”. What step should be started next? 
 
7. How many times should the step “perform scarlet” be completed? How many times should the 
step “perform ivory” be completed? 
 
8. What artifacts are required to start step “perform platinum”? 
 
9. What artifacts are required to start step “perform aqua”? 
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B.2.7 Final Questions
Participant ID: _________ 
1. Which notation was easier to understand, the diagrams or the narrative presentation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What information (e.g., the order of performing steps, the number of times a step needs to be 
performed, the artifacts used and produced by a step, what to do in exceptional situations, and/or 
something else that you would like to point out) was easier to understand with the 
narrative presentation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What information was easier to understand with the diagrams? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Do you have any other comments about the notations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. How much computer programming experience do you have? (E.g., none, some number of 
programming courses, worked as a programmer, programming as a hobby). 
 
 
 
 
6. What is your major? 
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APPENDIX C
LOW-LEVEL PROCESS MODEL REPRESENTATION
To make the implementation of the deviation detection experimental framework
independent of a particular process modeling language, we used a low-level process
model representation into which various high-level process modeling languages can
be translated. For our experimental evaluation, we used the Little-JIL translation
toolset [29] to translate Little-JIL models into this low-level representation. The
process model translation is performed in two stages (Figure C.1). In the first stage,
the Little-JIL Translator translates a Little-JIL process model into an intermediate
process model written in the Bandera Intermediate Representation (BIR) [43]. In the
second stage, the BIR Translator translates the intermediate process model into a
low-level process model written into a low-level representation (trace flow graph and
constraints [55]). The details of the process model translation are outside the scope
of this work and are described in [29]. In this chapter, we provide an overview and
selected details of the low-level representation to give a sense of the models that the
deviation detection experimental framework is currently utilizing, to illustrate some of
the issues we encountered, and explain some of the optimizations we implemented to
address these issues. We also discuss the correspondence between this representation
and the abstract ECFG notation used for discussion purposes in Chapter 4.
C.1 Trace flow graph and constraints
The low-level process model consists of a trace flow graph (TFG) and a set of
constraints [55]. A trace flow graph is a collection of control flow graphs (CFGs),
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Figure C.1: The stages of translating a Little-JIL process model into a low-level process model.
where each CFG is called a task and it represents a subprocess or an activity that
could potentially be concurrently executed with other subprocesses and/or activities.
Figure C.2 shows a TFG derived from the Little-JIL model of a simplified final stage
of a chemotherapy process shown in Figure C.3. Each TFG has a main task, which is
the CFG where control starts. The main task can fork additional tasks to represent
concurrent execution. In the example TFG in Figure C.2, there are two additional
tasks, TASK 1 and TASK 2, which represent the Little-JIL substeps from Figure C.3
prepare chemo drugs and administer pre-meds. These steps can be executed in any
order with each other—after the clinic nurse orders the chemo drugs from pharmacy,
the clinic nurse can administer the pre-medications to the patient while the pharmacy
is preparing the chemo drugs.
A TFG is a single-entry single-exit graph, meaning that there is a single start node,
at which control starts, and a single end node, at which control ends. Each TFG node
has a unique identifier, shown in Figure C.3 as an integer next to the corresponding
node. For TFGs derived from Little-JIL process models, nodes correspond to different
aspects of the execution of the Little-JIL process model. For example, some nodes
correspond to starting of a Little-JIL step, some correspond to completing of a Little-
JIL step, some correspond to forking a task, etc. Nodes are labeled with events
based on this correspondence. For instance, node 2 in Figure C.2 corresponds to
starting the root step perform final stages of chemo process in Figure C.3 and it is
labelled accordingly; node 7 represents the forking of the task 2, which is the task that
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Figure C.2: Trace flow graph derived from the Little-JIL model in Figure C.3.
represents the step administer pre-meds, which can be done in parallel with the step
prepare chemo drugs1. The set of node labels in a TFG forms the TFG’s alphabet.
There is an edge from node A to node B if the process event (such as starting
of a step) that node A represents can immediately precede the process event node B
represents. There are two kinds of edges in a TFG: an intra-task edge (shown as solid
arrows) connects nodes within a single task; may immediately precede edge (MIP)
1To keep the TFG in Figure C.2 relatively small and simple, we elided TFG nodes that correspond
to the posting of a Little-JIL step on the agenda of the agent responsible for that step (posting a
step represents assigning that step to an agent).
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Figure C.3: Little-JIL model of a simplified final stage of a chemotherapy process.
(shown as a dashed line) connects nodes in different tasks. MIP edges represent
possible interleavings between nodes in different tasks. A sequence of nodes (a path)
from the start node represents a process execution.
A TFG, like most CFG-based models that preserve all possible process executions
but abstract away some information (e.g., variable values) for the sake of compactness
of the model, is an over-approximation of the executions specified in the high-level
model it is translated from (in our case, the Little-JIL process model). This means
that a TFG might allow paths from the start node that correspond to sequences of
steps not allowed by the original high-level model.
To improve the precision of a TFG and eliminate such infeasible paths, the TFG
is augmented with a set of constraints. A constraint is used to selectively add back
information that was abstracted away from the TFG during the translation of the
original high-level model, without making the size of the low-level model (i.e., the TFG
and the constraints) prohibitively large. For example, constraints are used to ensure
that the control flow within a single task is properly followed as the introduction of
MIP edges could allow certain paths to skip a node that should not be skipped or
allow a node to be traversed multiple times, when it should not be. Such constraints
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are called task automata. Constraints are also used to represent other concurrency
semantics, such as a task in the TFG cannot start before it has been forked from its
parent task, and to represent boolean variables that capture the information whether
an exception has been thrown during a process execution.
Constraints are expressed as finite state machines (FSMs) whose alphabets consist
of TFG node identifiers. Figure C.4 shows the task automaton corresponding to Task
1 from the TFG in Figure C.2. The alphabet of that task automaton are the identifiers
of all nodes in Task 1 in the TFG, and the identifiers of the start and the end nodes.
The initial sate of that automaton (state 0) is marked with an arrow without a source
node. Transitions on labels from the alphabet of the task automaton that are not
shown go to the violation state by default. As a path from the start node of the TFG
is being followed (representing a process execution in progress), the task automaton
in Figure C.2 is updated based on the visited nodes. Suppose that during a given
TFG traversal, the following path of TFG nodes is taken: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 19, 17.
Once node 1 in the TFG has been visited, the task automaton transitions from state
0 to state 1. When nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are visited, the task automaton stays in
state 1 as these node identifiers are not in the alphabet of the task automaton and
do not affect it. After node 15 of the TFG is visited, the constraint transitions to
state 2 and stays in that state after node 19 is visited. When node 17 is visited, the
constraint enters the violation state. This means that the path through the TFG is
not feasible, which is indeed the case, as node 17 from Task 1 was visited before its
predecessor, node 16, was visited—this violates the control flow of Task 1.
If any of the constraint FSMs associated with a TFG enters its violation state
(i.e., a non-accepting state all of whose outgoing transitions are self-loops) during a
traversal of the TFG, the path is considered infeasible. Only paths from the start
node of the TFG that do not violate any constraints are considered feasible.
214
Figure C.4: The task automaton constraint for Task 1 of the TFG in Figure C.2.
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C.1.1 Trace Flow Graph Traversal
Several of the components of the deviation detection experimental framework
(Figure 4.4) presented in section 4.2 rely on a traversal of a trace flow graph derived
from a high-level process model. To generate a sequence of steps, the Sequence
Generator performs a walk from the start node of the TFG, using the Sequence
Specifications to decide what node to visit at each step of the walk and when to stop
the walk. During that walk, the Sequence Generator updates the constraint FSMs
accompanying the TFG and ensures that none of the constraints is violated as the
walk advances. Thus, the Sequence Generator performs a walk through the space
determined by the cross product of the set of TFG nodes and the set of states of each
constraint. We refer to this space as node-tuple space, where each position of a tuple
is occupied by a state of a constraint FSM.
During the TFG traversal, the Sequence Generator keeps track of the labels of
the visited nodes. The generated sequence is the sequence of labels of the visited
nodes where only relevant labels are kept. Relevant labels are provided as part of
the Sequence Specifications. Any subset of the TFG node labels can be chosen to
be the relevant labels; relevant labels are usually determined by what process exe-
cution events are of interest and/or are captured by the Process Execution Monitor.
For example, suppose that the process execution events of interest from the process
modeled by the Little-JIL diagram in Figure C.3 are the starting of the leaf steps2.
This would result in the following set of relevant labels of nodes from the TFG in
Figure C.2: {order chemo drugs from pharmacy STARTED, prepare chemo drugs
STARTED, administer pre-meds STARTED, administer chemo drugs STARTED}.
Suppose the Sequence Generator visits the following nodes on a TFG traversal: 0, 1,
2In Little-JIL, the leaf steps are the ones that agents perform and are thus most likely the steps
to be captured by the Process Execution Monitor. Non-leaf steps are used primarily to provide
abstraction and to specify control flow among leaf steps in a Little-JIL process model.
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2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23. This would
result in a sequence of 24 labels (corresponding to the above sequence of nodes), but
since only the labels of nodes 3, 16, 20, and 11 are relevant, the final generated se-
quence will be: order chemo drugs from pharmacy STARTED, prepare chemo drugs
STARTED, administer pre-meds STARTED, administer chemo drugs STARTED. To
keep the discussion at a higher level, in Chapter 4 the low-level process representation
(i.e., the TFG and constraints) is not introduced and we refer to such a sequence of
labels as a sequence of steps.
The Deviation Detector also relies on a traversal of the TFG (more precisely, a
traversal of node-tuple space). The Deviation Detector takes as input a sequence of la-
bels, the set of relevant labels, and the low-level process model (TFG and constraints),
and then determines whether the given sequence is a legal sequence through the given
model. To accomplish that, the Deviation Detector performs a guided breadth-first
exploration of the node-tuple space determined by the TFG and the constraints. The
deviation detector begins with the node-tuple consisting of the TFG’s start node and
the tuple containing the initial states of all constraint FSMs. The deviation detector
then follows all paths from the start node-tuple, discarding paths that violate some
of the constraints or paths whose sequence of labels (i.e., the sequence of labels of the
nodes on the path) is not the same as the given sequence of labels3. If all paths are
discarded before the Deviation Detector finds a path whose sequence of labels is the
same as the given sequence of labels, a deviation is detected.
For efficiency, the Deviation Detector explores node-tuple space incrementally—
beginning from the TFG start node, the Deviation Detector first tries to find paths
to nodes whose label is the same as the first label in the given sequence of labels.
If it finds paths to such nodes, the Deviation Detector places these nodes (and their
3Similar to the Sequence Generator, the deviation detector ignores node labels that are not
relevant during the breadth-first traversal.
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corresponding tuples) on a frontier4 (we refer to such node-tuples, i.e., node-tuples
where the node’s label is relevant, as relevant node tuples and to the node itself as a
relevant node). Then, starting from the nodes on the frontier, the Deviation Detector
looks for paths to other relevant nodes with a label that is the same as the second
label in the given sequence of labels, and places such nodes on the frontier. The
Deviation Detection continues this exploration until it either reaches the end of the
given sequence of labels (in this case, the sequence of labels is a legal sequence through
the TFG) or until the frontier is empty before the end of the given sequence of labels
is reached, meaning that the given sequence of labels is not a legal sequence through
the TFG, and therefore a deviation is detected.
C.2 Issues and Optimizations
This section presents some of the issues associated with using the low-level process
model representation and some optimization we performed to tackle these issues.
C.2.1 Construction of Low-level Process Model
We ran into several issues related to the construction of the low-level process
model. As previously discussed, important real-world HIPs, such as medical processes,
often encompass complex behaviors, such as concurrent execution and the handling of
various exceptional situations. To adequately represent real-world HIPs and thus be
useful for process guidance, models of HIPs need to capture such complex behaviors.
This results in large and intricate process models. For example, the Little-JIL model
of a blood transfusion process we used in our studies contained 220 Little-JIL steps
(including 102 leaf steps) and captured 63 exception handling situations.
4A TFG node can have multiple corresponding tuples, because there could be different paths
through the TFG leading to the same node, where each path changes the states of the constraints
differently.
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The corresponding low-level process models are even larger as a high-level con-
struct, such as a Little-JIL step, is translated into multiple low-level constructs, such
as TFG nodes and edges and states and transitions of FSM constraints associated
with the TFG. For instance, the very simple Little-JIL process model in Figure C.3,
which has 6 steps, is translated into a TFG with more than 24 nodes and close to
100 edges5. When a high-level process model is larger and more complex (e..g, it
contains exception handling, other more complex control flow (such as Little-JIL try
and choice steps), and artifacts), than the one in Figure C.3, then the explosion of
the size of the low-level model with respect to the size of the high-level model from
which it was derived is more severe. This could result in low-level process models
that are too large for their construction to be practical. For example, when we tried
to construct the low-level process models corresponding to the Little-JIL models of
the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes we studied, the translation did
not finish in more than several days and eventually the Java Virtual Machine (the
translation is implemented in Java) ran out of heap memory.
In previous work on applying model checking to low-level process models derived
from high-level Little-JIL models [29], the explosion of the size of the low-level process
model was tackled by not constructing parts of the model that are not relevant to
the property of interest. Since in this work the properties of interest contained a
small number of events (usually fewer than 5) that correspond to a small number of
steps in the Little-JIL process model, most of the steps in the process model were not
relevant to the property of interest resulting in a significant reduction of the size of
the low-level process model.
For the purposes for deviation detection, however, most of the steps in the process
model are relevant, because process performers could potentially perform any of the
5As previously discussed, not all nodes and edges of the TFG in Figure C.2 are shown to reduce
visual clutter.
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executions allowed by the process model. Thus, applying the above optimization
did not result in a significant reduction of the size of the low-level process models
needed for deviation detection. We applied a similar optimization, called alphabet
refinement, where we specified certain TFG node labels from the TFG alphabet as
irrelevant (e.g., labels that represent the posting of a Little-JIL step or labels that
represent some action on an artifact) and removed nodes with such labels from the
TFG. This did not result in a significant reduction of the size of the low-level process
model, however, as many nodes with irrelevant labels need to be kept in the TFG to
conserve paths that represent feasible process executions.
Given that to support deviation detection it is necessary to keep most of the low-
level process model, we tackle the problem of feasibly constructing the low-level model
by not explicitly constructing parts of that model and storing them only implicitly.
In particular, we identified two parts of the model that are expensive to compute and
too large to store—MIP edges and certain task automata constraints.
MIP edges represent possible interleavings between nodes in tasks that can happen
in parallel. Thus, there could be a large number of MIP edges between parallel tasks
and the number of MIP edges could potentially be quadratic in the number of nodes
in these tasks. We modified the translation from Little-JIL to TFG to not explicitly
compute and store MIP edges. Instead, the deviation detection experimental frame-
work provides a routine to compute MIP edges at run-time and on-demand. The
Sequence Generator and the Deviation Detector use that routine when they traverse
the TFG.
Task automata constraints, as previously described, accompany a TFG to ensure
that the control flow within a single task is not violated during a traversal of the TFG.
TFGs derived from large and realistic process models can have large tasks, which in
turn can have very large corresponding task automata. In fact, when creating the
low-level models for the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes, we ran into
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a similar problem as with the MIP edges—some task automata were too expensive
to compute and also eventually caused the translator to run out of heap memory.
To tackle this problem, we modified the translation from Little-JIL to the low-level
process model to not explicitly compute and store all transitions in a task automaton.
Instead, we associated rules with each task automaton that the deviation detection
framework uses at run-time to compute task automata transitions on demand.
Before we applied the optimizations for implicit MIP edges and task automata
transitions, we were not able to construct the low-level models for the Little-JIL
models of the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes. After these optimiza-
tions, we could construct the low-level models in less than 20 minutes each (for the
construction of the low-level model we used a MacBook laptop with 2.4 GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo processor, running Java with 2.5 GB maximum heap size). The low-level
models for the blood transfusion and chemotherapy processes were 328 MB and 19
MB respectively.
C.2.2 Traversal of Low-level Process Model
The optimizations discussed above help with the construction of the low-level
process model by making parts of it implicit and not constructing these parts. These
optimizations, however, do not reduce the size of the model at runtime (i.e., while the
model is being traversed), resulting in a large search space that needs to be explored.
The size of that search space becomes a serious problem for the Deviation Detector,
which, beginning from the TFG’s start node, needs to keep track of all paths whose
sequence of relevant labels6 is the same as the given sequence of labels. As discussed
in section C.1.1, the Deviation Detector traverses the node-tuple space incrementally,
6A path (i.e., a sequence of nodes) through the TFG has a corresponding sequence of labels,
which are the labels of the nodes on the path. If we delete from that sequence all the labels that
are not relevant (as previously discussed, the relevant labels are given as input to the Deviation
Detector), we are left with what we call the relevant sequence of labels of the path.
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beginning from the TFG start node-tuple, first finding all relevant node-tuples whose
node label is the same as the first label in the given sequence of labels, then from
these node-tuples finding all node-tuples whose node label is the same as the second
label in the given sequence, and so on. This exploration of node-tuple space could
be quite expensive, however, as there could be multiple paths between two relevant
nodes in the TFG and there could be multiple nodes with the same label, resulting
in a large number of paths.
There could be multiple TFG nodes with the same label, because the same step
could occur in different parts of a process and it will have different corresponding TFG
nodes to represent it. There could be multiple paths between two relevant nodes, be-
cause one could potentially be reachable from the other on a different sequence of
irrelevant nodes in between. For example, consider the TFG in Figure C.2 and the
set of relevant labels we used in the discussion before: {order chemo drugs from phar-
macy STARTED, prepare chemo drugs STARTED, administer pre-meds STARTED,
administer chemo drugs STARTED}. To reach relevant node 16 from relevant node
3, for example, at least three different paths can be taken: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16; 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 19, 15, 16; and 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19, 20, 15, 16. Each of these paths would
also result in a different node-tuple that would need to be placed on the frontier that
the Deviation Detector is maintaining and each such node-tuple would need to be
explored.
To reduce the number of paths between two relevant nodes that the Deviation
Detector needs to explore, we take advantage of domain knowledge. In particular,
we identify situations in processes (if such situations exist) where two or more sub-
processes can happen in any order with each other, but not in parallel, meaning that
steps in different subprocesses cannot be interleaved (we call such subprocesses shuf-
fled subprocesses). In such situations, we add additional constraints to the low-level
process model to eliminate paths that interleave steps of different shuffled subpro-
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cesses. For example, such constraints can be added for the low-level model of the
simplified blood transfusion process in Figure 4.2 where check blood product expira-
tion date and check blood product info matches patient info can happen in any order
with each other, but not in parallel. Such constraints cannot be added to the low-
level model of the simplified chemotherapy process in Figure C.3, however, because
prepare chemo drugs and administer pre-meds can happen in any order, including in
parallel.
Another optimization we performed is related to speeding up the finding of relevant
nodes from a given node in the TFG. As the TFG is traversed, every time a successor
node is obtained, it needs to be checked that all TFG constraints are not violated.
Given that the number of constraints for the low-level model of realistic high-level
process models could be large, this check could be expensive. Furthermore, this check
is performed many times during the traversal of a TFG. To speed this check up, we
precomputed which constraints are affected when visiting a TFG node. Given that
most TFG nodes affect only a small number of constraints, this optimization resulted
in a significant speed-up of the check of whether any TFG constraint is violated upon
visiting a node.
C.3 Correspondence between TFG with constraints and ECFG
The ECFG process model representation used in Chapter 4 is a simplified repre-
sentation that is introduced to keep the discussion in that chapter at a high level.
The ECFG representation is less expressive than the Little-JIL representation and
the Little-JIL’s corresponding low-level representation—the TFG with constraints.
In this section, we discuss the correspondence of the ECFG representation to the
TFG with constraints representation.
The ECFG nodes are a subset of the TFG nodes. In particular, the ECFG nodes
are the nodes of interest, the relevant nodes, from the TFG. These nodes of interest
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consist of nodes that correspond to events captured by the Process Execution Monitor
(e.g., starting of a process step) and nodes that represent the forking and joining of
concurrent tasks. TFG nodes that represent forking and joining of tasks correspond
to fork and join nodes in the ECFG, respectively.
There is an edge from node A to node B in the ECFG if A and B are in the
same CFG (task) in the TFG and there is a path from node A to node B that does
not violate any of the TFG constraints (i.e., there is a feasible path from A to B).
MIP edges from the TFG are not explicitly represented in the ECFG; the possible
interleavings of nodes from different CFGs in the TFG is captured by the fork/join
semantics of the ECFG.
Unlike the TFG, the ECFG does not have any accompanying constraints. Thus,
any path from a start node of the ECFG is considered feasible.
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